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Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy (Paperback): Donald L Gilmore, Carolyn D. Conway Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy (Paperback)
Donald L Gilmore, Carolyn D. Conway; Richard M Swain
R1,205 Discovery Miles 12 050 Ships in 10 - 15 working days

William E. DePuy was likely the most important figure in the recovery of the United States Army from its collapse after the defeat in Vietnam. That is a rather large claim, and it suggests a precedence over a number of other distinguished officers, both his contemporaries and successors. But it is a claim that can be justified by the test of the "null hypothesis: " Could the Army that conducted the Gulf War be imagined without the actions of General DePuy and those he instructed and inspired? Clearly, it could not. There are a few officers of the period about whom one can make the same claim. To judge properly the accomplishments of General DePuy and his talented subordinates at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), one must understand the sense of crises and defeat that pervaded the Army in the 1970s. By 1973, the United States had lost the war in Vietnam. Only the most optimistic or naive observer held out hope that the Geneva Accords would provide security for the Republic of South Vietnam. The US Army was in a shambles, with discipline destroyed and the chain of command almost nonexistent. The "All Volunteer Army" was borne on a wave of permissiveness that compounded the problems of restoring discipline. Moreover, the army was ten years behind its most likely enemy in equipment development, and it had no warfighting doctrine worthy of the same. With the able assistance of the commander of the Armor Center, General Donn Starry, General DePuy wrenched the Army from self-pity and recrimination about its defeat in Vietnam into a bruising doctrinal debate that focused the Army's intellectual energies on mechanized warfare against a first-class opponent. Critics might argue correctly that that the result was incomplete, but they out not to underestimate how far the Army had to come just to begin the discussion. General DePuy also changed the way Army battalions prepared for war. He made the US Army a doctrinal force for the first time in history. Ably seconded by General Paul Gorman, DePuy led the Army into the age of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The intellectual and training initiatives were joined then, with a third concern of General DePuy's TRADOC: the development of a set of equipment requirements, with a concentration of effort on a limited number, ultimately called the "Big Five." The result was the suite of weapons that overmatched the Iraqis in Operation Desert Storm - Apache attack helicopters, M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Patriot air defense missiles, and Black Hawk assault helicopters. General DePuy championed the recruitment of a high-quality soldiery, an effort beyond his own significant responsibilities but, even so, one he never ceased to support and forward.

"Lucky War" - Third Army in Desert Storm (Paperback): Richard M Swain "Lucky War" - Third Army in Desert Storm (Paperback)
Richard M Swain
R714 Discovery Miles 7 140 Ships in 10 - 15 working days

There is a crossroads near Safwan in southeastern Iraq. Nearby, there is a small hill and an airstrip. After the Gulf War, Safwan became a gathering point for refugees fleeing the Iraqi Army as it reestablished control of Basrah. Prior to that, the airstrip was the site of the dictation of armistice terms to that army by the victorious coalition's military high command. Still earlier, at the end of the coalition attack, the absence of American forces on the airstrip and at the road junction was the source of the most serious command crisis of the U.S. expeditionary forces. Its resolution put at risk American soldiers and threatened the reputations of the very commanders who had just conducted the greatest offensive of concentrated armored forces in the history of the United States Army. In many ways, events at Safwan in late February and early March are emblematic of the Gulf War. It is to explain how U.S. forces arrived at Safwan, what they did and did not do there, and what this all meant, that this book is written. The Gulf War was an undoubted success. It was also a war of clear, sharp contrasts. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait was an obvious wrong that begged for setting right. Saddam's stranglehold on much of the world's proven oil reserves presented a clear and present danger to Western interests, and his wanton attack on Kuwait posed a clear threat to his Arab brothers. Moreover, Saddam's own ineptness in dealing with the crisis ensured the unity of the global community against him unless the diplomatic effort to resolve the situation was seriously mishandled. It was altogether a war of the old comfortable sort-good against evil, a wrong to be righted-a crusade. It was for all that a difficult strategic and operational challenge for the American armed forces, which at first found themselves badly out of position. Though freed of the Soviet threat, U.S. forces were still deployed along the inter-German border and, half a world away, in the continental United States. Saddam was able to snap up Kuwait before Western military forces could intervene. In early August 1990, there was much to be done and precious little time in which to do it. It was a long road to the greatly unbalanced victory on the last day of February in 1991. The purpose of this book is to provide an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. Like all contemporary history, this is written in one respect to provide work for revisionists. That is to say, it is written from the evidence at hand and from the author's observations as the Third Army historian. This book's focus is on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt-General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." The book is titled "Lucky War" after the affectation of Third Army, whose telephone switch, as far back as General George Patton's World War II headquarters, has been named "Lucky." In the same fashion, the Third Army's tactical operations center in Desert Storm was referred to as "Lucky TOC." Its forward command post was "Lucky Wheels," and so on. "Lucky" is a talisman to Third Army as, incidentally, are "Jay Hawk" to VII Corps, and "Danger" to the 1st Infantry Division. It is for that reason alone that "Lucky" is incorporated in the title.

"Lucky War" - Third Army in Desert Storm (Paperback): Richard M Swain "Lucky War" - Third Army in Desert Storm (Paperback)
Richard M Swain; Foreword by Roger J. Spiller; Combat Studies Institute. U.S. Army
R999 Discovery Miles 9 990 Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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