Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law investigates the notion of sovereignty from three different, but related perspectives: as a legal question in relation to the sovereign state, as a political question in relation to sovereign power, and as a metaphysical question in relation to sovereign self-knowledge. The varied and interchangeable uses of legal sovereignty, political sovereignty and metaphysical sovereignty in contemporary debates have resulted in a situation where the word sovereignty itself has become something of a non-concept. Panu Minkkinen shows here how these three perspectives have informed one another, by addressing their shared relationship to law, and to the autocephalous function of sovereignty; that is, the attempt to provide a single source and foundation for law, power, and self-knowledge. Through an effort to domesticate the intrinsically heterocephalous nature of power, the juridical and jurisprudential aim has been to confine power within the closed vertical hierarchy of traditional legal thinking. Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law thus elaborates this heterocephaly, proposing new understandings of sovereignty, as well as of law and of legal scholarship.

What does Carl Schmitt have to offer to ongoing debates about sovereignty, globalization, spatiality, the nature of the political, and political theology? Can Schmitt's positions and concepts offer insights that might help us understand our concrete present-day situation? Works on Schmitt usually limit themselves to historically isolating Schmitt into his Weimar or post-Weimar context, to reading him together with classics of political and legal philosophy, or to focusing exclusively on a particular aspect of Schmitt's writings. Bringing together an international, and interdisciplinary, range of contributors, this book explores the question of Schmitt's relevance for an understanding of the contemporary world. Engaging the background and intellectual context in which Schmitt wrote his major works - often with reference to both primary and secondary literature unavailable in English - this book will be of enormous interest to legal and political theorists.

Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law investigates the notion of sovereignty from three different, but related perspectives: as a legal question in relation to the sovereign state, as a political question in relation to sovereign power, and as a metaphysical question in relation to sovereign self-knowledge. The varied and interchangeable uses of legal sovereignty, political sovereignty and metaphysical sovereignty in contemporary debates have resulted in a situation where the word 'sovereignty' itself has become something of a non-concept. Panu Minkkinen shows here how these three perspectives have informed one another, by addressing their shared relationship to law, and to the 'autocephalous' function of sovereignty; that is, the attempt to provide a single source and foundation for law, power, and self-knowledge. Through an effort to domesticate the intrinsically 'heterocephalous' nature of power, the juridical and jurisprudential aim has been to confine power within the closed vertical hierarchy of traditional legal thinking. Sovereignty, Knowledge, Law thus elaborates this heterocephaly, proposing new understandings of sovereignty, as well as of law and of legal scholarship.

With a strong focus on constitutional law, this book examines the legal as well as the political power of 'the people' in constitutional democracies. Bringing together an international range of contributors from the USA, Latin America, the UK and continental Europe, it explores the complex relationship between constitutional democracy and 'the people' from the angles of constitutional law, legal theory, political theory, and history. Contributors explore this relationship through the lens of radical democracy, engaging with the work of key figures such as Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmitt, Claude Lefort, and Jacques Ranciere.

What does Carl Schmitt have to offer to ongoing debates about sovereignty, globalization, spatiality, the nature of the political, and political theology? Can Schmitt's positions and concepts offer insights that might help us understand our concrete present-day situation? Works on Schmitt usually limit themselves to historically isolating Schmitt into his Weimar or post-Weimar context, to reading him together with classics of political and legal philosophy, or to focusing exclusively on a particular aspect of Schmitt's writings. Bringing together an international, and interdisciplinary, range of contributors, this book explores the question of Schmitt's relevance for an understanding of the contemporary world. Engaging the background and intellectual context in which Schmitt wrote his major works - often with reference to both primary and secondary literature unavailable in English - this book will be of enormous interest to legal and political theorists.

Recent social and political developments, including the presidential elections in the United States, antidemocratic state policies in Hungary and Poland, and the political climate in the rest of Europe have brought questions relating to the position and composition of 'the people' in constitutional democracies to the forefront. This book confronts these questions head on as leading scholars across the fields of law, legal theory, political theory and history explore the contemporary problems facing constitutional democracies.With a strong focus on constitutional law, this book examines the legal as well as the political power of 'the people' in constitutional democracies. Bringing together an international range of contributors from the USA, Latin America, the UK and continental Europe, it explores the complex relationship between constitutional democracy and 'the people' from the angles of constitutional law, legal theory, political theory, and history. Contributors explore this relationship through the lens of radical democracy, engaging with the work of key figures such as Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmitt, Claude Lefort, and Jacques Ranciere.

The book is an attempt to evaluate the reception of Continental philosophy (phenomenology,hermeneutics, deconstruction, etc.) within mainstream jurisprudence. The book claims that the reduction of philosophy to social theory can only be accomplished by impoverishing the impetus of philosophical thinking and, consequently, by transforming critique into criticism, and the philosophy of law into legal theory. The response developed in this book is the creation of a metaphysical understanding of law or, in other words, what Aristotle called a 'first philosophy'. In addition to philosophy proper - the classics of Antiquity, the great German philosophers, contemporary French thinking -, the book covers a wide range of jurisprudential literature. These include the neo-Kantian philosophers of law whose thinking is allegedly at the root of legal positivism, but special emphasis is also given to 'existential' philosophers of law deeply inspired by the hermeneutical phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. Lastly, the book encourages specifically philosophical approaches in law to the thinking of French contemporaries whose work has inspired critical legal scholarship during the past ten years.