This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases in which issues of its applicability were raised. It will be revised biannually. In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law's enactment in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution P.L. 93-148 was passed over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When such a report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the time period. Section 3 requires that the "President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing" U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. From 1975 through mid-September 2012, Presidents have submitted 136 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited section 4(a)(1), which triggers the time limit, and in this case the military action was completed and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the report was made. The reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of military activities, from embassy evacuations to full-scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, and the anti-terrorism actions in Afghanistan. In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On one occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq. In several instances neither the President, Congress, nor the courts have been willing to trigger the War Powers Resolution mechanism.

Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces Armed Forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of Armed Forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. This report does not deal with the substantive merits of using Armed Forces in specific cases, but rather with congressional authorization for military action, and the application and effectiveness of the WPR. The purpose of the WPR (P.L. 93-148, passed over President Nixon's veto on November 7, 1973) is to ensure that Congress and the President share in making decisions that may get the United States involved in hostilities. Compliance becomes an issue whenever the President introduces U.S. forces abroad in situations that might be construed as hostilities or imminent hostilities. Criteria for compliance include prior consultation with Congress, fulfillment of the reporting requirements, and congressional authorization. If the President has not complied fully, the issue becomes what action Congress should take to bring about compliance or to influence U.S. policy. A related issue has been congressional authorization of U.N. peacekeeping or other U.N.-sponsored actions. For over three decades, war powers and the War Powers Resolution have been an issue in U.S. military actions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and Europe. Presidents have submitted 136 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution, although only one (the Mayaguez situation) cited Section 4(a)(1) or specifically stated that forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Congress invoked the WPR in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), which authorized the Marines to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. In addition, P.L. 102-1, enacted in January 1991, authorizing the use of U.S. Armed Forces in response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, stated that it constituted specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the WPR. On November 9, 1993, the House used a section of the WPR to state that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994; Congress had already taken this action in appropriations legislation. War powers have been at issue in former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq, and Haiti. Authorizing military actions in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001, through P.L. 107-40 directly involved war powers. The continued use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions remained a war powers issue from the end of the Gulf War on February 28, 1991, until the enactment of P.L. 107-243 in October 2002, which explicitly authorized the President to use force against Iraq, an authority he exercised in March 2003, and continues to exercise for military operations in Iraq. Most recently, issues associated with presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution have arisen over his use of U.S. military forces to support a U.N. sanctioned "no-fly zone" in Libya, without obtaining congressional authorization for such action. Debate continues on whether using the War Powers Resolution is effective as a means of assuring congressional participation in decisions that might get the United States involved in a significant military conflict. Proposals have been made to modify or repeal the resolution. None have been enacted to date.

St. John's Episcopal Church, Lafayette Square, in Washington, DC is one of the most unique churches in the United States. A National Historic Landmark, located just north of Lafayette Square, and in clear view of the White House, it has witnessed the presence within its walls of more notable civilian and military leaders of the United States than any other church in the nation. Apart from the White House, St. John's Church is the oldest building adjacent to Lafayette Square. It was designed, and its construction supervised, by Benjamin Henry Latrobe, a leading architect of the early national period. From its opening in October 1816, every person, beginning with James Madison, who has held the office of President of the United States has attended St. John's at least once. Several Presidents have been members. Thus, St. John's is called "the Church of the Presidents." A significant number of members of St. John's, past and present, have played very prominent roles in the public life of the United States and the city of Washington, DC. This book tells the story of this historic church from its origins to the present, while chronicling notable services held at it, and key events in the lives of distinguished Americans who were personally connected with St. John's during their residence in Washington. REVIEWS The first thing to note about this marvelous history of St. John's Church is the research. From start to finish the facts are meticulously assembled and clearly laid out to the reader. This alone makes the book worth reading. But it is far more than a collection of facts. It is the story--or rather the stories-- of St. John's Church that makes this book stand out as a true gem with very few equals in the annals of Church History. --Harry S. Stout Jonathan Edwards Professor of American Religious History Yale University Sited importantly on its corner across from the White House, St. John's Episcopal Church has served both the famous and Everyman without interruption for nearly 200 years, its architectural evolution an index of the development of the capital itself. Historian Richard Grimmett tells the story of the "Church of the Presidents" in "St. John's Church: Lafayette Square" with the painstaking accuracy of an experienced researcher. Flavored with personalities and rich anecdotes, this book begins life as a Washington classic. --William Seale Editor, White House History author of "The President s House: A History." Because St. John s Church has been so closely associated with presidents, cabinet members, powerful insiders and Washington society anyone interested in the compelling historical details of a slice of Washington life would want to add the book to his or her library. --Mary O. Klein Archivist, Episcopal Diocese of Maryland.

This book provides the reader with unclassified quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries. Some general data are provided on world-wide conventional arms transfers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary purchasers in the sale of arms. During the years 1994-2001, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations compromised 68.3 per cent of all such agreements world-wide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 65.8 per cent of all such agreements globally from 1998-2001, and 60.5 per cent of these agreements in 2001. Contents: Introduction; Major Findings; Summary of Data Trends, 1994-2001; Selected Weapons Deliveries to Developing Nations, 1994-2001; World-wide Arms Transfer Agreements and Deliveries Values, 1994-2001; Description of Items Counted in Weapons Categories, 1994-2001; Regions Identified in Arms Transfer Tables and Charts; List of Tables; Index.

This book provides historical background on the enactment of declarations of war and authorisations for the use of force and analyses their legal effects under international and domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. Because the statutes that confer standby authority on the President and the executive branch potentially play such a large role in an armed conflict to which the United States is a party, the book includes an extensive listing and summary of the statutes that are triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. The book concludes with a summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a declaration of war or authorisation for the use of force and to measures under the War Powers Resolution.