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It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion (CSR)
may have a bearing on the epistemic status of religious beliefs and
on other topics in philosophy of religion. Epistemologists have
used theories from CSR to argue both for and against the
rationality of religious beliefs, or they have claimed that CSR is
neutral vis-a-vis the epistemic status of religious belief.
However, since CSR is a rapidly evolving discipline, a great deal
of earlier research on the topic has become dated. Furthermore,
most of the debate on the epistemic consequences of CSR has not
taken into account insights from the philosophy of science, such as
explanatory pluralism and explanatory levels. This volume overcomes
these deficiencies. This volume brings together new philosophical
reflection on CSR. It examines the influence of CSR theories on the
epistemic status of religious beliefs; it discusses its impact on
philosophy of religion; and it offers new insights for CSR. The
book addresses the question of whether or not the plurality of
theories in CSR makes epistemic conclusions about religious belief
unwarranted. It also explores the impact of CSR on other topics in
philosophy of religion like the cognitive consequences of sin and
naturalism. Finally, the book investigates what the main theories
in CSR aim to explain, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses
of CSR.
Common sense philosophy holds that widely and deeply held beliefs
are justified in the absence of defeaters. While this tradition has
always had its philosophical detractors who have defended various
forms of skepticism or have sought to develop rival epistemological
views, recent advances in several scientific disciplines claim to
have debunked the reliability of the faculties that produce our
common sense beliefs. At the same time, however, it seems
reasonable that we cannot do without common sense beliefs entirely.
Arguably, science and the scientific method are built on, and
continue to depend on, common sense. This collection of essays
debates the tenability of common sense in the face of recent
challenges from the empirical sciences. It explores to what extent
scientific considerations-rather than philosophical
considerations-put pressure on common sense philosophy. The book is
structured in a way that promotes dialogue between philosophers and
scientists. Noah Lemos, one of the most influential contemporary
advocates of the common sense tradition, begins with an overview of
the nature and scope of common sense beliefs, and examines
philosophical objections to common sense and its relationship to
scientific beliefs. Then, the volume features essays by scientists
and philosophers of science who discuss various proposed conflicts
between commonsensical and scientific beliefs: the reality of space
and time, about the nature of human beings, about free will and
identity, about rationality, about morality, and about religious
belief. Notable philosophers who embrace the common sense tradition
respond to these essays to explore the connection between common
sense philosophy and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology,
neuroscience, physics, and psychology.
Common sense philosophy holds that widely and deeply held beliefs
are justified in the absence of defeaters. While this tradition has
always had its philosophical detractors who have defended various
forms of skepticism or have sought to develop rival epistemological
views, recent advances in several scientific disciplines claim to
have debunked the reliability of the faculties that produce our
common sense beliefs. At the same time, however, it seems
reasonable that we cannot do without common sense beliefs entirely.
Arguably, science and the scientific method are built on, and
continue to depend on, common sense. This collection of essays
debates the tenability of common sense in the face of recent
challenges from the empirical sciences. It explores to what extent
scientific considerations-rather than philosophical
considerations-put pressure on common sense philosophy. The book is
structured in a way that promotes dialogue between philosophers and
scientists. Noah Lemos, one of the most influential contemporary
advocates of the common sense tradition, begins with an overview of
the nature and scope of common sense beliefs, and examines
philosophical objections to common sense and its relationship to
scientific beliefs. Then, the volume features essays by scientists
and philosophers of science who discuss various proposed conflicts
between commonsensical and scientific beliefs: the reality of space
and time, about the nature of human beings, about free will and
identity, about rationality, about morality, and about religious
belief. Notable philosophers who embrace the common sense tradition
respond to these essays to explore the connection between common
sense philosophy and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology,
neuroscience, physics, and psychology.
This edited collection focuses on the moral and social dimensions
of ignorance-an undertheorized category in analytic philosophy.
Contributors address such issues as the relation between ignorance
and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal
excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. In
the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse;
some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral
character; and ignorance is closely related to moral risk.
Ignorance has certain social dimensions as well: it has been
claimed to be the engine of science; it seems to be entailed by
privacy and secrecy; and it is widely thought to constitute a legal
excuse in certain circumstances. Together, these contributions
provide a sustained inquiry into the nature of ignorance and the
pivotal role it plays in the moral and social domains.
Ignorance: A Philosophical Study provides an in-depth exploration
of ignorance in its many dimensions. Philosophers have long
examined epistemological concepts like belief, knowledge, and
understanding, but they have paid less attention to ignorance.
Socrates famously claimed to be ignorant about a wide variety of
issues, such as physical matters and ethics, but did not study
ignorance itself. It was not until the 1960's and 70's that
ignorance itself became a topic of concern in philosophy, when the
fields of agnotology, philosophy of race, and feminist philosophy
were born. These fields, however, focused on specific properties of
ignorance, rather than ignorance itself. Rik Peels provides a
full-on epistemology of ignorance, and then applies that
epistemology to a wide variety of philosophical issues. Among the
questions he addresses are: What kinds of ignorance are there? What
is it to be ignorant of a proposition? What varieties of
propositional ignorance are there? What is group ignorance? What is
it for ignorance to come in degrees? What is strategic ignorance?
What is "white ignorance"? What does ignorance excuse? When is
ignorance culpable? Can ignorance be a proper aim in education?
Peels presents a wide-angle exploration that is relevant to the
interests of philosophers across epistemology, ethics, philosophy
of language, philosophy of science, and other disciplines.
