These essays cover a wide range of subjects and tell the story of air power's evolution over the past century. The author discusses the golden age of air theory before World War II, examining the ideas of British, American and continental airmen. In the great test of World War II, he covers some of the key roles played by air power in both Europe and the Pacific.

These essays cover a wide range of subjects and tell the story of air power's evolution over the past century. The author discusses the golden age of air theory before World War II, examining the ideas of British, American and continental airmen. In the great test of World War II, he covers some of the key roles played by air power in both Europe and the Pacific.

Included on the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force's reading list for 2008Dr. John Andreas Olsen has written an insightful, compelling biography of retired U.S. Air Force colonel John A. Warden III, the brilliant but controversial air warfare theorist and architect of Operation Desert Storm's air campaign. Warden's radical ideas about air power's purposes and applications, promulgated at the expense of his own career, sparked the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Legendary in defense circles, Warden is also the author of "The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat" (republished by Brassey's, Inc. in 1989). Presenting both the positives and negatives of Warden's personality and impact in this objective portrait, Olsen offers a trenchant analysis of his revolutionary ideas and great accomplishments.

Airpower is not widely understood. Even though it has come to play an increasingly important role in both peace and war, the basic concepts that define and govern airpower remain obscure to many people, even to professional military officers. This fact is largely due to fundamental differences of opinion as to whether or not the aircraft has altered the strategies of war or merely its tactics. If the former, then one can see airpower as a revolutionary leap along the continuum of war; but if the latter, then airpower is simply another weapon that joins the arsenal along with the rifle, machine gun, tank, submarine, and radio. This book implicitly assumes that airpower has brought about a revolution in war. It has altered virtually all aspects of war: how it is fought, by whom, against whom, and with what weapons. Flowing from those factors have been changes in training, organization, administration, command and control (C 2), and doctrine. War has been fundamentally transformed by the advent of the airplane. Billy Mitchell defined airpower as "the ability to do something in the air. It consists of transporting all sorts of things by aircraft from one place to another."1 Two British air marshals, Michael Armitage and Tony Mason, more recently wrote that airpower is "the ability to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension above the surface of the earth."2 In truth, both definitions, though separated in time by almost six decades, say much the same thing. Interestingly, however, most observers go on to note that airpower includes far more than air vehicles; it encompasses the personnel, organization, and infrastructure that are essential for the air vehicles to function. On a broader scale, it includes not only military forces but also the aviation industry, including airline companies and aircraft/engine manufacturers. On an even broader plane, airpower includes ideas-ideas on how it should be employed. Even before the aeroplane was invented, people speculated-theorized-on how it could be used in war. The purpose of this book is to trace the evolution of airpower theory from the earliest days of powered flight to the present, concluding with a chapter that speculates on the future of military space applications.3 Attempting to find the origins of airpower theory, trace it, expose it, and then examine and explain it, is no easy task. Perhaps because airpower's history is short-all of it can be contained in a single lifetime-it lacks first-rate narrative and analytical treatments in many areas. As a result, library shelves are crammed with books about the aerodynamics of flight, technical eulogies to specific aircraft, and boys' adventure stories. Less copious are good books on airpower history or biography. For example, after nearly five decades, we still do not have an adequate account of American airpower in the Southwest Pacific theater during World War II, or the role of George Kenney, perhaps the best operationallevel air commander of the war. Similarly, we need a biography of one of the most brilliant thinkers and planners in US Air Force history; the only airman ever to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and the third youngest general in American history-Lauris Norstad. Nor do we have a complete, official history of airpower's employment in the war in Southeast Asia. Much needs to be done to fill such gaps.

