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Whether Europe will ever have anything resembling the ?common
foreign and security policy? described in the Maastricht Treaty
will depend most of all on whether France and Germany are able to
align their foreign policy goals and means. This thoughtful and
original study examines the Franco-German security partnership in
its post?Cold War context an
Since the mid-1990s, US and European attitudes, strategies and
policies towards the Middle East have diverged. In the Middle East
peace process, Europeans have grown frustrated with the lack of
progress and with Washington's near-monopoly on diplomatic action,
and have begun to demand a greater role. On Iraq, the US insists on
strong military and economic containment of Saddam Hussein, while
some Europeans have started to press for a more rapid reintegration
of Iraq into the international community and are reluctant to use
or threaten force. The issue of how to deal with Iran has been most
divisive of all, with the US and Europe deeply divided over whether
they should contain, or engage, Tehran. Transatlantic tensions over
the Middle East are damaging for three main reasons. They reduce
the effectiveness of allied policies; undermine NATO's cohesion
when its future is no longer guaranteed by a common threat; and
threaten to spill over into the economic domain. This paper
examines the reasons for these potentially damaging differences,
assesses the prospects for improving transatlantic cooperation in
the region and suggests approaches that may help to bring this
about. Its main policy conclusions are:On the Arab Israeli
conflict, as long as the peace process is moving forward, or has
reasonable prospects of doing so, the US is probably right that
Europe's formal involvement in direct peace talks would not be
helpful, particularly if such a role aimed to promote policies
different from those of the US. If the peace process stalls
completely, however, it will be difficult for Washington to justify
opposing a more active European role. On Iraq, the US-led policy of
containment is correct, and economic sanctions should remain in
place until Baghdad complies fully with UN Security Council
disarmament resolutions. However, in exchange for Europe's
agreement to contribute to Iraq's military containment, the US,
like Europe, should abide by the letter and spirit
Turkey has always been a crossroads: the point where East meets
West, Europe meets Asia, and Christianity meets Islam. Turkey has
also been a close and important American ally, but a series of
converging political and strategic factors have now endangered its
longstanding Western and democratic orientation. In Winning Turkey,
two leading analysts explain this worrisome situation and present a
plan for improving it. The stakes are clear. Turkey is the most
advanced democracy in the Islamic world, bordering a number of the
world's hotspots, including Iraq, Iran, and the Caucasus. It
occupies the corridor between Western markets and Caspian Sea
energy reserves. A stable, Western-oriented Turkey moving toward EU
membership would provide a growing market for exports, a source of
needed labor, a positive influence on the Middle East, and an ally
in the war on terror. The picture has darkened, however, as rising
anti-Americanism, deflated hopes for EU accession, civil-military
tensions, and terrorist threats have destabilized an already
volatile Turkish political system. Wi "nning Turkey d"esigns a plan
to ease tensions in this critical part of the world. In addition to
proposing a "grand bargain" between Turkey and the Kurds, it
advocates greater support for increased liberalism and democracy, a
renewed commitment by both Europe and Turkey to promote EU
membership, a historic compromise with Armenia, and greater Western
engagement with Turkish Cypriots.
Since the mid-1990s, US and European attitudes, strategies and
policies towards the Middle East have diverged. In the Middle East
peace process, Europeans have grown frustrated with the lack of
progress and with Washington's near-monopoly on diplomatic action,
and have begun to demand a greater role. On Iraq, the US insists on
strong military and economic containment of Saddam Hussein, while
some Europeans have started to press for a more rapid reintegration
of Iraq into the international community and are reluctant to use
or threaten force. The issue of how to deal with Iran has been most
divisive of all, with the US and Europe deeply divided over whether
they should contain, or engage, Tehran. Transatlantic tensions over
the Middle East are damaging for three main reasons. They reduce
the effectiveness of allied policies; undermine NATO's cohesion
when its future is no longer guaranteed by a common threat; and
threaten to spill over into the economic domain. This paper
examines the reasons for these potentially damaging differences,
assesses the prospects for improving transatlantic cooperation in
the region and suggests approaches that may help to bring this
about. Its main policy conclusions are: On the Arab-Israeli
conflict, as long as the peace process is moving forward, or has
reasonable prospects of doing so, the US is probably right that
Europe's formal involvement in direct peace talks would not be
helpful, particularly if such a role aimed to promote policies
different from those of the US. If the peace process stalls
completely, however, it will be difficult for Washington to justify
opposing a more active European role. On Iraq, the US-led policy of
containment is correct, and economic sanctions should remain in
place until Baghdad complies fully with UN Security Council
disarmament resolutions. However, in exchange for Europe's
agreement to contribute to Iraq's military containment, the US,
like Europe, should abide by the letter and spirit of these
resolutions, even if this means agreeing to lift restrictions on
oil exports if Iraq complies in full. Failing to do so could
undermine global support for the integrity of the UN system,
ultimately leaving the US, and perhaps the UK, isolated in
maintaining a policy that might not be sustainable in the long
term. On Iran, a transatlantic compromise would need to include an
agreement by the US not to impose sanctions against European
companies doing business with Iran, as long as Europe offered
unstinting support in combating terrorism and helping to contain
the development of weapons of mass destruction. The US should also
seek agreement with the European Union on which Iranian actions
would justify sanctions or other punitive measures. The paper
concludes by examining institutional changes that might help to
promote transatlantic cooperation on the Middle East.
