While many analysts emphasize Trump's uniqueness, he can also be viewed as a symptom of a deeper systemic crisis. This collection examines the roots, impacts, and future prospects of Trumpism as well as the possibilities for combatting it. Chapters analyze the role of racism and xenophobia, evangelical religion, and elite support in enabling Trump's political ascent, demonstrating how both his demagogic style and his policies draw from the historic repertoire of the Right. The authors also trace the impacts of his presidency on inequality, health, ecological destruction, and U.S. empire. As far-right forces cement their hold on the Republican Party, and as the Democratic Party appears unable to stop them, what lies ahead? The authors argue that confronting Trumpism requires a frontal attack on the conditions that incubated the monster.

Is the United States in decline? If so, what are the causes and dimensions of that decline and is it irreversible? Will American decline be accompanied by the rise of a new hegemon? To what extent are that rise and decline merely concurrent processes, determined by forces internal to each polity, or are American decline and the rise of its competitors both manifestations of a single global dynamic? The essays in this volume address those questions by examining the rise of finance in the U.S. and worldwide, the U.S. government's actual industrial strategy, China's failure so far to challenge the dollar's status as the world reserve currency, and the contradictions in American strategic doctrine as the Pentagon responds to failures in recent wars and to China's growing power. Two articles address the restructuring of politics in the U.S since the 1960s to explain governmental paralysis and the simultaneous disorganization and political success of corporate elites. This volume concludes with a comparison of U.S. decline and that of its once superpower rival, the Soviet Union. The contributors to this volume clarify our understanding of the current state and future trajectory of the United States and the effect of decline on its citizens and the world.

The extent and irreversibility of US decline is becoming ever more obvious as America loses war after war and as one industry after another loses its technological edge. Lachmann explains why the United States will not be able to sustain its global dominance. He contrasts America's relatively brief period of hegemony with the Netherlands' similarly short primacy and Britain's far longer era of leadership. Decline in all those cases was not inevitable and did not respond to global capitalist cycles. Rather, decline is the product of elites' success in grabbing control of resources and governmental powers. Not only are ordinary people harmed, but also capitalists become increasingly unable to coordinate their interests and adopt policies and make investments necessary to counter economic and geopolitical competitors elsewhere in the world. Conflicts among elites and challenges by non-elites determine the timing and mould the contours of decline. Lachmann traces the transformation of US politics from an era of elite consensus to present-day paralysis combined with neoliberal plunder, explains the paradox of an American military with an unprecedented technological edge unable to subdue even the weakest enemies, and the consequences of finance's cannibalisation of the US economy.

Here, Lachmann offers a new explanation for the origins of nation-states and capitalist markets in early modern Europe. Comparing regions and cities within and across England, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands from the 12th through 18th centuries, he shows how conflict among feudal elites---landlords, clerics, kings, and officeholders---transformed the bases of their control over land and labor, forcing the winners of feudal conflicts to become capitalists in spite of themselves as they took defensive actions to protect their privileges from rivals in the aftermath of the Reformation.

Richard Lachmann's work offers a new explanation for the origins of nation-states and capitalist markets in early modern Europe. Comparing regions and cities within and across England, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries, Lachmann shows how conflict among feudal elites---landlords, clerics, kings and officeholders---transformed the bases of their control over land and labor, forcing the winners of feudal conflicts to become capitalists in spite of themselves as they took defensive actions to protect their privileges from rivals in the aftermath of the Reformation.