In Missile Defense and American Security 2003, leading defense and foreign policy experts take stock of the emerging American missile defense system. This volume, based on proceedings from the 2003 Conference on Missile Defenses and American Security, is critical reading of one of the most important strategic initiatives ever undertaken by the United States.

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced to a surprised world that it had decided to abandon its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, as well as its longer-range missiles. Within hours, Prime Minister Blair and President Bush made separate but coordinated statements welcoming Tripoli's decision. Both made clear that Colonel Qadaffi had made this historic choice following months of secret contacts with the United States and United Kingdom. The author of The Libyan Experience, Ambassador Robert Joseph was at the center of this single most successful counterproliferation event of the decade. As the director of the National Security Council's counterproliferation activities, he was one of very few involved in, or even aware of, the secret face-to-face negotiations that preceded Libya's renunciation of its programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In fact, he headed the policy discussions with the Libyans that led to this historic and dramatic outcome. What occurred during those months has never before been made available publically or recorded in sufficient detail to answer key questions about Libyan motivations or to identify the lessons learned from this case that may apply to other proliferation challenges. In The Libyan Experience, Robert Joseph fills the void by providing this first hand account of the events that led to this great counterproliferation. Here is the actual history presented by a central figure involved in that success story. The narrative is both scholarly and highly-readable; at times it as much a real-life thriller as it is an historical text. As only a direct participant can, he describes the interactions with the Libyans and assesses their implications forboth Tripoli's decision and for the future. This is the definitive, true story that now is told thanks to the author's intrepid work and to his meticulous, highly readable accounting and assessment of events. This is a story that is profoundly important to our understanding of proliferation and of the tools and processes most helpful to its prevention and rollback. As such, it is profoundly important to our future.