Soviet military leadership is unable or unwilling to disassociate itself from past experiences. Red Armour Combat Orders illustrates through captured regulations that many of the Soviet Techniques in armoured warfare have remained unchanged over the last four decades. Study of the regulations provides a fundamental understanding of current Soviet armoured tactics and the ways in which they may develop.

For twenty-five years, it was the author's job to watch and examine the Soviet Army for a possible conflict, and to understand the Soviet Army's use of its combat experience. In Richard Armstrong's new book, Red Army Legacies: Essays on Forces, Capabilities & Personalities, eleven essays show how the Soviet Army used its "Red Army Legacy". Among the subjects covered are Part I-Forces; Chapter One-Guards of Destruction; Chapter Two-The Bukrin Drop: Limits to Creativity; Chapter Three-Tank Corps Commander; Chapter Four-Moblie Groups: Prologue to MG: Part II-Capabilities; Chapter Five-Hunting Tongues;Chapter Six-Battlefield Agility: The Soviet Legacy; Chapter Seven-Red Army indicators; Chapter Eight-Repelling Counterattacks and Counterstrikes: Part III-Personalities; Chapter Nine-Nachalnik Razvedki: The Red Two; Chapter Ten-Popel: The Fighting Commissar; Chapter Eleven-Radzievskii: The Thinking Warrior.

Based on German and Soviet military archival material, this book provides an insight into the tactics and planning for combat in a winter climate. It also studies the mechanisms for change in an army during the course of battle.
The first part of the book looks at the tactical pamphlet 'People's Commissar for Defence Order No. 109', as passed by Red Army units on 4 March 1941, which provided regulations for combat in Winter. The second part of the book, using material from the Soviet military archives, reveals Red Army General Staff supplements to the winter regulation.

Based on German and Soviet military archival material, this book provides an insight into the tactics and planning for combat in a winter climate. It also studies the mechanisms for change in an army during the course of battle.
The first part of the book looks at the tactical pamphlet 'People's Commissar for Defence Order No. 109', as passed by Red Army units on 4 March 1941, which provided regulations for combat in Winter. The second part of the book, using material from the Soviet military archives, reveals Red Army General Staff supplements to the winter regulation.

Tank and mechanized forces spearhead Red Army operations from the gates of Stalingrad to the center of Berlin. This new book profiles Six Soviet commanders who rose to lead six tank armies created by the Red Army on the eastern front during the Second World War: Mikhail Efimov Katukov, Semen Ill'ich Bogdanov, Pavel Semenovich Rybalko, Dmitri Danilovich Lelyushenko, Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov, and Andrei Grigorevich Kravchenko. Each tank commanders' combat career is examined, as is the rise of Red Army forces, and reveals these lesser known leaders and their operations to western military history readers. Richard N. Armstrong, a colonel in the United States Army, has served in military intelligence since 1969, and holds a military historian specialty. He has published historical and professional articles on Red Army operations and Soviet military affairs. He wrote the Combat Studies Institute monograph, Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak, and edited Red Armor Combat Orders; Combat Regulations for Tank and Mechanized Forces 1944.

Soviet military leadership is unable or unwilling to disassociate itself from past experiences. Red Armour Combat Orders illustrates through captured regulations that many of the Soviet Techniques in armoured warfare have remained unchanged over the last four decades. Study of the regulations provides a fundamental understanding of current Soviet armoured tactics and the ways in which they may develop.

The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in World War II. While its success is widely recognized, there are few published Western assessments of Soviet operational deception. Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak, by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong. examines the role of operational deception in the Red Army's World War II victories. This Combat Studies Institute special study focuses on operational level deception planning, allocation of resources, and deception measures used during battle in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong's insightful study demonstrates the clear connection between the wise use of deception and Soviet battlefield success. Richard M. Swain Colonel, Field Artillery Director, Combat Studies Institute