Just as war is not a new phenomenon, neither are the issues associated with the mental and emotional scars combat brings to those who fight a nation's wars. Historically, the United States has assumed a reactive vice proactive posture as it relates to coping with the fiscal, and humanistic challenges that manifest within a nation at war, and those who experience the trauma of combat. The Army has proven slow to respond to the need to train and educate its leaders and instead has devoted vast capital on the assessment and treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), attacking the symptoms as they arise, vice attacking the stressors which cause the affliction. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the deployment of forces throughout the world to combat terror, however, have created conditions whereby PTSD is again in the lime-light. This monograph examines PTSD from a historical perspective reviewing the manner in which the Army viewed, assessed, and treated those afflicted with PTSD as well its methods for training and educating those honored with the opportunity to lead these warriors in battle. This monograph highlights existing shortfalls in assessment, training, doctrine, and education as it relates to those commanding at the battalion-level.