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This book examines how governments around the world responded to
the health emergency created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Before
vaccines became available, non-medical interventions were the main
means to protect the public. Non-medical interventions were put in
place by governments as public health policies. In every nation,
politicians and governments faced a choice situation, and
worldwide, they made different choices. Public health policies came
at a price, in economic, social, and ultimately electoral costs to
the political incumbents. The book discusses differences in
governments’ policy efforts to mitigate the virus spread. The
authors conduct in-depth analysis of country-cases from Africa,
North and South America, Asia, and Europe. They also offer small-n-
comparative analyses as well as report global patterns and trends
of governments’ responsiveness to the medical emergency. It
will appeal to all those interested in public policy, health policy
and governance.
A formal model in the social sciences builds explanations when it
structures the reasoning underlying a theoretical argument, opens
venues for controlled experimentation, and leads to hypotheses. Yet
more importantly, models evaluate theory, build theory, and enhance
conjectures. Formal Modeling in Social Science addresses the varied
helpful roles of formal models and goes further to take up more
fundamental considerations of epistemology and methodology.The
authors integrate the exposition of the epistemology and the
methodology of modeling and argue that these two reinforce each
other. They illustrate the process of designing an original model
suited to the puzzle at hand, using multiple methods in diverse
substantive areas of inquiry. The authors also emphasize the
crucial, though underappreciated, role of a narrative in the
progression from theory to model. Transparency of assumptions and
steps in a model means that any analyst will reach equivalent
predictions whenever she replicates the argument. Hence, models
enable theoretical replication, essential in the accumulation of
knowledge. Formal Modeling in Social Science speaks to scholars in
different career stages and disciplines and with varying expertise
in modeling.
A formal model in the social sciences builds explanations when it
structures the reasoning underlying a theoretical argument, opens
venues for controlled experimentation, and can lead to hypotheses.
Yet more importantly, models evaluate theory, build theory, and
enhance conjectures. Formal Modeling in Social Science addresses
the varied helpful roles of formal models and goes further to take
up more fundamental considerations of epistemology and methodology.
The authors integrate the exposition of the epistemology and the
methodology of modeling and argue that these two reinforce each
other. They illustrate the process of designing an original model
suited to the puzzle at hand, using multiple methods in diverse
substantive areas of inquiry. The authors also emphasize the
crucial, though underappreciated, role of a narrative in the
progression from theory to model. Transparency of assumptions and
steps in a model means that any analyst will reach equivalent
predictions whenever she replicates the argument. Hence, models
enable theoretical replication, essential in the accumulation of
knowledge. Formal Modeling in Social Science speaks to scholars in
different career stages and disciplines and with varying expertise
in modeling.
In this book, Carol Mershon and Olga Shvetsova explore one of the
central questions in democratic politics: how much autonomy do
elected politicians have to shape and reshape the party system on
their own, without the direct involvement of voters in elections?
Mershon and Shvetsova's theory focuses on the choices of party
membership made by legislators while serving in office. It
identifies the inducements and impediments to legislators' changes
of partisan affiliation, and integrates strategic and institutional
approaches to the study of parties and party systems. With
empirical analyses comparing nine countries that differ in
electoral laws, territorial governance and executive-legislative
relations, Mershon and Shvetsova find that strategic incumbents
have the capacity to reconfigure the party system as established in
elections. Representatives are motivated to bring about change by
opportunities arising during the parliamentary term, and are
deterred from doing so by the elemental democratic practice of
elections.
The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)
In this book, Carol Mershon and Olga Shvetsova explore one of the
central questions in democratic politics: How much autonomy do
elected politicians have to shape and reshape the party system on
their own, without the direct involvement of voters in elections?
Mershon and Shvetsova's theory focuses on the choices of party
membership made by legislators while serving in office. It
identifies the inducements and impediments to legislators' changes
of partisan affiliation, and integrates strategic and institutional
approaches to the study of parties and party systems. With
empirical analyses comparing nine countries that differ in
electoral laws, territorial governance, and executive legislative
relations, Mershon and Shvetsova find that strategic incumbents
have the capacity to reconfigure the party system as established in
elections. Representatives are motivated to bring about change by
opportunities arising during the parliamentary term, and are
deterred from doing so by the elemental democratic practice of
elections.
The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)
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