How did Greece, with less than 3% of the population of the European Union, become the epicenter of Europe's "existential crisis?" Why did Greece opt for an obligation-laden bailout rather default or leave the Eurozone, as many said it should? Could it have avoided the disappointments that followed, including needing a second bailout, holding repeat elections, and swearing in its fourth prime minister in a year? The conventional narrative answered these questions by viewing the Greek crisis as the result of a "flawed currency union." Many economists, moreover, thought Greece was foolish to seek a bailout rather than renege on its debts or leave the Eurozone. And as the crisis deepened, economists again blamed the international community for pushing "austerity" onto Greece. Beyond Debt offers a different account of this crisis. It sees it, first and foremost, as a Greek crisis, best understood through the lens of Greek history, politics and economics. The crisis was triggered by global events, but it was not caused by them. As the book shows, Greece's chosen path-a bailout-made infinitely more sense than either a default or the abandonment of the common currency that many economists called for. And while others see "austerity" as the problem for Greece's woes after the bailout, Beyond Debt blames instead an indecisive government that could not see reform through to the end.

In July 2018, CSIS embarked on a major analytical assessment that centered on the following research question: What will be the strategic consequences for the United States by 2050 if America's two near-peer military competitors, China and Russia, continue to develop their long-term economic and security interests in the Arctic, but the United States does not? Russia's growing economic and military ambitions in the Arctic, as well as China's increased physical presence in the region, underscore that both nations have long-term strategic designs for the Arctic region. Data analysis, satellite imagery, and scenario development all demonstrate the continued growth of Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic and heighten the sense of stasis in the U.S. military and economic presence. Unless the United States wishes to lose access to portions of the Arctic and have increasingly diminished capabilities to defend and deter attack against the homeland, the United States must return to the Arctic.