An insider's view of the U.S. government's response to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, recounted by the people who made the key decisions In 2008, the world's financial system stood on the brink of disaster. The United States faced an unprecedented crisis when the investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a global panic. Faced with the prospect of a new Great Depression, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and other agencies took extraordinary measures to contain the damage and steady the financial system and the economy. Edited by three of the policymakers who led the government's response to the crisis, with chapters written by the teams tasked with finding policy solutions, this book provides a comprehensive accounting of the internal debates and controversies surrounding the measures that were taken to stabilize the financial system and the economy. Offering previously untold insight into the key choices (including rejected options) and a frank evaluation of successes and failures, this volume is both an important historical document and an indispensable guide for confronting future financial calamities.

We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management share ownership encourages higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems--those with low market-to-book ratios and low management stock ownership. We also find that management stock options change the composition of payouts. We find a strong negative relationship between dividends and management stock options, as predicted by Lambert, Lannen, and Larcker (1989), and a positive relatinship between repurchases and management stock options. Our results suggest that the growth in stock options may help to explain the rise in repurchases at the expense of dividends.