What determines whether an action is right or wrong? One appealing idea is that a moral code ought to contain a number of rules that tell people how to behave and that are simple and few enough to be easily learned. Another appealing idea is that the consequences of actions matter, often more than anything else. Rule consequentialism tries to weave these two ideas into a general theory of morality. This theory holds that morally wrong actions are the ones forbidden by rules whose acceptance would maximize the overall good. Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader explores for students and researchers the relationship between consequentialist theory and moral rules. Most of the chapters focus on rule consequentialism or on the distinction between act and rule versions of consequentialism. Contributors, among them the leading philosophers in the discipline, suggest ways of assessing whether rule consequentialism could be a satisfactory moral theory. These essays, all of which are previously unpublished, provide students in moral philosophy with essential material and ask key questions on just what the criteria for an adequate moral theory might be.

Are we morally required to act in the interests of others? Does our worth as persons depend in any way on our valuing the good of others? These questions, illustrative of those addressed in this book, concern the relevance of other-interested considerations -- of facts about what is good or bad for others -- to the moral status of persons and their actions. Pursuing answers to such questions is not only interesting and important in its own right, but also yields valuable insights in to the nature of morality. A distinguishing feature of the book is its unusually comprehensive treatment of the moral significance of other-interested considerations per se, of how these considerations are interrelated, and of where they should be located in more general moral theory. It will be of greatest interest to individuals with fairly well-developed philosophical interests and abilities -- to teachers and advanced students of moral philosophy in particular.

People punished by law are treated in ways that we consider immoral in other contexts. In Punishment as Societal-Defense, Phillip Montague develops a new theory of punishment that, instead of justifying it on the basis of deterrence or retribution, constructs it as analogous to individual self-defense. If people are justified in defending themselves against wrongful aggression, Montague argues, the same principles of distributive justice underlie punishment as societal defense.