|
Showing 1 - 5 of
5 matches in All Departments
This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and
its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed
background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases
in which issues of its applicability were raised. It will be
revised biannually. In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have
continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities,
sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the
War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential
subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a
vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the
War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by
every President since the law's enactment in 1973. In 1999, after
the President committed U.S. military forces to action in
Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom
Campbell used expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a
debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia, and later
sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce
presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers
Resolution. The War Powers Resolution P.L. 93-148 was passed over
the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide
procedures for Congress and the President to participate in
decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section
4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any
introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent
hostilities. When such a report is submitted, or is required to be
submitted, section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be
terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use
or extends the time period. Section 3 requires that the "President
in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before
introducing" U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent
hostilities. From 1975 through mid-September 2012, Presidents have
submitted 136 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution,
but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited section 4(a)(1),
which triggers the time limit, and in this case the military action
was completed and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of
conflict when the report was made. The reports submitted by the
President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a
range of military activities, from embassy evacuations to
full-scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf
conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo,
and the anti-terrorism actions in Afghanistan. In some instances,
U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without
formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On one
occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the
requirements of section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29,
1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by
law, the use of military force against Iraq. In several instances
neither the President, Congress, nor the courts have been willing
to trigger the War Powers Resolution mechanism.
Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time
the President introduces Armed Forces into a situation abroad that
conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One
issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and
Congress, whether the use of Armed Forces falls within the purview
of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers
Resolution (WPR). The other issue is whether or not Congress
concurs in the wisdom of the action. This report does not deal with
the substantive merits of using Armed Forces in specific cases, but
rather with congressional authorization for military action, and
the application and effectiveness of the WPR. The purpose of the
WPR (P.L. 93-148, passed over President Nixon's veto on November 7,
1973) is to ensure that Congress and the President share in making
decisions that may get the United States involved in hostilities.
Compliance becomes an issue whenever the President introduces U.S.
forces abroad in situations that might be construed as hostilities
or imminent hostilities. Criteria for compliance include prior
consultation with Congress, fulfillment of the reporting
requirements, and congressional authorization. If the President has
not complied fully, the issue becomes what action Congress should
take to bring about compliance or to influence U.S. policy. A
related issue has been congressional authorization of U.N.
peacekeeping or other U.N.-sponsored actions. For over three
decades, war powers and the War Powers Resolution have been an
issue in U.S. military actions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa,
Central America, and Europe. Presidents have submitted 136 reports
to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution, although only
one (the Mayaguez situation) cited Section 4(a)(1) or specifically
stated that forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent
hostilities. Congress invoked the WPR in the Multinational Force in
Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), which authorized the Marines to
remain in Lebanon for 18 months. In addition, P.L. 102-1, enacted
in January 1991, authorizing the use of U.S. Armed Forces in
response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, stated that it
constituted specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
the WPR. On November 9, 1993, the House used a section of the WPR
to state that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Somalia by March
31, 1994; Congress had already taken this action in appropriations
legislation. War powers have been at issue in former
Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq, and Haiti. Authorizing military
actions in response to the terrorist attacks against the United
States of September 11, 2001, through P.L. 107-40 directly involved
war powers. The continued use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance
with U.N. resolutions remained a war powers issue from the end of
the Gulf War on February 28, 1991, until the enactment of P.L.
107-243 in October 2002, which explicitly authorized the President
to use force against Iraq, an authority he exercised in March 2003,
and continues to exercise for military operations in Iraq. Most
recently, issues associated with presidential compliance with the
War Powers Resolution have arisen over his use of U.S. military
forces to support a U.N. sanctioned "no-fly zone" in Libya, without
obtaining congressional authorization for such action. Debate
continues on whether using the War Powers Resolution is effective
as a means of assuring congressional participation in decisions
that might get the United States involved in a significant military
conflict. Proposals have been made to modify or repeal the
resolution. None have been enacted to date.
St. John's Episcopal Church, Lafayette Square, in Washington, DC is
one of the most unique churches in the United States. A National
Historic Landmark, located just north of Lafayette Square, and in
clear view of the White House, it has witnessed the presence within
its walls of more notable civilian and military leaders of the
United States than any other church in the nation. Apart from the
White House, St. John's Church is the oldest building adjacent to
Lafayette Square. It was designed, and its construction supervised,
by Benjamin Henry Latrobe, a leading architect of the early
national period. From its opening in October 1816, every person,
beginning with James Madison, who has held the office of President
of the United States has attended St. John's at least once. Several
Presidents have been members. Thus, St. John's is called "the
Church of the Presidents." A significant number of members of St.
John's, past and present, have played very prominent roles in the
public life of the United States and the city of Washington, DC.
This book tells the story of this historic church from its origins
to the present, while chronicling notable services held at it, and
key events in the lives of distinguished Americans who were
personally connected with St. John's during their residence in
Washington. REVIEWS The first thing to note about this marvelous
history of St. John's Church is the research. From start to finish
the facts are meticulously assembled and clearly laid out to the
reader. This alone makes the book worth reading. But it is far more
than a collection of facts. It is the story--or rather the
stories-- of St. John's Church that makes this book stand out as a
true gem with very few equals in the annals of Church History.
--Harry S. Stout Jonathan Edwards Professor of American Religious
History Yale University Sited importantly on its corner across from
the White House, St. John's Episcopal Church has served both the
famous and Everyman without interruption for nearly 200 years, its
architectural evolution an index of the development of the capital
itself. Historian Richard Grimmett tells the story of the "Church
of the Presidents" in "St. John's Church: Lafayette Square" with
the painstaking accuracy of an experienced researcher. Flavored
with personalities and rich anecdotes, this book begins life as a
Washington classic. --William Seale Editor, White House History
author of "The President s House: A History." Because St. John s
Church has been so closely associated with presidents, cabinet
members, powerful insiders and Washington society anyone interested
in the compelling historical details of a slice of Washington life
would want to add the book to his or her library. --Mary O. Klein
Archivist, Episcopal Diocese of Maryland.
This book provides the reader with unclassified quantitative data
on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United
States and foreign countries. Some general data are provided on
world-wide conventional arms transfers, but the principal focus is
the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations
in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the
primary purchasers in the sale of arms. During the years 1994-2001,
the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations
compromised 68.3 per cent of all such agreements world-wide. More
recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations
constituted 65.8 per cent of all such agreements globally from
1998-2001, and 60.5 per cent of these agreements in 2001. Contents:
Introduction; Major Findings; Summary of Data Trends, 1994-2001;
Selected Weapons Deliveries to Developing Nations, 1994-2001;
World-wide Arms Transfer Agreements and Deliveries Values,
1994-2001; Description of Items Counted in Weapons Categories,
1994-2001; Regions Identified in Arms Transfer Tables and Charts;
List of Tables; Index.
This book provides historical background on the enactment of
declarations of war and authorisations for the use of force and
analyses their legal effects under international and domestic law.
It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. Because the
statutes that confer standby authority on the President and the
executive branch potentially play such a large role in an armed
conflict to which the United States is a party, the book includes
an extensive listing and summary of the statutes that are triggered
by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency,
and/or the existence of a state of war. The book concludes with a
summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment
of a declaration of war or authorisation for the use of force and
to measures under the War Powers Resolution.
|
You may like...
Loot
Nadine Gordimer
Paperback
(2)
R398
R330
Discovery Miles 3 300
|