This is a cross-cultural study of the political economy of war in South Asia. Randolf G. S. Cooper combines an overview of Maratha military culture with a battle-by-battle analysis of the 1803 Anglo-Maratha Campaigns. Building on that foundation he challenges ethnocentric assumptions about British superiority in discipline, drill and technology. He argues that these campaigns, in which Arthur Wellesley served with distinction, represent the military high-water mark of the Marathas who posed the last serious opposition to the formation of the British Raj. Dr Cooper asserts that the real contest for India was never a single decisive battle for the subcontinent. Rather it turned on a complex social and political struggle for control of the South Asian military economy. The author shows that victory in 1803 hinged as much on finance, diplomacy, politics and intelligence as it did on battlefield manoeuvre and war itself.

The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns of 1803 represented the last serious indigenous obstacle to the formation of the British Raj. This study examines Maratha military culture through a battle-by-battle analysis of the campaigns. Randolf Cooper challenges the ethnocentric assumptions that associate Western political ascendancy with "The Military Revolution" and argues that the real contest for India was the struggle to control the South Asian military economy, rather than a single decisive military battle. Victory depended more on economics and intelligence than on superiority in discipline, drill and technology.