This work examines the labyrinth of complexities that confronts the Intelligence Community in its efforts to provide accurate and timely intelligence in support of American foreign policy and national security interests. Kennedy begins with an analysis of the collection processes and the obstacles that must be overcome if accurate and meaningful information is to be obtained. He addresses such issues as the need for strategic vision and clarity in setting priorities, as well as constraints imposed by the executive branch and the complexities associated with translating priorities into collection programs. The focus then shifts to the obstacles that confront those tasked to analyze collected information, examining such issues as the impact of people, technology, and budgets on the overall analytical effort. The third area of emphasis for Kennedy centers on the "quality control" of collection and analysis, addressing both Executive Branch and Congressional Oversight of the intelligence processes. Finally, he examines issues associated with the distribution and use of the intelligence products - the so-called "end game" obstacles. Issues addressed include the lack of presidential support for and confidence in the Intelligence Community, the impact of "worst-case planning," and the "coloring" of intelligence to suit policy preferences. Ultimately, the component parts provide the reader with a broad understanding of the Intelligence Community and the difficulties it faces as it strives to keep the United States safe and informed. In the wake of recent intelligence failures, the Intelligence Community has come under increasing attack. Yet few people outside of government, and all toofrequently many inside of government, do not understand just how difficult and complex are the processes of collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and effectively using gathered intelligence. The purpose of this undertaking is to illustrate the many road blocks the Intelligence Community confronts as it attempts to meet the needs of policymakers and to provide the average American, students of foreign and security policy, and many inside of government with a more comprehensive understanding of the overall intelligence effort. The complex processes for identifying, prioritizing, and communicating requirements to the intelligence community are further complicated by a lack of strategic vision on the part of American policy makers. Kennedy contends that those problems are compounded by Executive department oversight of the Intelligence Community, which has contributed significantly to past failures of intelligence. Moreover, the lack of effective oversight by Congress of the Intelligence Community in terms of the quality of its product upon which Congress has often been required to make life and death decisions too often has been either seriously deficient or non-existent. All too frequently, Kennedy notes, what could be called "political coloring" adversely affects the intelligence product. Intelligence findings are often "colored" to suit the preferred policies of decision-makers. As a result, actions are taken based on assumptions and opinions that are not supported by existing intelligence.

A troubling look at why, for a variety of reasons, congressional power on issues of war and peace has diminished over time, resulting in an abdication of responsibility as the executive branch led the United States into a war with Iraq in 2003. The Road to War: Congress' Historic Abdication of Responsibility is a thought-provoking discussion of the ramifications of a shift in the balance of powers between Congress and the Executive Branch with regard to war and peace. To underscore his argument, author Robert Kennedy outlines the intellectual origins of the U.S. Constitution and examines the intent of the Framers on the relationship between Congress and the executive branch in the formulation of foreign and security policy and decisions of war and peace. Kennedy traces the erosion of congressional power from 1789 to the 21st century, concluding that Congress has often gifted away its war powers to the president, preferring to leave decisions on his shoulders, rather than accept the responsibility for a comprehensive examination of the issues and the tough decisions that such efforts might entail. This abdication by Congress of its constitutionally mandated responsibilities dangerously threatens the systems of checks and balances established under the Constitution. Power no longer checks power. Ambition is set free to take the Road to War.

Drawing on their daily involvement with defense issues and their interactions with the military and political elements of the national security community, civilian and military defense analysts in the U.S. Army War Colleger Strategic Studies Institute offer a lucid analysis of the complex mosaic of strategic and European defense issues. Their contributions are probing, balanced, and provocative, designed for students of foreign and defense affairs, as well as for policymakers. In the first section of the book, the offensive and defensive aspects of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union are examined. Going beyond sterile, static weapons counts, the authors address the relationship between the overall disposition of military forces and deterrence and are attentive to possible future developments, including the impact of new technologies and changing Sino-Soviet relations that are likely to affect the U.S.-USSR relationship. The second section of the book focuses on crucial East-West defense issues within Europe: the balance of conventional and theater nuclear forces, prospects for European arms control, the impact of chemical weapons on deterrence and defense, and the fashioning of an effective nonnuclear NATO defense. The book concludes with a chapter that illuminates U.S.-West European historical and cultural divergences, explaining in a new way the political strains that frequently plague the alliance.