Challenging the views of Benito Mussolini's Italian biographer, Renzo De Felice, this book argues that the Duce's aggressive war against the predominant Mediterranean powers, Britain and France, was the only means whereby Italy might secure access to the world's oceans. Following Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Mussolini actively pursued the Italo-German alliance which he believed would enable him to conquer a Fascist empire stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. By the eve of Italy's entry in the world war II, the Fascist administration had commissioned substantial new capital-ship programmes, and created a major surface and underwater fleet that seemed to post a serious challenge to the strategic position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and Red Sea.
The study covers: the effects of Mussolini's pro-German policy on the policy-making and strategic planning of the Regia Marina; the major political, strategic and economic factors that shaped Italy's naval policy under Mussolini; the effectiveness of naval operational planning in the light of the various international crises that dominated the period before the war; and the part played by the Italian naval high command in Mussolini's quest for empire.

The essays that comprise this study of 20th-century fascism shift the focus away from the German and Italian models and towards the influence of fascist ideology within other countries.

The essays that comprise this study of 20th-century fascism shift the focus away from the German and Italian models and towards the influence of fascist ideology within other countries.

Challenging the views of Benito Mussolini's Italian biographer, Renzo De Felice, this book argues that the Duce's aggressive war against the predominant Mediterranean powers, Britain and France, was the only means whereby Italy might secure access to the world's oceans. Following Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Mussolini actively pursued the Italo-German alliance which he believed would enable him to conquer a Fascist empire stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. By the eve of Italy's entry in the world war II, the Fascist administration had commissioned substantial new capital-ship programmes, and created a major surface and underwater fleet that seemed to post a serious challenge to the strategic position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

This new study re-examines the controversial debate on Fascist Italy's road to international conflict that has raged for six decades. The author's privileged access to until now unseen archival materials allows him to assess the ideological, geopolitical, domestic and strategic considerations that shaped Mussolini's alliance with Hitler, and his subsequent decision to wage war against Great Britain and France in June 1940.

Mussolini in Ethiopia, 1919-1935 looks in detail at the evolution of the Italian Fascist regime's colonial policy within the context of European politics and the rise to power of German National Socialism. It delves into the tortuous nature of relations between the National Fascist Party and the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), while demonstrating how, ultimately, a Hitler-led Germany proved the best mechanism for overseas Italian expansion in East Africa. The book assesses the emergence of an ideologically driven Fascist colonial policy from 1931 onwards and how this eventually culminated in a serious clash of interests with the British Empire. Benito Mussolini's successful flouting of the League of Nations' authority heralded a new dark era in world politics and continues to have its resonance in today's world.