This title was first published in 2001. This work represents the author's writing and thinking over the last decade on the subject of military intervention and peacekeeping. He deconstructs what has been developed under the auspices of UN "peacekeeping" with a view to producing a new paradigm more appropriate to the challenges of the 21st century. This is not an exercise in disparaging the UN, the organization's achievements are recognized, along with its prevalent habit of entering environments it has neither the resources or expertise to manage. The first four chapters establish a foundation built upon philosophy, doctrine, definitions, principles and decision-making processes. This thinking is then tested using scenarios drawn from Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. The book is founded on theory and practice and it is particularly intended to explain the conduct of the political and military processes involved in military intervention and peacekeeping.

This title was first published in 2001. This work represents the author's writing and thinking over the last decade on the subject of military intervention and peacekeeping. He deconstructs what has been developed under the auspices of UN "peacekeeping" with a view to producing a new paradigm more appropriate to the challenges of the 21st century. This is not an exercise in disparaging the UN, the organization's achievements are recognized, along with its prevalent habit of entering environments it has neither the resources or expertise to manage. The first four chapters establish a foundation built upon philosophy, doctrine, definitions, principles and decision-making processes. This thinking is then tested using scenarios drawn from Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. The book is founded on theory and practice and it is particularly intended to explain the conduct of the political and military processes involved in military intervention and peacekeeping.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor and Francis, an informa company.

The war in the Persian Gulf marked the greatest "projection of power" in history, dwarfing in its scale and speed even the D-day landings of 1944. It dramatically demonstrated the revolution in military affairs which has followed the end of confrontation in Europe. Yet the Gulf War and its aftermath also demonstrated the vast complexities of the projection of power, even in the favorable conditions witnessed in the Gulf.
In this important and timely study, Richard Connaughton, who has visited a peace-keeping operation in Kurdistan and has worked in close collaboration with U.S. military authorities, makes a valuable contribution to the study of international affairs. "Military Intervention in the 1990s" provides the first comprehensive professional study of the problems of future interventions in the context of a complex of political and military issues at the operational level.

The definitive history of the Russo-Japanese war The Russians were wrong-footed from the start, fighting in Manchuria at the end of a 5,000 mile single track railway; the Japanese were a week or so from their bases. The Russian command structure was hopelessly confused, their generals old and incompetent, the Tsar cautious and uncertain. The Russian naval defeat at Tsushima was as farcical as it was complete. The Japanese had defeated a big European power, and the lessons for the West were there for all to see, had they cared to do so. From this curious war, so unsafely ignored for the most part by the military minds of the day, Richard Connaughton has woven a fascinating narrative to appeal to readers at all levels.