Focusing on the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras, R. Gerald Hughes explores the continuing influence of Appeasement on British foreign policy and re-evaluates the relationship between British society and Appeasement, both as historical memory and as a foreign policy process. "The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement" explores the reaction of British policy makers to the legacies of the era of Appeasement, the memory of Appeasement in public opinion and the media and the use of Appeasement as a motif in political debate regarding threats faced by Britain in the post-war era. Using many previously unpublished archival sources, this book clearly demonstrates that many of the core British beliefs and cultural norms that had underpinned the Chamberlainite Appeasement of the 1930s persisted in the postwar period.

The events of 9/11 and subsequent acts of jihadist terrorism, together with the failures of intelligence agencies over Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, have arguably heralded a new age of intelligence. For some this takes the form of a crisis of legitimacy. For others the threat of cataclysmic terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack gives added poignancy to the academic contention that intelligence failure is inevitable. Many of the challenges facing intelligence appear to be both new and deeply worrying. In response, intelligence has clearly taken on new forms and new agendas. How these various developments are viewed depends upon the historical, normative and political frameworks in which they are analysed. This book addresses fundamental questions arising in this new age. The central aim of the collection is to identify key issues and questions and subject them to interrogation from different methodological perspectives using internationally acclaimed experts in the field. A key focus in the collection is on British and North American perspectives. Recent trends and debates about the organisation and conduct of intelligence provide key themes for exploration. Underpinning several contributions is the recognition that intelligence faces a conflict of ideas as much as practices and threats. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

The events of 9/11 and subsequent acts of jihadist terrorism, together with the failures of intelligence agencies over Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, have arguably heralded a new age of intelligence. For some this takes the form of a crisis of legitimacy. For others the threat of cataclysmic terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack gives added poignancy to the academic contention that intelligence failure is inevitable. Many of the challenges facing intelligence appear to be both new and deeply worrying. In response, intelligence has clearly taken on new forms and new agendas. How these various developments are viewed depends upon the historical, normative and political frameworks in which they are analysed. This book addresses fundamental questions arising in this new age. The central aim of the collection is to identify key issues and questions and subject them to interrogation from different methodological perspectives using internationally acclaimed experts in the field. A key focus in the collection is on British and North American perspectives. Recent trends and debates about the organisation and conduct of intelligence provide key themes for exploration. Underpinning several contributions is the recognition that intelligence faces a conflict of ideas as much as practices and threats. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue detente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies.

From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking detente with the Soviet Union. British statesmen realized that only through compromise with Moscow over the German question could the elusive East-West be achieved. Against this, the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was seen by the British as perpetuating tension between the two blocs. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations to the West German state and its search for compromise with the Soviet bloc. Charting Britain's attempts to reconcile this contradiction, this book argues that Britain successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards detente in the early 1960s, whilst drawing towards Western Europe and applying for membership of the EEC in 1961.

Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of detente and the evolution of European integration.

This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history.

This volume brings together a collection of leading international experts to revisit and review our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis, via a critical reappraisal of some of the key texts. In October 1962, humankind came close to the end of its history. The risk of catastrophe is now recognised by many to have been greater than realised by protagonists at the time or scholars subsequently. The Cuban missile crisis remains one of the mostly intensely studied moments of world history. Understanding is framed and informed by Cold War historiography, political science and personal experience, written by scholars, journalists, and surviving officials. The emergence of Soviet (later Russian) and other national narratives has broadened the scope of enquiry, while scrutiny of the operational, especially military, dimensions has challenged assumptions about the risk of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal brings together world leading scholars from America, Britain, France, Canada, and Russia to present critical scrutiny of authoritative accounts and to recast assumptions and interpretations. The book aims to provide an essential guide for students of the missile crisis, the diplomacy of the Cold War, and the dynamics of historical interpretation and reinterpretation. Offering original ideas and agendas, the contributors seek to provide a new understanding of the secrets and mysteries of the moment when the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This book will be of great interest to students of the Cuban missile crisis, Cold War Studies, nuclear proliferation, international history and International Relations in general.