Common-sense philosophy is important because it maintains that we
can know many things about the world, about ourselves, about
morality, and even about things of a metaphysical nature. The
tenets of common-sense philosophy, while in some sense obvious and
unsurprising, give rise to powerful arguments that can shed light
on fundamental philosophical issues, including the perennial
problem of scepticism and the emerging challenge of scientism. This
Companion offers an exploration of common-sense philosophy in its
many forms, tracing its development as a concept and considering
the roles it has been assigned to play throughout the history of
philosophy. Containing fifteen newly commissioned chapters from
leading experts in the history of philosophy, epistemology, the
philosophy of science, moral philosophy and metaphysics, the volume
will be an essential guide for students and scholars hoping to gain
a greater understanding of the value and enduring appeal of
common-sense philosophy.
Common-sense philosophy is important because it maintains that we
can know many things about the world, about ourselves, about
morality, and even about things of a metaphysical nature. The
tenets of common-sense philosophy, while in some sense obvious and
unsurprising, give rise to powerful arguments that can shed light
on fundamental philosophical issues, including the perennial
problem of scepticism and the emerging challenge of scientism. This
Companion offers an exploration of common-sense philosophy in its
many forms, tracing its development as a concept and considering
the roles it has been assigned to play throughout the history of
philosophy. Containing fifteen newly commissioned chapters from
leading experts in the history of philosophy, epistemology, the
philosophy of science, moral philosophy and metaphysics, the volume
will be an essential guide for students and scholars hoping to gain
a greater understanding of the value and enduring appeal of
common-sense philosophy.
Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. This is surprising
for, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what
ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is a lack of
knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is an absence
of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? What
kinds of ignorance are there? This neglect is also remarkable
because ignorance plays a crucial role in all sorts of
controversial societal issues. Ignorance is often thought to be a
moral and legal excuse; it is a core concept in medical ethics and
debates about privacy, and it features in religious traditions and
debates about belief in God. This book does not only study an
epistemic phenomenon that is interesting in itself, but also
provides important tools that can be fruitfully used in debates
within and beyond philosophy.
Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. This is surprising
for, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what
ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is a lack of
knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is an absence
of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? What
kinds of ignorance are there? This neglect is also remarkable
because ignorance plays a crucial role in all sorts of
controversial societal issues. Ignorance is often thought to be a
moral and legal excuse; it is a core concept in medical ethics and
debates about privacy, and it features in religious traditions and
debates about belief in God. This book does not only study an
epistemic phenomenon that is interesting in itself, but also
provides important tools that can be fruitfully used in debates
within and beyond philosophy.
This edited collection focuses on the moral and social dimensions
of ignorance-an undertheorized category in analytic philosophy.
Contributors address such issues as the relation between ignorance
and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal
excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. In
the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse;
some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral
character; and ignorance is closely related to moral risk.
Ignorance has certain social dimensions as well: it has been
claimed to be the engine of science; it seems to be entailed by
privacy and secrecy; and it is widely thought to constitute a legal
excuse in certain circumstances. Together, these contributions
provide a sustained inquiry into the nature of ignorance and the
pivotal role it plays in the moral and social domains.
Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and
ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism
answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly
influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life
in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This
collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a
serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by
both proponents and critics of scientism. Before scientism can be
evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection
opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different
versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next,
several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case,
either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred
version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the
floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether
scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a
plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has
limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to
ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean
for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality
and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism
related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a
form of scientism tailored to philosophy?
What we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on
what we do and fail to do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we
should believe responsibly. However, do we have the kind of control
over our beliefs that such responsibility for our beliefs seems to
require? Do we have certain obligations to control or influence our
beliefs on particular occasions? And do we sometimes believe
responsibly despite violating such obligations, namely because we
are excused by, say, indoctrination or ignorance? By answering each
of these questions, Rik Peels provides a theory of what it is to
believe responsibly. He argues that we lack control over our
beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence our beliefs by
performing actions that make a difference to what we believe. We
have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic obligations
to perform such belief-influencing actions. We can be held
responsible for our beliefs in virtue of such influence on our
beliefs. Sometimes, we believe responsibly despite having violated
such obligations, namely if we are excused, by force, ignorance, or
luck. A careful consideration of these excuses teaches us,
respectively, that responsible belief entails that we could have
failed to have that belief, that responsible belief is in a
specific sense radically subjective, and that responsible belief is
compatible with its being a matter of luck that we hold that
belief.
It is widely thought that the cognitive science of religion (CSR)
may have a bearing on the epistemic status of religious beliefs and
on other topics in philosophy of religion. Epistemologists have
used theories from CSR to argue both for and against the
rationality of religious beliefs, or they have claimed that CSR is
neutral vis-a-vis the epistemic status of religious belief.
However, since CSR is a rapidly evolving discipline, a great deal
of earlier research on the topic has become dated. Furthermore,
most of the debate on the epistemic consequences of CSR has not
taken into account insights from the philosophy of science, such as
explanatory pluralism and explanatory levels. This volume overcomes
these deficiencies. This volume brings together new philosophical
reflection on CSR. It examines the influence of CSR theories on the
epistemic status of religious beliefs; it discusses its impact on
philosophy of religion; and it offers new insights for CSR. The
book addresses the question of whether or not the plurality of
theories in CSR makes epistemic conclusions about religious belief
unwarranted. It also explores the impact of CSR on other topics in
philosophy of religion like the cognitive consequences of sin and
naturalism. Finally, the book investigates what the main theories
in CSR aim to explain, and addresses the strengths and weaknesses
of CSR.
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