This book introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, model, and analyze cyber deception. Drawing upon a collection of deception research from the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of defensive cyber deception. Three of these six species are highlighted in the context of emerging problems such as privacy against ubiquitous tracking in the Internet of things (IoT), dynamic honeynets for the observation of advanced persistent threats (APTs), and active defense against physical denial-of-service (PDoS) attacks. Because of its uniquely thorough treatment of cyber deception, this book will serve as a timely contribution and valuable resource in this active field. The opening chapters introduce both cybersecurity in a manner suitable for game theorists and game theory as appropriate for cybersecurity professionals. Chapter Four then guides readers through the specific field of defensive cyber deception. A key feature of the remaining chapters is the development of a signaling game model for the species of leaky deception featured in honeypots and honeyfiles. This model is expanded to study interactions between multiple agents with varying abilities to detect deception. Game Theory for Cyber Deception will appeal to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and researchers interested in applying game theory to cybersecurity. It will also be of value to researchers and professionals working on cybersecurity who seek an introduction to game theory.

This book introduces a cross-layer design to achieve security and resilience for CPSs (Cyber-Physical Systems). The authors interconnect various technical tools and methods to capture the different properties between cyber and physical layers. Part II of this book bridges the gap between cryptography and control-theoretic tools. It develops a bespoke crypto-control framework to address security and resiliency in control and estimation problems where the outsourcing of computations is possible. Part III of this book bridges the gap between game theory and control theory and develops interdependent impact-aware security defense strategies and cyber-aware resilient control strategies. With the rapid development of smart cities, there is a growing need to integrate the physical systems, ranging from large-scale infrastructures to small embedded systems, with networked communications. The integration of the physical and cyber systems forms Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), enabling the use of digital information and control technologies to improve the monitoring, operation, and planning of the systems. Despite these advantages, they are vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks, which aim to damage the physical layer through the cyber network. This book also uses case studies from autonomous systems, communication-based train control systems, cyber manufacturing, and robotic systems to illustrate the proposed methodologies. These case studies aim to motivate readers to adopt a cross-layer system perspective toward security and resilience issues of large and complex systems and develop domain-specific solutions to address CPS challenges. A comprehensive suite of solutions to a broad range of technical challenges in secure and resilient control systems are described in this book (many of the findings in this book are useful to anyone working in cybersecurity). Researchers, professors, and advanced-level students working in computer science and engineering will find this book useful as a reference or secondary text. Industry professionals and military workers interested in cybersecurity will also want to purchase this book.

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the key concerns as well as research challenges in designing secure and resilient Industrial Control Systems (ICS). It will discuss today's state of the art security architectures and couple it with near and long term research needs that compare to the baseline. It will also establish all discussions to generic reference architecture for ICS that reflects and protects high consequence scenarios. Significant strides have been made in making industrial control systems secure. However, increasing connectivity of ICS systems with commodity IT devices and significant human interaction of ICS systems during its operation regularly introduces newer threats to these systems resulting in ICS security defenses always playing catch-up. There is an emerging consensus that it is very important for ICS missions to survive cyber-attacks as well as failures and continue to maintain a certain level and quality of service. Such resilient ICS design requires one to be proactive in understanding and reasoning about evolving threats to ICS components, their potential effects on the ICS mission's survivability goals, and identify ways to design secure resilient ICS systems. This book targets primarily educators and researchers working in the area of ICS and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems security and resiliency. Practitioners responsible for security deployment, management and governance in ICS and SCADA systems would also find this book useful. Graduate students will find this book to be a good starting point for research in this area and a reference source.

This contributed volume offers a collection of papers presented at the 2018 Network Games, Control, and Optimization conference (NETGCOOP), held at the New York University Tandon School of Engineering in New York City, November 14-16, 2018. These papers highlight the increasing importance of network control and optimization in many networking application domains, such as mobile and fixed access networks, computer networks, social networks, transportation networks, and, more recently, electricity grids and biological networks. Covering a wide variety of both theoretical and applied topics in the areas listed above, the authors explore several conceptual and algorithmic tools that are needed for efficient and robust control operation, performance optimization, and better understanding the relationships between entities that may be acting cooperatively or selfishly in uncertain and possibly adversarial environments. As such, this volume will be of interest to applied mathematicians, computer scientists, engineers, and researchers in other related fields.

This book introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, model, and analyze cyber deception. Drawing upon a collection of deception research from the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of defensive cyber deception. Three of these six species are highlighted in the context of emerging problems such as privacy against ubiquitous tracking in the Internet of things (IoT), dynamic honeynets for the observation of advanced persistent threats (APTs), and active defense against physical denial-of-service (PDoS) attacks. Because of its uniquely thorough treatment of cyber deception, this book will serve as a timely contribution and valuable resource in this active field. The opening chapters introduce both cybersecurity in a manner suitable for game theorists and game theory as appropriate for cybersecurity professionals. Chapter Four then guides readers through the specific field of defensive cyber deception. A key feature of the remaining chapters is the development of a signaling game model for the species of leaky deception featured in honeypots and honeyfiles. This model is expanded to study interactions between multiple agents with varying abilities to detect deception. Game Theory for Cyber Deception will appeal to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and researchers interested in applying game theory to cybersecurity. It will also be of value to researchers and professionals working on cybersecurity who seek an introduction to game theory.

