This monograph examines the history and significance of women serving in the United States Army from 1942 through 2007. The author's thesis is that an organizational Revolution in Military Affairs occurred in the US Army pertaining to the permanency, increased scope and exponential expansion of the numbers of women serving.1 .

By 1990, the Cold War was over and many Americans talked of the "peace dividend" that would befall the country once military spending and commitments could be reduced in what some referred to as the New World Order. Instead, world affairs proved as dangerous and intractable as ever, even more so perhaps than during the period 1945-1990 when the two competing superpowers managed to hold various tribal, ethnic, religious, and political conflicts around the world somewhat in check. Driving home how dangerous the world remained in the 1990s, the US military found itself fighting one major war, Operation Desert Storm, and participating in a variety of other military activities, including three major interventions: Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. The Combat Studies Institute has published scholarly accounts of the Gulf War (Lucky War), the Somalian venture ("My Clan Against the World"), and the involvement in Haiti (Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion"). The publication of Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia adds another case study to the Institute's coverage of these post-Cold War US military operations. With the aid of a generous grant from the US Institute of Peace, Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit US and NATO forces in Bosnia. As a result of their labors, they have provided the reader an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the UN Protection Force to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of US forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force to the Stabilization Force a year later. The authors shed light on several of the critical military lessons that have emerged from the US experience in Bosnia-an involvement that continues as of this writing. In general, these cover the cooperation and contention present in virtually any coalition undertaking; the complexity of the local situation and the way in which strictly military tasks have political, social, economic, and cultural ramifications that the military cannot ignore or avoid; the inevitable adjustments peacekeepers have to make to dynamic and precarious situations; and the often unaccommodating role history plays when confronted with concerns about force protection, "mission creep," "end states," and early exits. In Bosnia, as in countless other operations, a US military force trained and equipped to fight a highly technological, conventional war found itself making adjustments that resulted in performing tasks that many officers considered unconventional and unorthodox. The ability to make these adjustments and to perform these tasks has thus far leant to the success of the US/NATO involvement in Bosnia. Now the United States is engaged in the Global War on Terror and, in the process, has already embarked on stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The case of Bosnia is, of course, unique but the general lessons it provides are relevant to US officers fighting in the current war and should not be overlooked.

As this overview seeks to remind the reader, the United States had a military presence in Somalia from December 1992 to the end of March 1994. A principal aim of the authors was to provide an analytical narrative of each phase of the US military involvement in Somalia. The authors address planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand. This case study also cautions against the misuse of "lessons learned."

The authors were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit U.S. and NATO forces in Bosnia in order to provide readers with an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of U.S. forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force (IFOR) to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) a year later. The authors shed light on several of the critical military lessons that have emerged from the U.S. experience in Bosnia.

First published in 1983 this detailed study has only now been made generally available. The Russians have a long history of fighting what are now called unconventional wars. Certainly since the 18th Century, and more recently in Afghanistan and Chechnia. The early wars were fought in the Caucasus. Fighting in that region started in earnest in the early 19th Century and continued to the late 1840s. Unrest continued in the region thereafter with major uprisings in the 1870s and also following the 1917 Revolution. It continues today in the Chechnia region. As the Russian Empire expanded Russian forces dominated the Kazahk region and undertook a series of campaigns in the area between the Caspian and Aral Sea. This culminated in the assault on Khiva in 1873 and the operations in 1880-1 on the Persian border, by then the Empire was on the borders of Persia and Afghanistan. After the Revolution the Red Army conducted a long campaign in the area north of the border with Afghanistan against the Basmachis Central Asian resistance. The Soviet operations started in 1918 and the last rumblings of resistance was finally quelled in 1933, though no serious fighting took place after 1924. The Soviets had considerable experience in the conduct of and fighting against, insurgency warfare. Prior to World War II it was either suppressing or encouraging such wars on its Asian frontiers. In World War II it organised activities behind the German line in Russia as well as supporting resistance and partisan movements in eastern and central Europe. After World War II it had to deal with resistance in the Ukraine and other areas of the Soviet Union that had been liberated from German occupation. Since World War II it encouraged, supplied and trained numerous participants in insurgent wars from the large scale such as Vietnam to the insignificant. In 1979, after the Soviet military intervention in Kabul, the Red Army allowed itself to become involved in an unwinnable war. This despite the Soviet experience in such fighting that extended back to the Revolution. Furthermore their conduct of operations demonstrated their failure to comprehend how such a war should be fought.

Published by the Combat Studies Institute Press. Provides an analytical narrative of each phase of the US military involvement in Somalia. For many Americans, the mention of that African country conjures up one memory, that of the fierce firefight between US troops and Somali militia on 3-4 October 1993. As this overview seeks to remind the reader, the United States had a military presence in Somalia from December 1992 to the end of March 1994. During that period, much was accomplished of a positive nature. Starving and mistreated Somalis were provided food and a modicum of security, while some progress was made toward peace in the country. That the broader goals of political reconciliation and stability ultimately were not achieved was in part a consequence of the intractability of the contending factions and the complexities of a country that defies Western definitions of "modern." Yet, US involvement in countries that have much in common with Somalia is a current reality and a future likelihood. For the professional officer, then, as well as the American public at large, it would be instructive to revisit the US experience in Somalia.

Published by the Combat Studies Institute Press."With the aid of a generous grant from the US Institute of Peace, Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit US and NATO forces in Bosnia. As a result of their labors, they have provided the reader an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the UN Protection Force to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of US forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force to the Stabilization Force a year later."