In the 1980s and 1990s, Nicolas Jabko suggests, the character of European integration altered radically, from slow growth to what he terms a "quiet revolution." In Playing the Market, he traces the political strategy that underlay the move from the Single Market of 1986 through the official creation of the European Union in 1992 to the coming of the euro in 1999. The official, shared language of the political forces behind this revolution was that of market reforms yet, as Jabko notes, this was a very strange "market" revolution, one that saw the building of massive new public institutions designed to regulate economic activity, such as the Economic and Monetary Union, and deeper liberalization in economic areas unaffected by external pressure than in truly internationalized sectors of the European economy.

What held together this remarkably diverse reform movement? Precisely because "the market" wasn't a single standard, the agenda of market reforms gained the support of a vast and heterogenous coalition. The "market" was in fact a broad palette of ideas to which different actors could appeal under different circumstances. It variously stood for a constraint on government regulations, a norm by which economic activities were (or should be) governed, a space for the active pursuit of economic growth, an excuse to discipline government policies, and a beacon for new public powers and rule-making. In chapters on financial reform, the provision of collective services, regional development and social policy, and economic and monetary union, Jabko traces how a coalition of strange bedfellows mobilized a variety of market ideas to integrate Europe."

In the 1980s and 1990s, Nicolas Jabko suggests, the character of European integration altered radically, from slow growth to what he terms a "quiet revolution." In Playing the Market, he traces the political strategy that underlay the move from the Single Market of 1986 through the official creation of the European Union in 1992 to the coming of the euro in 1999. The official, shared language of the political forces behind this revolution was that of market reforms yet, as Jabko notes, this was a very strange "market" revolution, one that saw the building of massive new public institutions designed to regulate economic activity, such as the Economic and Monetary Union, and deeper liberalization in economic areas unaffected by external pressure than in truly internationalized sectors of the European economy.

What held together this remarkably diverse reform movement? Precisely because "the market" wasn't a single standard, the agenda of market reforms gained the support of a vast and heterogenous coalition. The "market" was in fact a broad palette of ideas to which different actors could appeal under different circumstances. It variously stood for a constraint on government regulations, a norm by which economic activities were (or should be) governed, a space for the active pursuit of economic growth, an excuse to discipline government policies, and a beacon for new public powers and rule-making. In chapters on financial reform, the provision of collective services, regional development and social policy, and economic and monetary union, Jabko traces how a coalition of strange bedfellows mobilized a variety of market ideas to integrate Europe."

Twenty-first-century Europeans are suddenly confronting new choices about their place in the world. The most immediate challenges reflect tensions in the transatlantic partnership - long the keystone of European worldviews. In the Iraqi conflict President Bush posed a blunt general question to the world: 'Are you with us or against us?', and much of Europe chose the latter. More than at any time since 1945, Europeans are uncertain about the future of transatlantic cooperation. Internal European developments combine with this external shift to create the impression of a continental turning point. The fifty-year project of the European Union is entering a new phase. The Single Market program and monetary union realized the most ambitious visions of the EU's founding fathers. Most thinking about further integration is exceedingly vague. Simultaneous EU enlargement to the east (and beyond to Turkey) may create opportunities to reopen the Union's basic bargains. This book proposes to help students and scholars understand the many trends of change that have brought Europe to these crossroads. Its approach is novel in two ways. First, most similar scholarship either seeks a single grand theory of European change or implies that European politics is too complex to map change broadly. This book takes a middle-ground position, positing several distinct mechanisms of change and tracing them across policies and institutional settings. Second, it uses the United States as a reference point to chart European change. The aim is not comparative - the focus remains on Europe - but the volume maps out EU trends against American policy positions and institutional patterns, thus providing a useful comparative anchor for complex patterns. This is the seventh volume in the biennial series State of the European Union, launched in 1991, and produced under the auspices of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA).

New volume in the highly influential State of the European Union series, produced under the auspices of the European Union Studies AssociationMajor new analysis of the future of the EU, mapping European trends against American policies and institutionsKey consideration of the two pillars of postwar Europe - transatlantic partnership and European integration - as they each enter new phases