This book presents a compendium of selected game- and decision-theoretic models to achieve and assess the security of critical infrastructures. Given contemporary reports on security incidents of various kinds, we can see a paradigm shift to attacks of an increasingly heterogeneous nature, combining different techniques into what we know as an advanced persistent threat. Security precautions must match these diverse threat patterns in an equally diverse manner; in response, this book provides a wealth of techniques for protection and mitigation. Much traditional security research has a narrow focus on specific attack scenarios or applications, and strives to make an attack "practically impossible." A more recent approach to security views it as a scenario in which the cost of an attack exceeds the potential reward. This does not rule out the possibility of an attack but minimizes its likelihood to the least possible risk. The book follows this economic definition of security, offering a management scientific view that seeks a balance between security investments and their resulting benefits. It focuses on optimization of resources in light of threats such as terrorism and advanced persistent threats. Drawing on the authors' experience and inspired by real case studies, the book provides a systematic approach to critical infrastructure security and resilience. Presenting a mixture of theoretical work and practical success stories, the book is chiefly intended for students and practitioners seeking an introduction to game- and decision-theoretic techniques for security. The required mathematical concepts are self-contained, rigorously introduced, and illustrated by case studies. The book also provides software tools that help guide readers in the practical use of the scientific models and computational frameworks.

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the key concerns as well as research challenges in designing secure and resilient Industrial Control Systems (ICS). It will discuss today's state of the art security architectures and couple it with near and long term research needs that compare to the baseline. It will also establish all discussions to generic reference architecture for ICS that reflects and protects high consequence scenarios. Significant strides have been made in making industrial control systems secure. However, increasing connectivity of ICS systems with commodity IT devices and significant human interaction of ICS systems during its operation regularly introduces newer threats to these systems resulting in ICS security defenses always playing catch-up. There is an emerging consensus that it is very important for ICS missions to survive cyber-attacks as well as failures and continue to maintain a certain level and quality of service. Such resilient ICS design requires one to be proactive in understanding and reasoning about evolving threats to ICS components, their potential effects on the ICS mission's survivability goals, and identify ways to design secure resilient ICS systems. This book targets primarily educators and researchers working in the area of ICS and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems security and resiliency. Practitioners responsible for security deployment, management and governance in ICS and SCADA systems would also find this book useful. Graduate students will find this book to be a good starting point for research in this area and a reference source.

This brief introduces game- and decision-theoretical techniques for the analysis and design of resilient interdependent networks. It unites game and decision theory with network science to lay a system-theoretical foundation for understanding the resiliency of interdependent and heterogeneous network systems. The authors pay particular attention to critical infrastructure systems, such as electric power, water, transportation, and communications. They discuss how infrastructure networks are becoming increasingly interconnected as the integration of Internet of Things devices, and how a single-point failure in one network can propagate to other infrastructures, creating an enormous social and economic impact. The specific topics in the book include: * static and dynamic meta-network resilience game analysis and design; * optimal control of interdependent epidemics spreading over complex networks; and * applications to secure and resilient design of critical infrastructures. These topics are supported by up-to-date summaries of the authors' recent research findings. The authors then discuss the future challenges and directions in the analysis and design of interdependent networks and explain the role of multi-disciplinary research has in computer science, engineering, public policy, and social sciences fields of study. The brief introduces new application areas in mathematics, economics, and system and control theory, and will be of interest to researchers and practitioners looking for new approaches to assess and mitigate risks in their systems and enhance their network resilience. A Game- and Decision-Theoretic Approach to Resilient Interdependent Network Analysis and Design also has self-contained chapters, which allows for multiple levels of reading by anyone with an interest in game and decision theory and network science.

This book presents the latest research in cognitive security, a rapidly emerging field that addresses the vulnerabilities in human behavior and cognition that can lead to Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) compromise. This book demonstrates that as adversaries increasingly use manipulative and deceptive information to disrupt human cognitive processes, including sensation, attention, memory, and mental operations, humans are misled into fallacious reasoning and manipulated decisions that can lead to system-level meltdown. Cognitive security aims to protect humans from the exploitation of cognitive vulnerabilities, help them make informed decisions that are free from manipulation and undue influence, and mitigate the aggravating risk in the ensuing steps of the attacker’s kill chain. This book offers solutions that work across different fields, such as psychology, neuroscience, data science, social science, and game theory, to deal with cognitive threats. It guides the reader through the core ideas with figures, real-life examples, and case studies. Moreover, it formally defines all research questions, presents the results using mathematical theorems and proofs, and obtains insights through numerical validation. This book provides a self-contained and brief overview of essential system-scientific tools for modeling, analyzing, and mitigating cognitive vulnerabilities. The concepts of human cognitive capacities and cognitive vulnerabilities are formally discussed, followed by two case studies in the scenarios of reactive and proactive attention vulnerabilities. This book provides insights and applications on this transdisciplinary topic, with the goal of motivating future research in this emerging area and pushing the frontier of human-technology convergence. This book is a valuable reference for researchers and advanced-level students studying or working in cognitive security and related fields. It is also useful for decision-makers, managers, and professionals working within these related fields.

