|
Showing 1 - 11 of
11 matches in All Departments
In this memoir, Ambassador Ray Garthoff paints a dynamic
diplomatic history of the cold war, tracing the life of the
conflict from the vantage points of an observant insider. His
intellectually formative years coincided with the earliest days of
the cold war, and during his forty-year career, Garthoff
participated in some of the most important policymaking of the
twentieth century: - In the late 1950s he carried out pioneering
research on Soviet military affairs at the Rand Corporation. -
During his four-year tenure at the CIA (1957-61), in addition to
drafting national intellingence estimates, Garthoff made trips to
the Soviet Union with Vice President Richard Nixon and as an
interpreter for a delegation from the Atomic Energy Commission. -
As a special assistant in the State Department, Garthoff worked
with Secretary Dean Rusk., and he was directly involved in the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Later he served as executive officer
and senior State Department adviser for the strategic arms
limitation talks (SALT) delegation. - In the 1970s he served as a
senior Foreign Service inspector, leading missions to a number of
countries around the globe. - As U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria
(1977-79), Garthoff gained first-hand knowledge of the workings of
a communist state and of the Soviet bloc. - In the 1980s, Garthoff
wrote two major studies of American-Soviet relations. He traveled
to the Soviet Union nearly a dozen times in the final decade of the
cold war, and in the early 1990s he had access to the former Soviet
Communist Party archives in Moscow. Garthoff's journey through the
Cold War informs the views, positions, and actions of the past. His
anecdotes and observations will be of great value to those
anticipating the challenges of reevaluating American post-cold war
security policy.
Dramatic changes under way in the Soviet union and the world have
significant implications for American security policy. Soviet
expert Raymond L. Garthoff makes use of unique, newly available
material-- including a complete file of the confidential Soviet
General Staff journal-- to illuminate the development of Soviet
military thinking. In this groundbreaking study, Garthoff explains
that the Soviets regard nuclear deterrence only as a necessary
interim safeguard, not a solution to the quest for security. He
examines the implications of the " remarkable recasting of the
Soviet concept of security" for U.S. policy and global security.
This book, first published in 1954, is a key analysis of the
guiding policies, basic assumptions, fundamental principles and
methods of the Red Army, in many respects the most powerful force
in the Cold War. This analysis examines the strategy and tactics,
weapons systems, training, discipline and political doctrine of the
Red Army, as well as focusing on the political control of the USSR
and its satellite states.
This book, first published in 1954, is a key analysis of the
guiding policies, basic assumptions, fundamental principles and
methods of the Red Army, in many respects the most powerful force
in the Cold War. This analysis examines the strategy and tactics,
weapons systems, training, discipline and political doctrine of the
Red Army, as well as focusing on the political control of the USSR
and its satellite states.
Intelligence agencies spend huge sums of money to collect and
analyze vast quantities of national security data for their
political leaders. How well is this intelligence analyzed, how
often is it acted on by policymakers, and does it have a positive
or negative effect on decision making? Drawing on declassified
documents, interviews with intelligence veterans and policymakers,
and other sources, The Image of the Enemy breaks new ground as it
examines how seven countries analyzed and used intelligence to
shape their understanding of their main adversary. The cases in the
book include the Soviet Union's analysis of the United States (and
vice versa), East Germany's analysis of West Germany (and vice
versa), British intelligence in the early years of the Troubles in
Northern Ireland, Israeli intelligence about the Palestinians,
Pakistani intelligence on India, and US intelligence about Islamist
terrorists. These rivalries provide rich case studies for scholars
and offer today's analysts and policymakers the opportunity to
closely evaluate past successes and failures in intelligence
analysis and the best ways to give information support to
policymakers. Using these lessons from the past, they can move
forward to improve analysis of current adversaries and future
threats.
During the Cold War, the political leadership of the Soviet Union
avidly sought intelligence about its main adversary, the United
States. Although effective on an operational level, Soviet leaders
and their intelligence chiefs fell short when it came to analyzing
intelligence. Soviet leaders were often not receptive to
intelligence that conflicted with their existing beliefs, and
analysts were reluctant to put forward assessments that challenged
ideological orthodoxy. There were, however, important changes over
time. Ultimately the views of an enlightened Soviet leader,
Gorbachev, trumped the ideological blinders of his predecessors and
the intelligence service's dedication to an endless duel with their
ideologically spawned "main adversary," making it possible to end
the Cold War. Raymond Garthoff draws on over five decades of
personal contact with Soviet diplomats, intelligence officers,
military leaders, and scholars during his remarkable career as an
analyst, senior diplomat, and historian. He also builds on previous
scholarship and examines documents from Soviet and Western
archives. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence offers an informed and
highly readable assessment of how the Soviets understood-and
misunderstood-the intentions and objectives of their Cold War
adversary.
Intelligence agencies spend huge sums of money to collect and
analyze vast quantities of national security data for their
political leaders. How well is this intelligence analyzed, how
often is it acted on by policymakers, and does it have a positive
or negative effect on decision making? Drawing on declassified
documents, interviews with intelligence veterans and policymakers,
and other sources, The Image of the Enemy breaks new ground as it
examines how seven countries analyzed and used intelligence to
shape their understanding of their main adversary. The cases in the
book include the Soviet Union's analysis of the United States (and
vice versa), East Germany's analysis of West Germany (and vice
versa), British intelligence in the early years of the Troubles in
Northern Ireland, Israeli intelligence about the Palestinians,
Pakistani intelligence on India, and US intelligence about Islamist
terrorists. These rivalries provide rich case studies for scholars
and offer today's analysts and policymakers the opportunity to
closely evaluate past successes and failures in intelligence
analysis and the best ways to give information support to
policymakers. Using these lessons from the past, they can move
forward to improve analysis of current adversaries and future
threats.
During the Cold War, the political leadership of the Soviet Union
avidly sought intelligence about its main adversary, the United
States. Although effective on an operational level, Soviet leaders
and their intelligence chiefs fell short when it came to analyzing
intelligence. Soviet leaders were often not receptive to
intelligence that conflicted with their existing beliefs, and
analysts were reluctant to put forward assessments that challenged
ideological orthodoxy. There were, however, important changes over
time. Ultimately the views of an enlightened Soviet leader,
Gorbachev, trumped the ideological blinders of his predecessors and
the intelligence service's dedication to an endless duel with their
ideologically spawned "main adversary," making it possible to end
the Cold War. Raymond Garthoff draws on over five decades of
personal contact with Soviet diplomats, intelligence officers,
military leaders, and scholars during his remarkable career as an
analyst, senior diplomat, and historian. He also builds on previous
scholarship and examines documents from Soviet and Western
archives. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence offers an informed and
highly readable assessment of how the Soviets understood-and
misunderstood-the intentions and objectives of their Cold War
adversary.
|
You may like...
Loot
Nadine Gordimer
Paperback
(2)
R398
R330
Discovery Miles 3 300
|