Applying a rational choice perspective, this book presents a dynamic theory of the evolution of totalitarian regimes and terrorism. By demonstrating that totalitarian regimes rest on ideologies involving supreme values that are assumed to be absolutely true, the author identifies the factors that lead to totalitarian regimes, and those that transform or abolish those regimes with time. The author addresses different ideologies, such as National Socialism, Communism, and religious movements; examines numerous historical cases of totalitarian regimes; and develops a formal, mathematical model of totalitarianism in the book's closing chapter.

This book discusses theories of monetary and financial innovation and applies them to key monetary and financial innovations in history - starting with the use of silver bars in Mesopotamia and ending with the emergence of the Eurodollar market in London. The key monetary innovations are coinage (Asia minor, China, India), the payment of interest on loans, the bill of exchange and deposit banking (Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London). The main financial innovation is the emergence of bond markets (also starting in Venice). Episodes of innovation are contrasted with relatively stagnant environments (the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire). The comparisons suggest that small, open and competing jurisdictions have been more innovative than large empires - as has been suggested by David Hume in 1742.

Acclaim for the first edition: 'Peter Bernholz's book brings together his comprehensive studies of inflation from the fourth century to the present, showing their common elements and their differences. This is an impressive work that bankers, central bankers, economists and laymen can read with pleasure and profit. I recommend it highly.' - Allan H. Meltzer, The Hoover Institution, Stanford Exploring the characteristics of inflations and comparing historical cases from Roman times up to the modern day, this book provides an in depth discussion of the subject. It analyses the high and moderate inflations caused by the inflationary bias of political systems and economic relationships, as well as the importance of different monetary regimes in containing them. The differences for the possible size of inflations among monetary regimes like metallic currencies, the gold standard and fiat paper money are discussed. It is shown that huge budget deficits of government have been responsible for all hyperinflations. This revised second edition debates whether a growth of the money supply exceeding that of real Gross Domestic Production is a necessary or sufficient reason for inflation and also includes a new concluding chapter, which explores the long-term tendencies to create, maintain and abolish inflation-stable monetary regimes. Moreover, the conditions for long-term inflation-stable monetary regimes in history are explored. By surveying thirty hyperinflations, Peter Bernholz demonstrates that certain economic traits have been stable characteristics of inflations over the centuries, and illustrates their causes. He also examines the consequences of high inflations for unemployment, the distortions between relative prices and the political conditions that allow a return to stable monetary regimes after high inflations, given the inflationary tendencies of political systems. This book will appeal to a wide-ranging audience, including students, economists, historians, political scientists and sociologists looking to improve their knowledge of monetary regimes and inflation. Bankers, businessmen and politicians attempting to solve the problems caused for them by inflation, will also find this to be a useful read.

Acclaim for the first edition: 'Peter Bernholz's book brings together his comprehensive studies of inflation from the fourth century to the present, showing their common elements and their differences. This is an impressive work that bankers, central bankers, economists and laymen can read with pleasure and profit. I recommend it highly.' - Allan H. Meltzer, The Hoover Institution, Stanford Exploring the characteristics of inflations and comparing historical cases from Roman times up to the modern day, this book provides an in depth discussion of the subject. It analyses the high and moderate inflations caused by the inflationary bias of political systems and economic relationships, as well as the importance of different monetary regimes in containing them. The differences for the possible size of inflations among monetary regimes like metallic currencies, the gold standard and fiat paper money are discussed. It is shown that huge budget deficits of government have been responsible for all hyperinflations. This revised second edition debates whether a growth of the money supply exceeding that of real Gross Domestic Production is a necessary or sufficient reason for inflation and also includes a new concluding chapter, which explores the long-term tendencies to create, maintain and abolish inflation-stable monetary regimes. Moreover, the conditions for long-term inflation-stable monetary regimes in history are explored. By surveying thirty hyperinflations, Peter Bernholz demonstrates that certain economic traits have been stable characteristics of inflations over the centuries, and illustrates their causes. He also examines the consequences of high inflations for unemployment, the distortions between relative prices and the political conditions that allow a return to stable monetary regimes after high inflations, given the inflationary tendencies of political systems. This book will appeal to a wide-ranging audience, including students, economists, historians, political scientists and sociologists looking to improve their knowledge of monetary regimes and inflation. Bankers, businessmen and politicians attempting to solve the problems caused for them by inflation, will also find this to be a useful read.