This volume brings together a collection of leading international experts to revisit and review our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis, via a critical reappraisal of some of the key texts. In October 1962, humankind came close to the end of its history. The risk of catastrophe is now recognised by many to have been greater than realised by protagonists at the time or scholars subsequently. The Cuban missile crisis remains one of the mostly intensely studied moments of world history. Understanding is framed and informed by Cold War historiography, political science and personal experience, written by scholars, journalists, and surviving officials. The emergence of Soviet (later Russian) and other national narratives has broadened the scope of enquiry, while scrutiny of the operational, especially military, dimensions has challenged assumptions about the risk of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal brings together world leading scholars from America, Britain, France, Canada, and Russia to present critical scrutiny of authoritative accounts and to recast assumptions and interpretations. The book aims to provide an essential guide for students of the missile crisis, the diplomacy of the Cold War, and the dynamics of historical interpretation and reinterpretation. Offering original ideas and agendas, the contributors seek to provide a new understanding of the secrets and mysteries of the moment when the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This book will be of great interest to students of the Cuban missile crisis, Cold War Studies, nuclear proliferation, international history and International Relations in general.

This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue detente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies.

From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking detente with the Soviet Union. British statesmen realized that only through compromise with Moscow over the German question could the elusive East-West be achieved. Against this, the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was seen by the British as perpetuating tension between the two blocs. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations to the West German state and its search for compromise with the Soviet bloc. Charting Britain's attempts to reconcile this contradiction, this book argues that Britain successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards detente in the early 1960s, whilst drawing towards Western Europe and applying for membership of the EEC in 1961.

Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of detente and the evolution of European integration.

This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history."

If deception, deceit and manipulation are integral to the business of intelligence gathering - what are the implications for the historical record? Are intelligence archives themselves officially constructed to allow only manipulated histories?

This new book examines these questions and explores how various kinds of people involved in studying and/or practicing intelligence, view texts and issues from different perspectives. It shows how scholars have long sought to make use of relevant archives, but constraints on access to such sources have been considerable. With the end of the Cold War and other changes in official attitudes, more intelligence documents are now becoming available.

This is a fascinating new examination that shows how no document speaks entirely for itself, though some may be more eloquent or assertive than others. The interpretation of the archival record (as indeed the non-archival record) is at the heart of scholarship, and challenges in interpreting textsare generic problems for any researcher.

If deception, deceit and manipulation are integral to the business of intelligence gathering - what are the implications for the historical record? Are intelligence archives themselves officially constructed to allow only manipulated histories?

This new book examines these questions and explores how various kinds of people involved in studying and/or practicing intelligence, view texts and issues from different perspectives. It shows how scholars have long sought to make use of relevant archives, but constraints on access to such sources have been considerable. With the end of the Cold War and other changes in official attitudes, more intelligence documents are now becoming available.

This is a fascinating new examination that shows how no document speaks entirely for itself, though some may be more eloquent or assertive than others. The interpretation of the archival record (as indeed the non-archival record) is at the heart of scholarship, and challenges in interpreting textsare generic problems for any researcher.

This collection of essays by leading experts seeks to explore what lessons for the exploitation and management of secret intelligence might be drawn from a variety of case studies ranging from the 1920s to the 'War on Terror'. Long regarded as the 'missing dimension' of international history and politics, public and academic interest in the role of secret intelligence has continued to grow in recent years, not least as a result of controversy surrounding the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 2001. Intelligence, Crises and Security addresses a range of themes including: crisis management, covert diplomacy, intelligence tradecraft, counterterrorism, intelligence 'overload', intelligence in relation to neutral states, deception, and signals intelligence. The work breaks new ground in relation to numerous key international episodes and events, not least as a result of fresh disclosures from government archives across the world. This book was previously published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security and will be essential reading for students of intelligence, intelligence practitioners and general readers alike.

This collection of essays by leading experts seeks to explore what lessons for the exploitation and management of secret intelligence might be drawn from a variety of case studies ranging from the 1920s to the 'War on Terror'. Long regarded as the 'missing dimension' of international history and politics, public and academic interest in the role of secret intelligence has continued to grow in recent years, not least as a result of controversy surrounding the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 2001. Intelligence, Crises and Security addresses a range of themes including: crisis management, covert diplomacy, intelligence tradecraft, counterterrorism, intelligence 'overload', intelligence in relation to neutral states, deception, and signals intelligence. The work breaks new ground in relation to numerous key international episodes and events, not least as a result of fresh disclosures from government archives across the world. This book was previously published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

Focusing on the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras, R. Gerald Hughes explores the continuing influence of Appeasement on British foreign policy and re-evaluates the relationship between British society and Appeasement, both as historical memory and as a foreign policy process. The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement explores the reaction of British policy makers to the legacies of the era of Appeasement, the memory of Appeasement in public opinion and the media and the use of Appeasement as a motif in political debate regarding threats faced by Britain in the post-war era. Using many previously unpublished archival sources, this book clearly demonstrates that many of the core British beliefs and cultural norms that had underpinned the Chamberlainite Appeasement of the 1930s persisted in the postwar period.