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This volume contains the proceedings of the Social Ontology,
Normativity, and Philosophy of Law conference, which took place on
May 30-31, 2019 at the University of Glasgow. At the invitation of
the Social Ontology Research Group, a panel of prominent scholars
shed light on normativity from the perspective of social ontology
and the philosophy of law.
This collection does not only include articles by Raimo Tuomela and
his co-authors which have been decisive in social ontology. An
extensive introduction provides an account of the impact of the
works, the most important debates in the field, and also addresses
future issues. Thus, the book gives insights that are still viable
and worthy of further scrutiny and development, making it an
inspiring source for those engaged in the debates of the field
today.
Der Band ist mehr als eine Aufsatzsammlung, die Beitrage sind
aufeinander aufgebaut und dicht miteinander vernetzt.
Zusammengenommen wird damit ein neues Paradigma der Erklarung
geschaffen. Grossere Vorkenntnisse sind nicht erforderlich. Die
Beitrage dieses Bandes folgen zwei miteinander zusammenhangenden
Leitlinien: Zum einen handelt es sich um pragmatisch-epistemische
Erklarungsmodelle und zum zweiten wird der Begriff des Verstehens
als zentrales Moment von Erklarung wissenschaftstheoretisch
etabliert."
Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature
of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The
starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is
the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person
("I-mode") versus as a "we-thinking" group member ("we-mode"). The
we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons,
which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons
to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends the
we-mode notion to cover groups controlled by external authority.
Thus, for instance, cooperation and attitude formation are studied
in cases where the participants are governed "from above" as in
many corporations. The volume goes on to present a systematic
philosophical theory related to the
collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A
weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) depends on
group-based collective intentionality. We-mode collective
intentionality is not individualistically reducible and is needed
to complement individualistic accounts in social scientific
theorizing. The we-mode approach is used in the book to account for
collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, and
social practices and institutions, as well as group solidarity.
Tuomela establishes the first complete theory of group reasons (in
the sense of members' reasons for participation in group
activities). The book argues in terms of game-theoretical
group-reasoning that the kind of weak collectivism that the we-mode
approach involves is both conceptually and rational-functionally
different from what an individualistic approach ("pro-group I-mode"
approach) entails.
Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature
of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The
starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is
the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person
("I-mode") versus as a "we-thinking" group member ("we-mode"). The
we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons,
which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons
to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends the
we-mode notion to cover groups controlled by external authority.
Thus, for instance, cooperation and attitude formation are studied
in cases where the participants are governed "from above" as in
many corporations.
The volume goes on to present a systematic philosophical theory
related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the
social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode"
approach) depends on group-based collective intentionality. We-mode
collective intentionality is not individualistically reducible and
is needed to complement individualistic accounts in social
scientific theorizing. The we-mode approach is used in the book to
account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group
attitudes, and social practices and institutions, as well as group
solidarity. Tuomela establishes the first complete theory of group
reasons (in the sense of members' reasons for participation in
group activities). The book argues in terms of game-theoretical
group-reasoning that the kind of weak collectivism that the we-mode
approach involves is both conceptually and rational-functionally
different from what an individualistic approach ("pro-group I-mode"
approach) entails.
The Philosophy of Sociality examines the nature of sociality in its
various forms, with special emphasis on collective intentionality.
Raimo Tuomela begins with a distinction between the
"we-perspective" and the "I-perspective." His study of strong
collective intentionality -- as expressed by joint intentions,
collective commitment, group belief, authority-based group action,
and other phenomena -- outlines the circumstances under which an
individual is required to think and act as a group member. By
developing a systematic theory of sociality, Tuomela investigates
such topics as social institutions, cooperation, cultural
evolution, and group responsibility.
In The Philosophy of Sociality Tuomela asserts that "we-mode"
collective intentionality is a conceptual prerequisite for
understanding basic social notions. He finds several contexts in
which we-mode intentionality is preferable to "pro-group" I-mode
intentionality. He ultimately defends a naturalistic view of the
social world by arguing that the we-mode is a genetic and cultural
adaptaion.
Concepts based on full-blown collective intentionality (aboutness),
viz., we-mode intentionality, are central for understanding and
explaining the social world. The book systematically studies social
groups, acting in them as a group member, collective commitment,
group intentions, beliefs, and actions, especially authority-based
group attitudes and actions. There are also chapters on
cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution, and group
responsibility.
This is a systematic philosophical and conceptual study of the
notion of a social practice. Raimo Tuomela explains social
practices in terms of the interlocking mental states of the agents;
he shows how social practices (for example customs and traditions)
are 'building blocks of society'; and he offers a clear and
powerful account of the way in which social institutions are
constructed from these building blocks as established,
interconnected sets of social practices with a special new social
status. His analysis is based on the novel concept of shared
'we-attitudes', which represent a weak form of collective
intentionality, and he makes instructive connections to major
topics and figures in philosophy and the social sciences. His book
will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of
mind, philosophy of social science, psychology and sociology, and
artificial intelligence.
This philosophical and conceptual study shows how social practices (customs and traditions) are "building blocks of society." Raimo Tuomela systematically reveals how social institutions are constructed from these "building blocks." His analysis is based on the novel concept of shared "we-attitudes," which represent a weak form of collective intentionality, and he makes instructive connections to major topics and figures in philosophy and the social sciences.
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