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This Handbook provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of the
state of the field of the philosophy of meditation and engages
primarily in the philosophical assessment of the merits of
meditation practices. This Handbook unites novel and original
scholarship from 28 leading Asian and Western philosophers,
scientists, theologians, and other scholars on the philosophical
assessment of meditation. It critically assesses the conceptual and
empirical validity of meditation, its philosophical implications,
its legitimacy as a phenomenological research tool, its potential
value as an aid to neuroscience research, its many practical
benefits, and, among other considerations, its possibly misleading
interpretations, applications, and consequences. Following the
introduction by the editor, the Handbook's chapters are organized
in six parts: * Meditation and philosophy * Meditation and
epistemology * Meditation and metaphysics * Meditation and values *
Meditation and phenomenology * Meditation in Greco-Roman and
Judeo-Christian traditions A distinctive, timely, and invaluable
reference work, it marks the emergence of a new discipline therein,
the philosophy of meditation. The book will be of interest to an
interdisciplinary audience in the fields of philosophy, meditation,
Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, theology, and Asian and Western
philosophy. It will serve as the textbook in any philosophy course
on meditation, and as secondary reading in courses in philosophy of
mind, consciousness, selfhood/personhood, metaphysics, or
phenomenology, thereby helping to restore philosophy as a way of
life.
Throughout the history of Buddhism, little has been said prior to
the Twentieth Century that explicitly raises the question whether
we have free will, though the Buddha rejected fatalism and some
Buddhists have addressed whether karma is fatalistic. Recently,
however, Buddhist and Western philosophers have begun to explicitly
discuss Buddhism and free will. This book incorporates Buddhist
philosophy more explicitly into the Western analytic philosophical
discussion of free will, both in order to render more perspicuous
Buddhist ideas that might shed light on the Western philosophical
debate, and in order to render more perspicuous the many possible
positions on the free will debate that are available to Buddhist
philosophy. The book covers: Buddhist and Western perspectives on
the problem of free will The puzzle of whether free will is
possible if, as Buddhists believe, there is no agent/self Theravada
views Mahayana views Evidential considerations from science,
meditation, and skepticism The first book to bring together
classical and contemporary perspectives on free will in Buddhist
thought, it is of interest to academics working on Buddhist and
Western ethics, comparative philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of
mind, philosophy of action, agency, and personal identity.
Traditionally, Buddhist philosophy has seemingly rejected the
autonomous self. In Western philosophy, free will and the
philosophy of action are established areas of research. This book
presents a comprehensive analytical review of extant scholarship on
perspectives on free will. It studies and refutes the most powerful
Western and Buddhist philosophical objections to free will and
explores the possibility that a form of agency may in fact exist
within Buddhism. Providing a detailed explanation of how Buddhist
meditation increases self-regulative mind-control abilities, the
author argues that the Buddhist path is designed to produce
meditation virtuosos exhibiting mind-control abilities far
exceeding the free-will advocate's ability to 'do otherwise' or
have their choices be 'up to' them. Based on the
empirically-supported mind-control cultivated by these meditation
virtuosos, the book proposes the principle of, 'Buddhist Soft
Compatibilism', a theory of 'freedom of the mind' that entails
freedoms of the will, attention, emotion and action, compatible
with both determinism and indeterminism. Buddhism, Meditation and
Free Will will be of interest to Buddhist and Western philosophers
and academics interested in comparative philosophy, free will,
philosophy of action, metaphysics, ethics and Religious Studies.
Traditionally, Buddhist philosophy has seemingly rejected the
autonomous self. In Western philosophy, free will and the
philosophy of action are established areas of research. This book
presents a comprehensive analytical review of extant scholarship on
perspectives on free will. It studies and refutes the most powerful
Western and Buddhist philosophical objections to free will and
explores the possibility that a form of agency may in fact exist
within Buddhism. Providing a detailed explanation of how Buddhist
meditation increases self-regulative mind-control abilities, the
author argues that the Buddhist path is designed to produce
meditation virtuosos exhibiting mind-control abilities far
exceeding the free-will advocate's ability to 'do otherwise' or
have their choices be 'up to' them. Based on the
empirically-supported mind-control cultivated by these meditation
virtuosos, the book proposes the principle of, 'Buddhist Soft
Compatibilism', a theory of 'freedom of the mind' that entails
freedoms of the will, attention, emotion and action, compatible
with both determinism and indeterminism. Buddhism, Meditation and
Free Will will be of interest to Buddhist and Western philosophers
and academics interested in comparative philosophy, free will,
philosophy of action, metaphysics, ethics and Religious Studies.
