Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

This book, originally published in 1994, explores the effects of federal policies on the US auto industry in the 1970s and 80s which were designed to save jobs and help the domestic industry become more competitive. The author develops a new model based on modern oliopoly theory to estimate the effects of the voluntary Restraint Agreements (which limited Japanese imports) on the US auto market. The results demonstrate that VRAs caused price increases which adversely affected the comptitiveness of US producers. On the eve of a new Trump administration, and the likelihood of new restrictions on imports to boost US manufacturing, this book has particular enduring relevance.

This book, originally published in 1994, explores the effects of federal policies on the US auto industry in the 1970s and 80s which were designed to save jobs and help the domestic industry become more competitive. The author develops a new model based on modern oliopoly theory to estimate the effects of the voluntary Restraint Agreements (which limited Japanese imports) on the US auto market. The results demonstrate that VRAs caused price increases which adversely affected the comptitiveness of US producers. On the eve of a new Trump administration, and the likelihood of new restrictions on imports to boost US manufacturing, this book has particular enduring relevance.

Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.