|
Showing 1 - 4 of
4 matches in All Departments
Faced with the need to establish unified command of US military
forces in peacetime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 created an
organizational directive, the "Outline Command Plan," which was the
first in a series of documents known as Unified Command Plans.
Approved by the President, the Unified Command Plan prescribes high
level command arrangements for operational forces on a global
basis; its structure and the organizational philosophies that
structure represents have had a major impact on US military
operations in the post-World War II era. Thus the history of the
Unified Command Plan is a useful guide for those engaged in the
development of current military policy and strategy as well as an
important reference for students of US policy and strategy during
the Cold War. The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993,
covers the formulation of the plan, modifications, and periodic
revisions. This volume is a compilation of three separate histories
which were originally classified.
At the time it was fought, the war in Korea was unique in recent
American military experience. Unlike World Wars I and II, which
were vigorously prosecuted on the battlefield until the enemy
surrendered unconditionally, the Korean conflict ended without
clear-cut military victory for either side. It was fought with
limited means for limited objectives. In fact, political efforts to
resolve the conflict at the negotiating table predominated during
the last two years of the conflict. During this period, neither
side sought a decision by military means. The conflict in Korea
also was an important milestone in the "cold war" relations between
the Communist and non-Communist nations. By launching an unprovoked
attack on a militarily insignificant country located in an area
where none of their vital interests were involved, the Communists
appeared to leaders of the non-Communist states to be giving proof
of their aggressive designs for world domination. As a result, the
United States reversed the policy of reducing its military
establishment and launched an impressive expansion of its armed
forces. At the same time, the United States joined with its North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to create a military
command for the alliance and to incorporate German forces in it. In
the Far East, the United States also acted to shore up the defenses
of the non-Communist world by entering into treaties with Australia
and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and
Nationalist China. The Korean War provided the first wartime test
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as part of the machinery set
up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment. In
this capacity, they provided strategic direction to the United
Nations (UN) forces in the field and were the agency by with
President Truman exercised overall control of war strategy. When
the focus shifted from combat to armistice negotiations, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff continued to play an active role. They participated
in all the key decisions taken during negotiations, and they
provided the channel of communications between the Government in
Washington and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
(CINCUNC), and his armistice negotiating team in Korea. The focus
of this volume is, naturally, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as
they were not acting in a vacuum, it has been necessary to describe
the context in which they functioned. To this end, the actions of
the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning
overall military strategy and armistice negotiations have been
described in some detail. In addition, the consequences of these
actions, on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, have been
sketched in broad outline.
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding
the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the
war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a
significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge
of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council,
and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is
essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of
their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides,
moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history
of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
directed that an official history be written for the record. Its
value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers
newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of
information for staff studies will be readily recognized. The
series, The Joint Chiefs of Staffand National Policy, treats the
activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World
War II. Because of the nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the volumes of
the series were originally prepared in classified form.
Classification designations, in text and footnotes, are those that
appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and
declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945
to 1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified form
within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the
National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now
being made available as official publications. Volume III describes
the participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Korean War;
their other activities during the period are covered in Volume IV,
except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a
separate series. This volume was originally planned by Mr. Wilber W
Hoare, who developed an outline and drafted six of the first seven
chapters. Following a lapse of some years, these drafts were
revised and expanded by Dr. Walter S. Poole, under the direction of
Mr. KennethW Condit. Meanwhile, other chapters, or portions
thereof, had been prepared by Miss Martha Derthick, Mr. Morris
MacGregor, and Miss Barbara Sorrill. In 1968, Dr. Robert J. Watson
was assigned as the responsible author. He reviewed existing
drafts, carried out additional research, and wrote Chapters 1
through 9 in essentially their present form. When he was
transferred to other duties, Mr. James F. Schnabel assumed
responsibility for the volume and planned, researched, and wrote
the remaining eight chapters. Subsequently, all of the chapters
were reviewed and revised by both Mr. Schnabel and Dr. Watson.
Final revision and historical editing proceeded under the
supervision of Dr. Watson in his capacity as Chief, Histories
Branch, and of his successor in that position, Mr. Kenneth W.
Condit.
Drawing on extensive primary and archive source material this
volume traces the development of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) from 1956 through 1960 during the eventful tenures of
three secretaties: Charles E. Wilson, Neil H. McElroy and Thomas S.
Gates, Jr. It focuses on the secretaties of defense, their staff.
and the administration of the Pentagon within the larger framework
of national security policy making and execution.
|
You may like...
The Gallows
Pfeifer Brown, Travis Cluff, …
Blu-ray disc
R54
Discovery Miles 540
|