This collection by a distinguished group of philosophers, psychologists, and physiologists reflects an interdisciplinary approach to the central question of cognitive science: how do we model the mind? Among the topics explored are the relationships (theoretical, reductive, and explanatory) between philosophy, psychology, computer science, and physiology; what should be asked of models in science generally, and in cognitive science in particular; whether theoretical models must make essential reference to objects in the environment; whether there are human competences that are resistant, in principle, to modelling; whether simulated thinking and intentionality are really thinking and intentionality; how semantics can be generated from syntactics; the meaning of the terms "representations" and "modelling;" whether the nature of the "hardware" matters; and whether computer models of humans are "dehumanizing." Contributors include Donald Davidson, Daniel C. Dennett, Margaret A. Boden, Adam Morton, Dennis Noble, T. Poggio, Colin Blakemore, K.V. Wilkes, P.N. Johnson-Laird, and Jonathan St. B.T. Evans.

This paper presents the author's views regarding the center of gravity, a concept which has created a surprising amount of disagreement among people studying operational art. The problem seems to stem from differences in interpretation of Carl von Clausewitz, from whose work the term "center of gravity" is derived. The principal point of contention is whether or not the term should be limited in application to military forces themselves, that is, to a concentration or mass of the enemy force, or whether it should be expanded to apply to a broad range of factors which affect war. Those who advocate an almost literal translation of Clausewitz's original word, schwerpunkt, argue that belligerents should seek a vital concentration of their enemy's armed forces and destroy it. The destruction of a major element of the enemy's combat power, they contend, will cause him to be unable to recover. He will have been unbalanced by the successful attack of his center of gravity. The U.S. Army's operations manual, FM 100-5, expands the concept of center of gravity beyond that encompassed by only the enemy forces. The manual states that at the operational and strategic levels of war, there are certain vital factors which can be attacked or manipulated in order to unhinge the enemy's effort, or at least to cause him to fight at a marked disadvantage. These vital factors, which are called centers of gravity, give balance and continuity to armed forces. The concept provides a planning tool whereby one looks at war as more than a simple clash of armies in the field, where the greater application of force is always decisive. Whichever way one interprets center of gravity, there is seldom dispute concerning its role in warfare. The determination of the enemy center of gravity and its effective attack are the essence of operational art, and represent the focus of strategic planners. "A Conversation at the Club" portrays a group of Army officers and their discussion of center of gravity.

The purpose of this monograph is to show how a nation's goals may be translated into national strategy and how operational plans are developed based on that strategy. To do so, the monograph will use the example of Japan in World War II. The paper consists of an introduction, a conclusion, and three parts. The first part begins with the events that led to increasing tensions, then hostility between the United States and Japan, and covers Japan's actions from the late 19th century to late 1941. The weeks and days immediately prior to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor are included in the second part, which deals with the reasons Japan elected to wage war on the United States. The last part of the paper identifies Japan's national objectives and examines the strategy by which she expected to accomplish them. It also shows the operational plans the Japanese military was to employ in the Pacific in support of the national strategy.