Reflecting on the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law, these essays provide a comprehensive survey of the most significant issues in contemporary U.S. foreign relations law. They review the context and assumptions on which that work relied, critique its analysis and conclusions, and explore topics left out of the published work that need research and development. Collectively the essays provide an authoritative study of the issues generating controversy today as well as those most likely to emerge in the coming decade. The book is organized in three parts. The first provides a historical context for the law of foreign relations from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present. The second and largest part looks at contested issues in foreign relations law today, from the status of international law as federal domestic law to presidential authority to make, unmake, and apply international agreements; and to the immunity of international organizations and foreign government officials from domestic lawsuits. The last part considers how foreign relations law might develop in the future as well as the difficulties raised by using the Restatement process as a way of contributing to the law's development. These essays for the most part concentrate on U.S. law, but the problems they face are common to all democratic republics that seek to reconcile international relations with the rule of law.

Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

This volume brings together experts and political actors from the United States and the USSR to assess the status of international law in the post-Cold War era with the intention of contributing ideas, judgements, and proposals tempered by experience. The topics covered range from terrorism to peaceful conflict resolution; from the renunciation of aggression to the right of self-defence; from chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons limitations to problems of verification; and from the military use of space to the right of political self-determination. Each chapter features contributions by both US and Soviet experts who have themselves participated in high-level policy making and international negotiations in the area (including, for example, the ABM, SALTI, SALTII, CFE, and START talks).

The knowledge economy, a seeming wonder for the world, has caused unintended harms that threaten peace and prosperity and undo international cooperation and the international rule of law. The world faces threats of war, pandemics, growing domestic political discord, climate change, disruption of international trade and investment, immigration, and the pollution of cyberspace, just as international law increasingly falls short as a tool for managing these challenges. Prosperity dependent on meritocracy, open borders, international economic freedom, and a wide-open Internet has met its limits, with international law one of the first casualties. Any effective response to these threats must reflect the pathway by which these perils arrive. Part of the answer to these challenges, Paul B. Stephan argues, must include a re-conception of international law as arising out of pragmatic and limited experiments by states, rather than as grand projects to remake and redeem the world.

The knowledge economy, a seeming wonder for the world, has caused unintended harms that threaten peace and prosperity and undo international cooperation and the international rule of law. The world faces threats of war, pandemics, growing domestic political discord, climate change, disruption of international trade and investment, immigration, and the pollution of cyberspace, just as international law increasingly falls short as a tool for managing these challenges. Prosperity dependent on meritocracy, open borders, international economic freedom, and a wide-open Internet has met its limits, with international law one of the first casualties. Any effective response to these threats must reflect the pathway by which these perils arrive. Part of the answer to these challenges, Paul B. Stephan argues, must include a re-conception of international law as arising out of pragmatic and limited experiments by states, rather than as grand projects to remake and redeem the world.

Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

By definition, international law, once agreed upon and consented to, applies to all parties equally. It is perhaps the one area of law where cross-country comparison seems inappropriate, because all parties are governed by the same rules. However, as this book explains, states sometimes adhere to similar, and at other times, adopt different interpretations of the same international norms and standards. International legal rules are not a monolithic whole, but are the basis for ongoing contestation in which states set forth competing interpretations. International norms are interpreted and redefined by national executives, legislatures, and judiciaries. These varying and evolving interpretations can, in turn, change and impact the international rules themselves. These similarities and differences make for an important, but thus far, largely unexamined object of comparison. This is the premise for this book, and for what the editors call "comparative international law." This book achieves three objectives. The first is to show that international law is not a monolith. The second is to map the cross-country similarities and differences in international legal norms in different fields of international law, as well as their application and interpretation with regards to geographic differences. The third is to make a first and preliminary attempt to explain these differences. It is organized into three broad thematic sections, exploring: conceptual matters, domestic institutions and comparative international law, and comparing approaches across issue-areas. The chapters are authored by contributors who include leading international law and comparative law scholars with diverse backgrounds, experience, and perspectives.