First published in 2003. The NATO-led Operation Allied Force was fought in 1999 to stop Serb atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. This war, as noted by the distinguished military historian John Keegan, "marked a real turning point . . . and proved that a war can be won by airpower alone." Colonels Haave and Haun have organized firsthand accounts of some of the people who provided that airpower-the members of the 40th Expeditionary Operations Group. Their descriptions-a new wingman's first combat sortie, a support officer's view of a fighter squadron relocation during combat, and a Sandy's leadership in finding and rescuing a downed F-117 pilot-provide the reader with a legitimate insight into an air war at the tactical level and the airpower that helped convince the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, to capitulate.

"Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 Gulf War, and Operation Allied Force, the 1999 Air War over Serbia, saw US and coalition Air Forces attacking enemy fielded forces at unprecedented levels. Given the real change in the nature, strategy, and conduct of air operations in the last decade, this study examines how to most efficiently employ airpower to achieve its objectives in the asymmetric attack against a fielded army. During Desert Storm, US Air Forces developed medium altitude tactics increasing survivability by over-flying the range of Iraqi AAA and MANPADS. Difficulties in attacking from medium altitude were countered with massed formations of specialized armor-killing A-10s, the development of F-16. Killer Scouts, and the F-111 and F-15E tactic of " Tank Plinking" with laser guided bombs. During Allied Force, the challenge lay not in attacking the enemy, but in locating and identifying an army interspersed with a large number of civilian refugees. A systems approach is required to most efficiently attack a fielded army by air. The key is the integration of ISR assets through an intelligence "flex targeting" cell and the use of terminal air controllers such as Forward Air Controllers Airborne (FACAs), along with trained strikers capable of precision attack. This approach requires a change in Joint and Air Force doctrine acknowledging the supported role that US Air Forces have performed against enemy fielded forces over the last decade. It calls for the adaptation of the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to ensure the USAF prepares for these kinds of operations in the future."

Since World War II, the U.S. has been involved in several limited conflicts, against smaller, far less militarily capable opponents. Unlimited war with the Soviet Union, for which the USAF prepared over 40 years, never materialized. Instead, U.S. airpower has generally been directed against underdeveloped, authoritarian states. Such regimes tend to rely upon their armies as their primary source of power. Yet the USAF, born out of the aerial combat experience of World War II, has firmly held to airpower as the means of bypassing military forces and striking directly at the vital center of the enemy. Thus, American airmen are predisposed to discounting the effectiveness of air attack against fielded forces. The realities of modern conflict, however, have dictated the need for direct attack on armies. Tactics have been improvised by airmen with little previous training or doctrine in order to use the equipment at hand to get the job done. This study examines two such groups of airmen the Misty FACs of Vietnam from 1967-70 and the A-10 FACs over Kosovo in 1999. A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until the USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to effectively attack fielded forces will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine.