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Revised and updated for the second edition, this textbook presents
over 100 exercises on industrial organization with detailed answer
keys. While most textbooks on industrial organization focus on
theory and empirical findings, this textbook offers practical
examples and exercises helping predict firm behavior in different
industries. The book emphasizes the game-theoretic tools used in
each type of exercise, so students can systematically apply them to
other markets, forms of competition, or information environments
where firms, consumers, and regulating agencies interact. The book
begins with examples that analyze different models of firm behavior
and interaction; starting with monopoly and moving through the
Cournot model of simultaneous quantity competition, the Bertrand
model simultaneous price competition, and sequential competition.
The following chapters apply game-theoretic tools to situations of
increasing complexity: regulation; R&D incentives; mergers and
collusion; bundling incentives; incomplete information, signaling,
and competition; networks and switching costs. In addition to
providing algebraic simplifications, some chapters also offer the
unique feature of worked exercises based on published journal
articles by leading scholars in the field. Finally, exercises are
ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to
the exercise number, which allows students to pace their studies
and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. The second
edition contains additional exercises optimized for study at the
upper undergraduate level. Providing a rigorous, yet practical
introduction to the field of industrial organization, this textbook
is appropriate for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in
economics and finance.Â
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory
through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical
examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict
bidders' equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along
with the seller's strategic incentives to organize one auction
format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so
students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also
included are several exercises based on published articles, with
the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided
into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background
in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and
simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper
undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a
discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without
using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated
auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions,
third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle,
common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement
auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their
difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which
allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also
offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for
instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters,
Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction
theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics,
finance, and business administration. This book may also be used
for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics
of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory
through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical
examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict
bidders' equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along
with the seller's strategic incentives to organize one auction
format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so
students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also
included are several exercises based on published articles, with
the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided
into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background
in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and
simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper
undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a
discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without
using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated
auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions,
third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle,
common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement
auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their
difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which
allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also
offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for
instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters,
Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction
theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics,
finance, and business administration. This book may also be used
for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics
of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
This textbook presents 122 exercises on industrial organization
with detailed answer keys. While most textbooks on industrial
organization focus on theory and empirical findings, this textbook
offers practical examples and exercises helping predict firm
behaviour in different industries. The book emphasizes the
game-theoretic tools used in each type of exercise, so students can
systematically apply them to other markets, forms of competition,
or information environments where firms, consumers, and regulating
agencies interact. The book begins with examples that analyse
different models of firm behavior and interaction; starting with
monopoly and moving through the Cournot model of simultaneous
quantity competition, the Bertrand model simultaneous price
competition, and sequential competition. The following chapters
apply game-theoretic tools to situations of increasing complexity:
regulation; R&D incentives; mergers and collusion; bundling
incentives; incomplete information, signalling, and competition;
networks and switching costs. In addition to providing algebraic
simplifications, some chapters also offer the unique feature of
worked exercises based on published journal articles by leading
scholars in the field. Finally, exercises are ranked according to
their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number,
which allows students to pace their studies and instructors to
structure their classes accordingly. Providing a rigorous, yet
practical introduction to the field of industrial organization,
this textbook is appropriate for advanced undergraduate and
graduate students in economics and finance.
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