Women and Gender Perspectives in the Military compares the integration of women, gender perspectives, and the women, peace, and security agenda into the armed forces of eight countries plus NATO and United Nations peacekeeping operations. This book brings a much-needed crossnational analysis of how militaries have or have not improved gender balance, what has worked and what has not, and who have been the agents for change. The country cases examined are Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, and South Africa. Despite increased opportunities for women in the militaries of many countries and wider recognition of the value of including gender perspectives to enhance operational effectiveness, progress has encountered roadblocks even nearly twenty years after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 kicked off the women, peace, and security agenda. Robert Egnell, Mayesha Alam, and the contributors to this volume conclude that there is no single model for change that can be applied to every country, but the comparative findings reveal many policy-relevant lessons while advancing scholarship about women and gendered perspectives in the military.

Women and Gender Perspectives in the Military compares the integration of women, gender perspectives, and the women, peace, and security agenda into the armed forces of eight countries plus NATO and United Nations peacekeeping operations. This book brings a much-needed crossnational analysis of how militaries have or have not improved gender balance, what has worked and what has not, and who have been the agents for change. The country cases examined are Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, and South Africa. Despite increased opportunities for women in the militaries of many countries and wider recognition of the value of including gender perspectives to enhance operational effectiveness, progress has encountered roadblocks even nearly twenty years after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 kicked off the women, peace, and security agenda. Robert Egnell, Mayesha Alam, and the contributors to this volume conclude that there is no single model for change that can be applied to every country, but the comparative findings reveal many policy-relevant lessons while advancing scholarship about women and gendered perspectives in the military.

This book explores the impact of different civil-military structures on operational effectiveness in complex peace operations. Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia are examples of grand failures to enforce peace and to promote democracy and development through international interventions. A missing variable in analyses of these conflicts hitherto has been the nature of the civil-military interface and its impact. The principal argument of this book is that the civil-military interface should ideally be integrated within the interagency arena as well as within the defence ministry. Such integration has the potential to provide joint civil-military planning and comprehensive approaches to operations. It also creates mutual trust and understanding amongst officers and civil servants from different departments, agencies and units, and thereby, a co-operative interagency culture. For the civil-military interface to function effectively within the chain of command during operations, a co-operative culture of trust is essential. Crucially, structurally and culturally integrated civil-military structures are likely to provide a more balanced view of the functional imperative of the armed forces. The results are armed forces fit for whatever purpose the political leadership decides for them - including complex peace support operations. Empirically, the book applies the theoretical framework to a comparative study of US and British patterns of civil-military relations, their strategic cultures and their operations in Iraq. This book will be of much interest to students of peace operations, civil-military relations, humanitarian intervention, and security studies/IR in general. Robert Egnell is a lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College and a senior researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. He was awarded the 2008 Kenneth N. Waltz Dissertation Prize for the best thesis in the field of international security.

This book explores the impact of different civil-military structures on operational effectiveness in complex peace operations. Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia are examples of grand failures to enforce peace and to promote democracy and development through international interventions. A missing variable in analyses of these conflicts hitherto has been the nature of the civil-military interface and its impact.

The principal argument of this book is that the civil-military interface should ideally be integrated within the interagency arena as well as within the defence ministry. Such integration has the potential to provide joint civil-military planning and comprehensive approaches to operations. It also creates mutual trust and understanding amongst officers and civil servants from different departments, agencies and units, and thereby, a co-operative interagency culture. For the civil-military interface to function effectively within the chain of command during operations, a co-operative culture of trust is essential. Crucially, structurally and culturally integrated civil-military structures are likely to provide a more balanced view of the functional imperative of the armed forces. The results are armed forces fit for whatever purpose the political leadership decides for them - including complex peace support operations. Empirically, the book applies the theoretical framework to a comparative study of US and British patterns of civil-military relations, their strategic cultures and their operations in Iraq.

This book will be of much interest to students of peace operations, civil-military relations, humanitarian intervention, and security studies/IR in general.

Robert Egnell is a lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College and a senior researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. He was awarded the 2008 Kenneth N. Waltz Dissertation Prize for the best thesis in the field of international security.

This volume connects the study of statebuilding to broader aspects of social theory and the historical study of the state, bringing forth new questions and starting-points, both academically and practically, for the field. Building states has become a highly prioritized issue in international politics. Since the 1990s, mainly Western countries and international institutions have invested large sums of money, vast amounts of manpower, and considerable political capital in ventures of this kind all across the globe. Most of the focus in current literature is on the acute cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to states that seem to fit the label 'failed states' such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. This book brings together a diverse group of scholars who introduce new theoretical approaches from the broader social sciences. The chapters revisit historical cases of statebuilding, and provide thought-provoking, new strategic perspectives on the field. The result is a volume that broadens and deepens our understanding of statebuilding by highlighting the importance of hybridity, contingency and history in a broad range of case-studies. This book will be of much interest to students of statebuilding and intervention, peacebuilding, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general.

This volume connects the study of statebuilding to broader aspects of social theory and the historical study of the state, bringing forth new questions and starting-points, both academically and practically, for the field. Building states has become a highly prioritized issue in international politics. Since the 1990s, mainly Western countries and international institutions have invested large sums of money, vast amounts of manpower, and considerable political capital in ventures of this kind all across the globe. Most of the focus in current literature is on the acute cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to states that seem to fit the label 'failed states' such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. This book brings together a diverse group of scholars who introduce new theoretical approaches from the broader social sciences. The chapters revisit historical cases of statebuilding, and provide thought-provoking, new strategic perspectives on the field. The result is a volume that broadens and deepens our understanding of statebuilding by highlighting the importance of hybridity, contingency and history in a broad range of case-studies. This book will be of much interest to students of statebuilding and intervention, peacebuilding, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general.

Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence.

By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.

Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence.

By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.