This book comprises a set of chapters that introduce various topics pertinent to novel approaches towards enhancing cyber-physical measures for increased security and resilience levels in control systems. The unifying theme of these approaches lies in the utilization of knowledge and models of the physical systems, rather than an attempt to reinvigorate conventional IT-based security measures. The contributing authors present perspectives on network security, game theory, and control, as well as views on how these disciplines can be combined to design resilient, safe, and secure control systems. The book explores how attacks in different forms, such as false data injections and denial-of-service can be very harmful, and may not be detected unless the security measures exploit the physical models. Several applications are discussed, power systems being considered most thoroughly. Because of its interdisciplinary nature-techniques from systems control, game theory, signal processing and computer science all make contributions-Security and Resilience of Control Systems will be of interest to academics, practitioners and graduate students with a broad spectrum of interests.

This SpringerBrief introduces methodologies and tools for quantitative understanding and assessment of supply chain risk to critical infrastructure systems. It unites system reliability analysis, optimization theory, detection theory and mechanism design theory to study vendor involvement in overall system security. It also provides decision support for risk mitigation. This SpringerBrief introduces I-SCRAM, a software tool to assess the risk. It enables critical infrastructure operators to make risk-informed decisions relating to the supply chain, while deploying their IT/OT and IoT systems. The authors present examples and case studies on supply chain risk assessment/mitigation of modern connected infrastructure systems such as autonomous vehicles, industrial control systems, autonomous truck platooning and more. It also discusses how vendors of different system components are involved in the overall security posture of the system and how the risk can be mitigated through vendor selection and diversification. The specific topics in this book include: Risk modeling and analysis of IoT supply chains Methodologies for risk mitigation, policy management, accountability, and cyber insurance Tutorial on a software tool for supply chain risk management of IoT These topics are supported by up-to-date summaries of the authors' recent research findings. The authors introduce a taxonomy of supply chain security and discusses the future challenges and directions in securing the supply chains of IoT systems. It also focuses on the need for joint policy and technical solutions to counter the emerging risks, where technology should inform policy and policy should regulate technology development. This SpringerBrief has self-contained chapters, facilitating the readers to peruse individual topics of interest. It provides a broad understanding of the emerging field of cyber supply chain security in the context of IoT systems to academics, industry professionals and government officials.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2020,held in College Park, MD, USA, in October 2020. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the conference was held virtually The 21 full papers presented together with 2 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 29 submissions. The papers focus on machine learning and security; cyber deception; cyber-physical systems security; security of network systems; theoretic foundations of security games; emerging topics.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2016, held in New York, NY, USA, in November 2016. The 18 revised full papers presented together with 8 short papers and 5 poster papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 40 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on network security; security risks and investments; special track-validating models; decision making for privacy; security games; incentives and cybersecurity mechanisms; and intrusion detection and information limitations in security.

Robotics is becoming more and more ubiquitous, but the pressure to bring systems to market occasionally goes at the cost of neglecting security mechanisms during the development, deployment or while in production. As a result, contemporary robotic systems are vulnerable to diverse attack patterns, and a posteriori hardening is at least challenging, if not impossible at all. This book aims to stipulate the inclusion of security in robotics from the earliest design phases onward and with a special focus on the cost-benefit tradeoff that can otherwise be an inhibitor for the fast development of affordable systems. We advocate quantitative methods of security management and design, covering vulnerability scoring systems tailored to robotic systems, and accounting for the highly distributed nature of robots as an interplay of potentially very many components. A powerful quantitative approach to model-based security is offered by game theory, providing a rich spectrum of techniques to optimize security against various kinds of attacks. Such a multi-perspective view on security is necessary to address the heterogeneity and complexity of robotic systems. This book is intended as an accessible starter for the theoretician and practitioner working in the field.

This book comprises a set of chapters that introduce various topics pertinent to novel approaches towards enhancing cyber-physical measures for increased security and resilience levels in control systems. The unifying theme of these approaches lies in the utilization of knowledge and models of the physical systems, rather than an attempt to reinvigorate conventional IT-based security measures. The contributing authors present perspectives on network security, game theory, and control, as well as views on how these disciplines can be combined to design resilient, safe, and secure control systems. The book explores how attacks in different forms, such as false data injections and denial-of-service can be very harmful, and may not be detected unless the security measures exploit the physical models. Several applications are discussed, power systems being considered most thoroughly. Because of its interdisciplinary nature-techniques from systems control, game theory, signal processing and computer science all make contributions-Security and Resilience of Control Systems will be of interest to academics, practitioners and graduate students with a broad spectrum of interests.