This is a new release of the original 1929 edition.

In 2001, the U.S. military clearly has no peer. We have the world's most dominating military capability. There is no other country that can assimilate and integrate combat capabilities of air, land, sea, and space forces to identify, locate, strike, assess and re-strike targets virtually anywhere on the planet like the U.S. military. Within the last decade, Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force showcased to the world the investment payoff of high technology-from the Global Positioning System, Joint Stars and cruise missiles to the F-117 stealth fighter, unmanned aerial vehicles and Joint Direct Attack Missiles (JDAMs)-and its powerful force-multiplying effects in joint and combined operations. But there are fissures in the foundation. Declining combat readiness, aging weapon systems, inadequate force structure, and inappropriate strategy are all elements of the on-going debate on the current status and future direction of the U.S. military. For some, the debate surrounding national defense is about technology and platforms-space and information systems, stealth aircraft, aircraft carriers, tanks, etc. For others, the debate is about the budget. What percentage of gross domestic product is appropriate during times of relative prosperity and peace? How to equitably divide the pie amongst the Services? Finally, what is the right military strategy in the 21st century-what engagement policy to adopt, what likely threats to prepare for, and what force structure to employ--that will ensure the U.S. military is as dominant into the future as it was in the 20th century? Overlying that debate, this paper looks at the U.S. military institution as the bureaucracy it is-complacently clinging to a thus-far successful, but stressed, two Major Theater War strategy devised in a different era, paralyzed by fear of transformation, predisposed to incremental change, and smug in its own hollow battlefield success.