Intelligence plays an important, albeit often hidden hand, in the everyday function of government. Australia's intelligence agencies-collectively referred to as the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC)-are an established and fundamental component of the bureaucracy: they keep watch on potential problems in the name of national security, exploit weaknesses in the name of national interests, and build a picture of the complexities of the broader world for their consumers-other domestic government departments, partner intelligence agencies overseas and, most importantly, Australia's policy-makers. Their aim is to provide the government with 'information'-for that is essentially what intelligence is-to better enable it to tackle the issues confronting it; to be better armed, informed and forewarned of what might lay ahead; and to facilitate coherent policy-making. But we should not expect intelligence to be perfect, nor should we think that good intelligence guarantees good policy. This book draws on a wide range experts including academics, former and current strategic advisers and members of government, private industry professionals and intelligence community experts, to provide a diagnostic, clear-eyed approach in explaining, accessing and exposing the central foundations and frameworks necessary for effective practice of intelligence in Australia as well as the shaping of intelligence expectations.

Intelligence plays an important, albeit often hidden hand, in the everyday function of government. Australia's intelligence agencies-collectively referred to as the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC)-are an established and fundamental component of the bureaucracy: they keep watch on potential problems in the name of national security, exploit weaknesses in the name of national interests, and build a picture of the complexities of the broader world for their consumers-other domestic government departments, partner intelligence agencies overseas and, most importantly, Australia's policy-makers. Their aim is to provide the government with 'information'-for that is essentially what intelligence is-to better enable it to tackle the issues confronting it; to be better armed, informed and forewarned of what might lay ahead; and to facilitate coherent policy-making. But we should not expect intelligence to be perfect, nor should we think that good intelligence guarantees good policy. This book draws on a wide range experts including academics, former and current strategic advisers and members of government, private industry professionals and intelligence community experts, to provide a diagnostic, clear-eyed approach in explaining, accessing and exposing the central foundations and frameworks necessary for effective practice of intelligence in Australia as well as the shaping of intelligence expectations.

Volume I of the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations recounts the Australian peacekeeping missions that began between 1947 and 1982, and follows them through to 2006, which is the end point of this series. The operations described in The Long Search for Peace - some long, some short; some successful, some not - represent a long period of learning and experimentation, and were a necessary apprenticeship for all that was to follow. Australia contributed peacekeepers to all major decolonisation efforts: for thirty-five years in Kashmir, fifty-three years in Cyprus, and (as of writing) sixty-one years in the Middle East, as well as shorter deployments in Indonesia, Korea and Rhodesia. This volume also describes some smaller-scale Australian missions in the Congo, West New Guinea, Yemen, Uganda and Lebanon. It brings to life Australia's long-term contribution not only to these operations but also to the very idea of peacekeeping.

Gallipoli: the mere name summons the story of this well-known campaign of the First World War. And the story of Gallipoli, where in August 1915 the Allied forces made their last valiant effort against the Turks, is one of infamous might-have-beens. If only the Allies had held out a little longer, pushed a little harder, had better luck - Gallipoli might have been the decisive triumph that knocked the Ottoman Empire out of the First World War. But the story is just that, author Rhys Crawley tells us: a story. Not only was the outcome at Gallipoli not close, but the operation was flawed from the start, and an inevitable failure. A painstaking effort to set the historical record straight, Climax at Gallipoli examines the performance of the Allies' Mediterranean Expeditionary Force from the beginning of the Gallipoli Campaign to the bitter end. Crawley reminds us that in 1915, the second year of the war, the Allies were still trying to adapt to a new form of warfare, with static defense replacing the maneuver and offensive strategies of earlier British doctrine. In the attempt both the MEF at Gallipoli and the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front aimed for too much - and both failed. To explain why, Crawley focuses on the operational level of war in the campaign, scrutinizing planning, command, mobility, fire support, interservice cooperation, and logistics. His work draws on unprecedented research into the files of military organizations across the United Kingdom and Australia. The result is a view of the Gallipoli Campaign unique in its detail and scope, as well as in its conclusions - a book that looks past myth and distortion to the facts, and the truth, of what happened at this critical juncture in twentieth-century history.