On New Year's Eve 1961, the first broadcast of the Irish television service was made. The initial broadcast featured addresses by the President of the Republic, Eamon de Valera, and the Primate of all Ireland, Cardinal D'Alton. Both expressed concern over the effect television might have on Irish society. The dire warnings issued by both men illustrated the high level of apprehension held by many. This anxiety had been articulated by numerous organizations and interest groups since the debate over television began to take shape in the 1950s. A number of corporations and organizations had expressed a keen interest in building and operating television stations in Ireland. Other groups stepped forward to make the case that their particular interests should be addressed in any service that might be established. From the onset, a coherent policy eluded successive governments, with the fiscally conservative Department of Finance insisting that public television was beyond the means of an under-developed economy, while the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, already responsible for the national radio service, championed a state-run system. The arguments of these and other organizations, including the Catholic Church, Irish language groups, and professional organizations, culminated in the establishment of a Television Commission to recommend public policy. After deliberating for more than a year, the Commission issued a confused and contradictory final report. As Professor Savage shows, the television service that emerged was a synthesis of these opposing positions; an Irish solution to an Irish problem. This volume will be of considerable interest to students and scholars of Ireland as well as public policy and communications.

This is a study of how the Northern Ireland conflict was presented to an increasingly global audience during the premiership of Britain's 'Iron Lady', Margaret Thatcher. It addresses the tensions that characterized the relationship between the broadcast media and the Thatcher Government throughout the 1980s. Robert J. Savage explores how that tension worked its way into decisions made by managers, editors, and reporters addressing a conflict that seemed insoluble. Margaret Thatcher mistrusted the broadcast media, especially the BBC, believing it had a left-wing bias that was hostile to her interests and policies. This was especially true of the broadcast media's reporting about Northern Ireland. She regarded investigative reporting that explored the roots of republican violence in the region or coverage critical of her government's initiatives as undermining the rule of law, and thereby providing terrorists with what she termed the 'oxygen of publicity'. She followed in the footsteps of the Labour Government that proceeded her by threatening and bullying both the BBC and IBA, promising that the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act would be deployed to punish journalists that came into contact with the IRA. Although both networks continued to offer compelling news and current affairs programming, the tactics of her government produced considerable success. Wary of direct government intervention, both networks encouraged a remarkable degree of self-censorship when addressing 'the Troubles'. Regardless, by 1988, the Thatcher Government, unhappy with criticism of its policies, took the extraordinary step of imposing formal censorship on the British broadcast media. The infamous 'broadcasting ban' lasted six years, successfully silencing the voices of Irish republicans while tarnishing the reputation of the United Kingdom as a leading global democracy.