Looking at a variety of armament sectors, the book examines how Artificial Intelligence (AI) impacts the fields of armament and arms control, how existing arms control measures will be affected by AI, and what new approaches based on AI have been or are currently developed. The significant increase in computing power, the increasing reliance on software, and the advent of (narrow) AI and deep-learning algorithms all have the potential to lead to disruptive changes for military operations and warfare, rendering many classical arms control instruments less effective, or even useless. On the other hand, AI might lead to completely new arms control approaches, raising the effectiveness and reliability of new verification measures. To provide a common understanding, the book starts by presenting a general introduction to the state of the art in artificial intelligence and arms control, and how the two topics are interrelated. The second part of the book looks at examples from various fields of weapon technology, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional armament, and emerging technologies. The final section offers a cross-cutting perspective based on the examples presented in the second part. This volume will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, as well as policy-makers and practitioners interested in a better understanding of peace and security studies in general, and armament and arms control in particular with a strong focus on AI.

It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general. This edited book offers a broad examination of how democratic preferences and norms are relevant to security policy beyond the decision of whether to go to war. It therefore offers a fresh understanding of state behaviour in the security realm. The contributors discuss such issues as defence policy, air war, cluster bombs, non-lethal weapons, weapons of mass destruction, democratic and non-democratic nuclear weapon states' transparency, and the political and ideological background of the ongoing 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general.

It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general. This edited book offers a broad examination of how democratic preferences and norms are relevant to security policy beyond the decision of whether to go to war. It therefore offers a fresh understanding of state behaviour in the security realm. The contributors discuss such issues as defence policy, air war, cluster bombs, non-lethal weapons, weapons of mass destruction, democratic and non-democratic nuclear weapon states' transparency, and the political and ideological background of the ongoing 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general.

Democratic peace theory - the argument that democracies very rarely go to war with each other - has come under attack recently for being too naive and for neglecting the vast amount of wars fought by democracies, especially since the end of the Cold War. This volume offers a fresh perspective by arguing that the same norms that are responsible for the democratic peace can be argued to be responsible for democratic war-proneness. The authors show that democratic norms, which are usually understood to cause peaceful behaviour, are heavily contested when dealing with a non-democratic other. The book thus integrates democratic peace and democratic war into one consistent theoretical perspective, emphasising the impact of national identity. The book concludes by arguing that all democracies have a 'weak spot' where they would be willing to engage militarily.