This lively and lucid introduction to the philosophy of music concentrates on the issues that illuminate musical listening and practice. It examines the conceptual debates relevant to the understanding and performing of music and grounds the philosophy to practical matters throughout. Ideal for a beginning readership with little philosophical background, the author provides an overview of the central debates enlivened by a real sense of enthusiasm for the subject and why it matters. The book begins by filling in the historical background and offers readers a succinct summary of philosophical thinking on music from the Ancient Greeks to Eduard Hanslick and Edmund Gurney. Chapter 2 explores two central questions: what is it that makes music, or, to be precise, some pieces of music, works of art? And, what is the work of music per se? Is it just what we hear, the performance, or is it something over and above that, something we invent or discover? Chapter 3 discusses a problem pecullar to music and one at the heart of philosophical discussion of it, can music have a meaning? And if so, what can it be? Chapter 4 considers whether music can have value. Are there features about music that make it good, features which can be specified in criteria? Is a work good if and only if it meets with the approval of an ideally qualified listener? How do we explain differences of opinion? Indeed, why do we need to make judgements of the relative value of pieces of music at all? This engaging and stimulating book will be of interest to students of aesthetics, musical practitioners and the general reader looking for a non-technical treatment of the subject.

Philosophy of Music is for anyone who has ever wondered whether or not music means anything or why some music is thought to be more significant than other music. It is a lively and lucid introduction to the aesthetics of music and to the issues that illuminate musical listening, understanding and practice. The book assumes no philosophical training on the part of its readers, only an interest in music and our reactions to it. It provides an authoritative analysis of the central issues, enlivened with a real sense of enthusiasm for the subject and its importance. At the heart of the book lie three key questions: What is the work of music? Can it have meaning? Can music have value? R. A. Sharpe guides the reader through the philosophical arguments and conceptual debates surrounding these questions while anchoring the discussion throughout to instances and examples from Western classical music and jazz. Unlike some other accounts of the philosophy of music, which view music as a branch of metaphysics, raising questions about sounds, tones and musical movement, Sharpe's approach is problem-orientated and the questions he raises are predominantly questions about the value of music, about the individuality of our assessments and about the way in which we prize music for its power to move us. He argues persuasively, and controversially for a philosopher, that when it comes to music philosophical analysis has its limitations and that one should not be surprised that the aesthetics of music can harbour contradictions and that our judgement of the value of music may be impossible to make internally consistent. This engaging and stimulating book will be of wide interest to music-lovers, critics, practitioners alike as well as students of aesthetics looking for a non-technical treatment of the subject.

"Making the Human Mind" is an attack on the widespread assumption that the mind has parts and that it is the interaction between these parts which accounts for some of the most characteristic human behaviour, the sorts of irrational behaviour displayed in self-deception and weakness of will.;The implications of this attack are considerable: Professor Sharpe contests a realism about the mind, the belief that there is an inventory which an all-seeing deity could compile and which could contain answers to all the questions we could ask about people. With this goes a hermeneutic approach to the understanding of human behaviour: these forms of understanding are markedly different from that suggested by the scientific model and favoured by those who partition the mind.;Finally, the author undermines eliminative materialism and the idea that the way we talk about the mind constitutes a "folk psychology", arguing that what is distinctively human about the human mind has been created by self-consciousness and is self-created.

In his book "The Moral Case against Religious Belief" (1997), the author argued that some important virtues cease to be virtues at all when set in a religious context, and that, consequently, a religious life is, in many respects, not a good life to lead. In this sequel he takes up the theme again because 'the intervening decade has brought home to us the terrible results of religious conviction'. He writes in the Introduction: 'Most religious people are conventionally devout. Religion does not play a huge part in their everyday lives and their moral life is not continuously under its gaze. I regard this as a thoroughly good thing...My suspicion is that the more intense the religious devotion the more the morality is in danger.'

Robert Sharpe examines the humanist conception of music as a language - as expressive and intelligible - which has traditionally been dominant in Western culture. He argues against the view that the way in which music is expressive is by causing certain states in us: rather, our beliefs about music are integral to our appreciation of it. Differences in musical taste are not just irresolvable differences in sensitivity: they are the result of differences in circumstance and upbringing, of associations and ideology.

This short book is intended to be read in an evening or even a sitting, though it provokes reflections that will go on for far longer. What it has to say is largely directed at the Christian faith, though it may apply to Judaism and Islam as well. Professor Sharpe is a philosopher and writes as a post-Christian. He does not believe in God for moral reasons and argues that in some ways morality is corrupted by religion. He claims that religious belief does not necessarily make its possessor an authority on matters moral and that spokesmen and spokeswomen for religion are often badly wrong about moral questions as a result of their religious commitment. Some virtues cease to be virtues when given a religious context, and consequently a religious life is not, in many respects, a good life to lead. Professor Sharpe has few quarrels with the teaching of Jesus and has tried to develop his argument as far as possible on the basis of values shared by Christians and non-Christians. But he firmly believes in the autonomy of morality. God is not required to guarantee morality and all the sureties and recognizances of morality are internal.