This monograph draws on the 10-nation CREDIT (Capacity for Research on European Defence and Industrial Technology) network. It covers post-Cold War related issues including: how to reduce and reorient national defence research and development efforts; the debate over dual-use technologies; how the diffusion of technologies of civil origin may affect the international flow of military-relevant technology; and how the competition with the USA will affect the European industry's ability to survive. By providing a comparative study of policy and practice in the countries of western Europe, this book provides insights into how governments and firms can begin to search for European-wide solutions to the dilemmas that face them.

Countries establish defence industries for various reasons. Chief among these are usually a concern with national security, and a desire to be as independent as possible in the supply of the armaments which they believe they need. But defence industries are different from most other industries. Their customer is governments. Their product is intended to safeguard the most vital interests of the state. The effectiveness of these products (in the real, rather than the experimental sense) is not normally tested at the time of purchase. If, or when, it is tested, many other factors (such as the quality of political and military leadership) enter into the equation, so complicating judgments about the quality of the armaments, and about the reliability of the promises made by the manufacturers. All of these features make the defence sector an unusually political industrial sector. This has been true in both the command economies of the former Soviet Union and its satellites, and in the market or mixed economies of the west. In both cases, to speak only a little over-generally, the defence sector has been particularly privileged and particularly protected from the usual economic vicissitudes. In both cases, too, its centrality to the perceived vital interests of the state has given it an unusual degree of political access and support.

This book arises from a meeting held at Wiston House, Sussex, UK, in September 1987. The meeting brought together academic, governmental and industrial experts from eight countries to discuss the increasingly important sUbject of the relations between civil and defence technologies. It was primarily funded under the Advanced Research Workshops Programme of NATO's Scientific Affairs Division, and was the first science policy workshop funded by the Programme. Additional financial support came from the Leverhulme Trust. The choice of topic, of speakers and, finally, of papers to be published was entirely ours. The conclusions reached were our own and those of the partIcipants. They were not in any way guided by NATO; nor do they represent NATO policy. We speak for all the participants in offering our thanks to the NATO SCIentific Affairs Division, especially Secretary General Durand and Dr. Craig Sinclair, for rnei r- generosity and encouragement. WIthout them this book would not exist. We thank the Leverhulme Trust for enabling assistance to be provided to the Workshop Directors, in the form of lain Bate, who himself played a major part in the success of the meeting. The staff of Wiston House must also be thanked for prOViding an admirable environment for the meeting. For secretarial support prior to the meeting we thank Gill Miller and Lesley Price. Finally, we offer special thanks to Mrs. Yvonne Aspinall for converting all the papers, in whatever state they were presented, into camera-ready copy with such professionalism and gOOd humour.

This book draws on the ten nation CREDIT (Capacity for Research on European Defence and Industrial Technology) network which was set up to tackle issue concerning defence science, technology and industrial policy, including the implications of the Cold War and a growing pan-European emphasis. By providing a comparative study of policy and practice in the countries of western Europe, the book provides vital insights into how governments and firms can begin to search for European-wide solutions to the dilemmas that face them.

This book arises from a meeting held at Wiston House, Sussex, UK, in September 1987. The meeting brought together academic, governmental and industrial experts from eight countries to discuss the increasingly important sUbject of the relations between civil and defence technologies. It was primarily funded under the Advanced Research Workshops Programme of NATO's Scientific Affairs Division, and was the first science policy workshop funded by the Programme. Additional financial support came from the Leverhulme Trust. The choice of topic, of speakers and, finally, of papers to be published was entirely ours. The conclusions reached were our own and those of the partIcipants. They were not in any way guided by NATO; nor do they represent NATO policy. We speak for all the participants in offering our thanks to the NATO SCIentific Affairs Division, especially Secretary General Durand and Dr. Craig Sinclair, for rnei r- generosity and encouragement. WIthout them this book would not exist. We thank the Leverhulme Trust for enabling assistance to be provided to the Workshop Directors, in the form of lain Bate, who himself played a major part in the success of the meeting. The staff of Wiston House must also be thanked for prOViding an admirable environment for the meeting. For secretarial support prior to the meeting we thank Gill Miller and Lesley Price. Finally, we offer special thanks to Mrs. Yvonne Aspinall for converting all the papers, in whatever state they were presented, into camera-ready copy with such professionalism and gOOd humour.

Countries establish defence industries for various reasons. Chief among these are usually a concern with national security, and a desire to be as independent as possible in the supply of the armaments which they believe they need. But defence industries are different from most other industries. Their customer is governments. Their product is intended to safeguard the most vital interests of the state. The effectiveness of these products (in the real, rather than the experimental sense) is not normally tested at the time of purchase. If, or when, it is tested, many other factors (such as the quality of political and military leadership) enter into the equation, so complicating judgments about the quality of the armaments, and about the reliability of the promises made by the manufacturers. All of these features make the defence sector an unusually political industrial sector. This has been true in both the command economies of the former Soviet Union and its satellites, and in the market or mixed economies of the west. In both cases, to speak only a little over-generally, the defence sector has been particularly privileged and particularly protected from the usual economic vicissitudes. In both cases, too, its centrality to the perceived vital interests of the state has given it an unusual degree of political access and support.