Organized, readable, technically sound and comprehensive from both theoretical and empirical standpoints, this book summarizes a vast amount of institutional, historical and descriptive detail.

Using case studies from the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland as well as the European Union and the global economy, this is the first book of its kind to examine historical evidence on how competition among states or the lack of it affects regulation, especially labour market regulation.

Edited by internationally respected scholars of economics and containing contributions from eminent economists, this book reveals important implications as to whether European political integration leads to more regulation and whether globalization restrains regulation. It will be of great interest to both economists and students engaged with political economy, public choice and regulation."

Do political decentralisation and inter state competition favour innovation and growth? There has long been a lively debate surrounding this question, going back to David Hume and Immanuel Kant. This book is a new attempt to test its veracity. The existing literature tends to assume that the beneficial effects of inter state competition have been confined to European history. By contrast, China, India and the Islamic Middle East are regarded as inherently imperial and overcentralised. However, these civilisations have not always been unified politically. In their history, there have been long spells of decentralised rule or inter state competition. The same is true for Japan. If the Hume-Kant hypothesis is correct, it should also apply to those periods. This volume analyses the qualitative and quantitative evidence. The authors comprise eminent historians, sociologists, economists and socio-psychologists and the resulting book is a truly interdisciplinary enterprise. Addressing a wide readership, this book will hold strong appeal for scholars and researchers of general, Asian and economic history, political economy, political science and sociology.

Applying a rational choice perspective, this book presents a dynamic theory of the evolution of totalitarian regimes and terrorism. By demonstrating that totalitarian regimes rest on ideologies involving supreme values that are assumed to be absolutely true, the author identifies the factors that lead to totalitarian regimes, and those that transform or abolish those regimes with time. The author addresses different ideologies, such as National Socialism, Communism, and religious movements; examines numerous historical cases of totalitarian regimes; and develops a formal, mathematical model of totalitarianism in the book's closing chapter.

This book discusses theories of monetary and financial innovation and applies them to key monetary and financial innovations in history – starting with the use of silver bars in Mesopotamia and ending with the emergence of the Eurodollar market in London. The key monetary innovations are coinage (Asia minor, China, India), the payment of interest on loans, the bill of exchange and deposit banking (Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London). The main financial innovation is the emergence of bond markets (also starting in Venice). Episodes of innovation are contrasted with relatively stagnant environments (the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire). The comparisons suggest that small, open and competing jurisdictions have been more innovative than large empires – as has been suggested by David Hume in 1742.

This volume confronts an important historical hypothesis with empirical evidence from selected periods of history. The hypothesis in question states that competition among political and legal organisations in developing rules has been a crucial condition for liberty, innovation and growth in the history of mankind. It is due to Immanuel Kant, Edward Gibbon and Max Weber and has been revived and further developed by Nobel-Laureate Douglass C. North who contributes the first chapter. The volume brings together political economists, historians and legal scholars to discuss the role of political competition in the rise and decline of nations - both in theory and in a large number of case studies.

Organized, readable, technically sound and comprehensive from both theoretical and empirical standpoints, this book summarizes a vast amount of institutional, historical and descriptive detail. Using case studies from the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland as well as the European Union and the global economy, this is the first book of its kind to examine historical evidence on how competition among states - or the lack of it - affects regulation, especially labour market regulation. Edited by internationally respected scholars of economics and containing contributions from eminent economists, this book reveals important implications as to whether European political integration leads to more regulation and whether globalization restrains regulation. It will be of great interest to both economists and students engaged with political economy, public choice and regulation.