The concept of flight has fascinated man for millennia. The minds of the ancients invented winged gods and goddesses who lived in the heavens or who traversed it in chariots of gold. The restless brilliance of Leonardo da Vinci designed a flying machine five centuries ago; but his vision, as well as those of many who followed, relied on the muscle power of man to make it work. That would not be enough. A mechanical engine would be necessary. Flight would have to be a byproduct of the industrial revolution. In the meantime, man turned to an alternative means of reaching into the sky-balloons. The first balloon ascent occurred in Paris in 1783-the same year the United States gained its independence from Britain, ratified, coincidentally, by a treaty signed in Paris. Over the next century and a half, balloons and their more steerable brethren, dirigibles or rigid airships, were designed and flown in various countries worldwide. But the notion of heavier-than-air flight in a winged vehicle would not go away. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century a number of aviation pioneers studied the problem of flight from an increasingly scientific viewpoint. All recognized that two primary problems needed to be overcome-power and directional control. Someone would have to build an engine that was both powerful enough and light enough to lift an airplane and its pilot into the air and sustain it. The internal combustion engine was the obvious solution, but early motors that were made for automobiles and dirigibles were too heavy- they delivered too little horsepower for their weight. Related to this issue was the need for a suitable airscrew, or propeller, to attach to the engine that would propel the craft through the air. The second problem, controlling an airplane in flight, seemed even more difficult. Both of these problems were solved by two hard-working and taciturn bicycle mechanics from Dayton, Ohio. (Their bicycle shop has since been restored and moved to Greenfield Village near Detroit). Orville and Wilbur Wright, sons of a minister, designed and built their own gasoline engine that was not a spectacular device, but adequate for their purpose. It weighed about 200 pounds and delivered 12 horsepower. Just enough. Also important, the brothers designed and built their own propellers. Their solution to the directional control issue was more ingenious. Learning from the flight of birds, the brothers saw that birds made subtle changes in their wingtips, bending them up or down slightly, and this allowed them to turn quickly and gracefully. The Wrights therefore rigged up a series of cables and pulleys that connected the wings of their craft to levers where the aviator would lie (later sit). When manipulating the levers, the pilot would actually twist the shape of the wings themselves-much like a bird alters the shape of its wings-allowing the craft to turn. This "wing warping" method was soon replaced by more practical devices-movable rudders and ailerons. The latter consisted of a separate airfoil usually attached to the outer portion of a wing: but the basic principle the Wrights invented was sound. On Dec. 17, 1903, at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, the Wright brothers made history's first powered flight in a heavier-than-air machine that incorporated their two scientific breakthroughs. Their invention, the airplane, changed the world. As the centennial of their momentous achievement approaches, the United States Air Force has established the Centennial of Flight Office, whose mission is to celebrate airpower and the Wright brothers' historic event. One of their projects is this pamphlet series, which will trace the most significant people, events, technologies and ideas in the history of the United States Air Force.

Airpower, especially strategic bombing, frequently generates controversy. Ever since the US Army bought it first "aeroplane" in 1909, debates have raged over the utility, effectiveness, efficiency, legality, and even the morality of air power. These debates continue despite (or perhaps because of) the hundreds of books that have been written on the subject and the scores of examples witnessed. Much of the debate regarding airpower and strategic bombing has been colored by accusations, misconceptions, inaccuracies, myths, and simple untruths. If airpower needs criticizing it must be based on accurate information. This manuscript highlights points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning air power and strategic bombing.

Ever since the US Army bought its first "aeroplane" in 1909, debates have raged over the utility, effectiveness, efficiency, legality, and even the morality of airpower and strategic bombing. Unfortunately, much of this controversy has been colored by accusations, misconceptions, inaccuracies, myths, and simple untruths. If airpower needs criticizing - and certainly there are times when criticism is appropriate - it must be based on accurate information. In Airpower: Myths and Facts, Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, retired, raises points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing and giving our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts.

Though we are still within the first century of powered flight, air power has already become the dominant form of military power projection in the modern world. The doctrinal underpinnings of air power thought are, of course, traditionally ascribed to the three great theorists of air power application, Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell. Since the Second World War, the air power community has not often explored the doctrinal implications of air power development. Lord Tedder's Lee Knowles lectures at Cambridge, and the writings of Air Vice Marshal R. A. Mason, and Colonel John A. Warden constitute notable-and noteworthy-exceptions. Now comes Colonel Phillip Meilinger, who has posited a group of provocative propositions that will instill an appreciation for air power for those who seek to understand it and challenge the assumptions of those who do not yet appreciate what it offers. This book has been deliberately designed in a small format so that it can be readily carried in the pocket of a flight suit or a BDU. Readers are encouraged to discuss these propositions and, if so moved, to communicate directly with Colonel Meilinger via the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, or through the Office of the Air Force Historian, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

The United States has the most expensive and seemingly unstoppable military in the world. Yet, since World War II the nation's military success rate has been meager. The Korean War was a draw, while Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan, and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. What differentiates the failures from the successes? Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops.Phillip S. Meilinger's new book advocates strategies that limit risks in war as well as achieve measurable goals. Instead of large numbers of conventional ground troops, the author argues in favor of a focus on asymmetric capabilities--a combination of airpower, special operation forces, intelligence, and indigenous ground troops--to achieve the desired political outcomes.