Throughout the history of Buddhism, little has been said prior to
the Twentieth Century that explicitly raises the question whether
we have free will, though the Buddha rejected fatalism and some
Buddhists have addressed whether karma is fatalistic. Recently,
however, Buddhist and Western philosophers have begun to explicitly
discuss Buddhism and free will. This book incorporates Buddhist
philosophy more explicitly into the Western analytic philosophical
discussion of free will, both in order to render more perspicuous
Buddhist ideas that might shed light on the Western philosophical
debate, and in order to render more perspicuous the many possible
positions on the free will debate that are available to Buddhist
philosophy. The book covers: Buddhist and Western perspectives on
the problem of free will The puzzle of whether free will is
possible if, as Buddhists believe, there is no agent/self Theravada
views Mahayana views Evidential considerations from science,
meditation, and skepticism The first book to bring together
classical and contemporary perspectives on free will in Buddhist
thought, it is of interest to academics working on Buddhist and
Western ethics, comparative philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of
mind, philosophy of action, agency, and personal identity.
Certain questions have recurred throughout the history of
philosophy. They are the big questions-about happiness and the good
life, the limits of knowledge, the ultimate structure of reality,
the nature of consciousness, the relation between causality and
free will, the pervasiveness of suffering, and the conditions for a
just and flourishing society-that thinkers in different cultures
across the ages have formulated in their own terms in an attempt to
make sense of their lives and the world around them. The essays in
this book turn to the major figures and texts of the Buddhist
tradition in order to expand and enrich our thinking on these
enduring questions. Examining them from a comparative and
cross-cultural perspective demonstrates the value of alternative
ways of addressing philosophical problems, showing how different
approaches can produce new and unexpected kinds of questions and
answers. Engaging with the Buddhist tradition, this book shows,
helps return philosophy to its practical as well as theoretical
aim: not only understanding the world but also knowing how to live
in it. Featuring striking and generative comparisons of Buddhist
and Western thought, Philosophy's Big Questions challenges our
thinking in fundamental ways and offers readers new conceptual
tools, methods, and insights for the pursuit of a good and happy
life.
Certain questions have recurred throughout the history of
philosophy. They are the big questions-about happiness and the good
life, the limits of knowledge, the ultimate structure of reality,
the nature of consciousness, the relation between causality and
free will, the pervasiveness of suffering, and the conditions for a
just and flourishing society-that thinkers in different cultures
across the ages have formulated in their own terms in an attempt to
make sense of their lives and the world around them. The essays in
this book turn to the major figures and texts of the Buddhist
tradition in order to expand and enrich our thinking on these
enduring questions. Examining them from a comparative and
cross-cultural perspective demonstrates the value of alternative
ways of addressing philosophical problems, showing how different
approaches can produce new and unexpected kinds of questions and
answers. Engaging with the Buddhist tradition, this book shows,
helps return philosophy to its practical as well as theoretical
aim: not only understanding the world but also knowing how to live
in it. Featuring striking and generative comparisons of Buddhist
and Western thought, Philosophy's Big Questions challenges our
thinking in fundamental ways and offers readers new conceptual
tools, methods, and insights for the pursuit of a good and happy
life.
Do we have free will? This question has puzzled reflective minds
for ages, but has become far more pressing in this era of
deterministic cognitive science, which challenges consciousness
itself. In this book, the author follows the lead of philosopher of
mind David Chalmers, who distinguished "hard" and "easy" problems
of consciousness, rejecting metaphysical puzzles as "hard" and
embracing practical ones that involve identifying causal/functional
relations between consciousness and brain/behavioral states as
"easy." Repetti argues that the "easy problem of autonomy" may be
resolved by applying deterministic (causal/counterfactual) criteria
to Harry Frankfurt's "hierarchical" model of free will as
volitional/metavolitional accord. Informed by the Buddhist (and
Lockean) intuition that reflection on volition is liberating, the
resulting "metacausal" account handles several objections to
determinism-compatible accounts (e.g., the Consequence,
Manipulation, and Impossibility arguments), and provides an error
theory for libertarian, Cartesian, and other inflated intuitions.
This work should interest everyone concerned with the problems of
free will, determinism, and compatibilism.
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