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This monograph determined that the tactical and strategic
experience of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since 1981 was
relevant to the future operational environment of the U.S. Army.
The IDF's experiences are relevant because the Israeli Army was
similarly equipped and organized to the heavy units in the U.S.
Army, both then and now. Israel faced a similar full spectrum
threat, and the IDF had to adapt to enemies who switched to
asymmetric methods in order to overcome Israel's conventional
military superiority. The IDF of 1981 paralleled the U.S. Army of
the 2000 in many ways. It was a mechanized heavy force designed to
conduct operations against a Soviet armed and equipped enemy. It
fought and defeated some of those enemies decisively eight years
previously. Beginning with the invasion of Lebanon (Operation
"Peace for Galilee"), the IDF discovered that there were no peer
competitors willing to fight it on its own terms. The nature of war
changed for the IDF in sometimes unexpected ways, and it struggled
to adapt to its changing operational environment. The IDF
operational environment became much more complicated, because while
it retained the old threats in the form of its Arab neighbors, it
added sustained guerrilla war and civil insurrection. This paper
summarized the trends and characteristics of the U.S. Army's
Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and used them as the
basis of comparison with the IDF operational environment. IDF
operations in Lebanon and the two Palestinian Intifadas represented
the trends of the IDF operational environment. All of the COE
characteristics were present in the IDF operational environment in
some form. Nine of the fourteen COE characteristics were present in
the IDF operational environment to a significant degree. The
comparison between the two operational environments was valid.
Having determined that the two operational environments were
similar, the remainder of the paper analyzed how the well the IDF
adapted to its operational environment. The goal was to determine
whether there were lessons relevant to the U.S. Army as it
undergoes Transformation. The IDF was at least partially successful
adapting to seven characteristics: asymmetry, constrained
resources, force protection, information operations, rapidity,
homeland sanctuary, and complex and urban terrain. IDF adaptation
to those seven characteristics had implications from which it was
possible to make recommendations about the course of
Transformation. This paper recommended that the U.S. Army pay
particularly close attention to the way that the IDF adapted its
mechanized and armored units to survive in complex and urban
terrain. The IDF's operational environment in Lebanon was so
hostile that information superiority had negligible impact on force
protection. Since everyone was potentially a threat, successful
enemy attacks were inevitable over time. Vehicle survivability
provided force protection, which in turn gave Israel's political
leadership policy options. The IDF experience confirmed that
homeland sanctuary is no longer possible, and that the effort must
be joint and multi-agency. The ability to adapt to the rapidity of
the operational environment demanded real time intelligence. More
importantly, it required both the will and the authority at the
proper levels to act on that intelligence while it was still of
value. The U.S. Army needs to incorporate asymmetry into its
gunnery and tactical training. It also needs to ensure that the
opposing forces at the training centers be used to determine likely
asymmetric methods of attack against friendly forces and use them
so that friendly units can determine countermeasures. None of the
findings of this 4 monograph were revolutionary or breathtaking.
There were no IDF adaptations that the U.S. Army could not improve
upon, as long as it has the will to do so.
The U.S. Army heavy conventional ground capability that crushed
Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003 no longer exists, and further
reduction of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams are proposed based upon
assumptions that there are no enemies willing to challenge alleged
U.S. conventional warfare supremacy, or that if challengers arise,
precision long range fires will neutralize them. A US Army War
College student argues in this research paper that recent examples
of hybrid warfare prove beyond any reasonable doubt the worth and
utility of a robust, scalable heavy combined arms capability.
This monograph determined that the tactical and strategic
experience of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since 1981 was
relevant to the future operational environment of the U.S. Army.
The IDF's experiences are relevant because the Israeli Army was
similarly equipped and organized to the heavy units in the U.S.
Army, both then and now. Israel faced a similar full spectrum
threat, and the IDF had to adapt to enemies who switched to
asymmetric methods in order to overcome Israel's conventional
military superiority. The IDF of 1981 paralleled the U.S. Army of
the 2000 in many ways. It was a mechanized heavy force designed to
conduct operations against a Soviet armed and equipped enemy. It
fought and defeated some of those enemies decisively eight years
previously. Beginning with the invasion of Lebanon (Operation
"Peace for Galilee"), the IDF discovered that there were no peer
competitors willing to fight it on its own terms. The nature of war
changed for the IDF in sometimes unexpected ways, and it struggled
to adapt to its changing operational environment. The IDF
operational environment became much more complicated, because while
it retained the old threats in the form of its Arab neighbors, it
added sustained guerrilla war and civil insurrection. This paper
summarized the trends and characteristics of the U.S. Army's
Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and used them as the
basis of comparison with the IDF operational environment.
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