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Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the
organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting.
The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis.
First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete
information and communication in economic organizations and
consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market
organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation
in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative
social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation
problems that arise in these situations.
The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in
cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social
networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard
concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the
Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are
the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions,
various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and
share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book
discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as
allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical
allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic
approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each
approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each
chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to
be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game
theory.
This book aims to develop an institutional approach to general
economic equi librium. Thus far, institutional economics has
essentially been confined to purely verbal discourse. Here I argue
the case that general equilibrium theory forms a well rounded basis
for the development of an institutional economic the ory. The
fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this refocusing is
that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modelled through the
equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. There is an extensive
literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism,
which is explored in this book. Next I develop an alternative model
of explicitly nonsovereign trade in the setting of an
institutionally structured economy. In this book the core and
several of its extensions are considered to be descriptions of the
equilibrium allocations resulting from institutionalized barter
processes, thereby providing a basis of an institutionally based
economic theory. Traditionally finite economies have been assessed
as the most natural represen tations of real life economies, in
particular of market economies. Many funda mental insights have
been developed. In the first half of the book I summarize the most
influential and important results in the literature on finite
economies regarding the relationship of the Walrasian model of a
perfectly competitive market system and the Edgeworthian theory of
individually based, pure barter processes. I use the axiomatic
method as the main methodological framework according to which I
construct my models."
The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in
cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social
networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard
concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the
Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are
the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions,
various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and
share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book
discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as
allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical
allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic
approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each
approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each
chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to
be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game
theory.
This book aims to develop an institutional approach to general
economic equi librium. Thus far, institutional economics has
essentially been confined to purely verbal discourse. Here I argue
the case that general equilibrium theory forms a well rounded basis
for the development of an institutional economic the ory. The
fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this refocusing is
that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modelled through the
equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. There is an extensive
literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism,
which is explored in this book. Next I develop an alternative model
of explicitly nonsovereign trade in the setting of an
institutionally structured economy. In this book the core and
several of its extensions are considered to be descriptions of the
equilibrium allocations resulting from institutionalized barter
processes, thereby providing a basis of an institutionally based
economic theory. Traditionally finite economies have been assessed
as the most natural represen tations of real life economies, in
particular of market economies. Many funda mental insights have
been developed. In the first half of the book I summarize the most
influential and important results in the literature on finite
economies regarding the relationship of the Walrasian model of a
perfectly competitive market system and the Edgeworthian theory of
individually based, pure barter processes. I use the axiomatic
method as the main methodological framework according to which I
construct my models."
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the
organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting.
The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis.
First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete
information and communication in economic organizations and
consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market
organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation
in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative
social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation
problems that arise in these situations.
This textbook introduces and develops new tools to understand the
recent economic crisis and how desirable economic policies can be
adopted. Gilles provides new institutional concepts for wealth
creation, such as network economies, which are based on the social
division of labour. This volume investigates the formation of
networks and hierarchical authority organisations, with a focus on
the role of trust. Gilles also looks at the theory of growth and
development, using real world examples and problem sets to put into
practice. This title is suitable reading for undergraduate, MSc and
postgraduate students in microeconomic analysis, economic theory
and political economy.
'This is the second book of a two-volume set that continues Adam
Smith's work, using the tools mathematical, experimental, and
behavioural economists have developed since 1776. As in the first
volume, markets are not the central organising principle. Instead,
attention centres on social institutions and the division of labour
that they enable. The book studies this via the endogenous division
of labour that existing institutions help form. The first book in
the series examined this problem deeply, resorting minimally to
formal mathematical modelling; the second volume is where the
formal modelling blossoms. General equilibrium theory meets network
theory and receives a breath of fresh air, including a new
viewpoint on economic inequality, the newly resurgent bane of
capitalism. What I said for the first volume applies to this second
volume equally: if you care to understand the economy, this book
belongs to your bookshelf.' -Dimitrios Diamantaras, Temple
University, Philadelphia, USA This textbook introduces and develops
new tools to understand the recent economic crisis and how
desirable economic policies can be adopted. Gilles provides new
institutional concepts for wealth creation, such as network
economies, which are based on the social division of labour. This
second volume introduces mathematical theories of the endogenous
formation of social divisions of labour through which economic
wealth is created. Gilles also investigates the causes of
inequality in the social division of labour under imperfectly
competitive conditions. These theories frame a comprehensive,
innovative and consistent perspective on the functioning of the
twenty-first century global economy, explaining many of its
failings. Suitable reading for advanced undergraduate, MSc and
postgraduate students in microeconomic analysis, economic theory
and political economy.
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