Tracing the transformation of NATO in the aftermath of the Cold
War, this volume assesses NATO's current accomplishments,
continuing challenges and political pitfalls. International
scholars and policy-makers explore three key themes influencing
NATO's future: transatlantic relations, the debate over enlargement
and the organization's new functions. Weighing the fate of an
alliance poised for renewal or decline, the contributors offer
analysis and discussion of an organization that has changed
profoundly over the past five years and continues to evolve in the
face of an uncertain global environment.
Whether Europe will ever have anything resembling the "common
foreign and security policy" described in the Maastricht Treaty
will depend most of all on whether France and Germany are able to
align their foreign policy goals and means. This thoughtful and
original study examines the Franco-German security partnership in
its post-Cold War context and analyzes the implications of that
partnership for both Europe and the United States. Utilizing French
and German sources and extensive interviews in Paris, Bonn, and
Washington, Philip Gordon traces the evolution of Franco-German
security cooperation since World War II, focusing especially on
post-1989 developments. The book's historical and conceptual
approach provides a framework for assessing the foundations of the
Euro-optimism and -pessimism at odds with each other today.Gordon
argues that Franco-German cooperation in the post-Cold War era will
be more challenging than it was during a time when the Soviet
threat united the two countries in a U.S.-led alliance. The book
demonstrates how the end of the Cold War, German unification, a
declining U.S. role in Europe, and emerging instabilities to
Europe's east and south will test the strength of the Franco-German
partnership, and it examines how French and German leaders have
stood up to the new challenges so far. Detailed case studies of the
Persian Gulf War, the debates over the "Eurocorps," policies toward
Eastern Europe, and the war in Yugoslavia make an invaluable
contribution to our understanding of French, German, and Alliance
policies in the post-Cold War world. Gordon also identifies new
trends in French and German security policies since 1989 and
analyzes their effects on the potential for Western and European
cohesion.The book concludes that the general commitment in Paris
and Berlin to continued cooperation is not in doubt but that a
truly common and effective Franco-German or European security
policy is unlikely; the national interests of the two countries and
their Western partners not only remain different, but they are
probably more divergent today than during the Cold War.
Consequently, Gordon also argues that U.S. and European fears of
Franco-German bilateralism are exaggerated and indeed that the
allies have more to gain than to lose from Franco-German
cooperation. The problem for the West is not so much that France
and Germany have formed a cohesive political-military force within
Europe but that they have failed to do so.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to
oust governments in the Middle East on an average of around once
per decade. It has done so in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq,
Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria - to count only the
instances where regime change was effectively U.S. policy and where
Washington led the effort. The reasons for these interventions have
also been extremely diverse, including countering communism,
geopolitical competition, preventing the development of weapons of
mass destruction, combatting terrorism, saving civilian lives, and
promoting democracy. And the methods by which the United States
pursued regime change have also been highly varied: sponsoring a
military coup, providing covert or overt military assistance to
opposition groups, invading and occupying, invading and not
occupying, providing air power to opposition forces, or relying on
diplomacy, rhetoric, and sanctions. What is common to all the
operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate
goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic
consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many
cases left the countries in question worse off than they were
before.
The greater Middle East region is beset by a crescent of crises,
stretching from Pakistan through Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Together, these five crises pose the
most pressing security challenges faced by the United States and
its European allies -ranging from terrorism and weapons
proliferation to the rise of fundamentalism and the lack of
democracy. Until now, Europe and the United States have approached
these issues (indeed, the Middle East as a whole) in differing
ways, with little effective coordination of policy. In fact, how
best to deal with the greater Middle East has emerged as one of the
most contentious issues in U.S.-European relations. The need for a
common approach to the region is more evident than ever. This book
brings together some of Europe and America's leading scholars and
practitioners in an effort to develop a common approach to
resolving the five major crises in the region. European and
American authors provide succinct and fact-filled overviews of the
different crises, describe U.S. and European perspectives on the
way forward, and suggest ways in which the United States and Europe
can better cooperate. In the conclusion, the editors synthesize the
different suggestions into a roadmap for U.S.-European cooperation
for addressing the challenges of the Greater Middle East in the
years ahead. Contributors include Stephen Cohen (Brookings
Institution), James Dobbins (RAND), Toby Dodge (University of
London), Martin Indyk (Saban Center at Brookings), Kenneth Pollack
(Saban Center at Brookings), Jean-Luc Racine (Center for the Study
of India and South Asia), Barnett Rubin (New York University),
Yezid Sayigh (University of Cambridge), and Bruno Tertrais
(Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique).
Colorectal cancer is the second-leading cause of cancer-related
death in the Western World. This Second Edition analyzes the
genetics, mechanisms, and development of colorectal carcinoma and
supplies the latest research and recommendations on the detection,
treatment, and prevention of malignancies of the colon, rectum, and
anus.
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