Because of the potential ease with which transnational corporations can relocate, many governments have avoided direct attempts to intervene in their activities. Nonetheless, the major economies have adopted a wide range of policies towards transnational corporations. Some (Japan and France in particular) have been very concerned by the impact of such firms. Others (most notably Britain) have had a relatively relaxed attitude. This book offers an account of policy towards transnationals over the last 30 years or so. It features: detailed, up-to-date accounts of policy in Japan, France, Germany, the United States and Britain; the role of organizations other than governments, including trade unions, business and opposition parties; summaries of which issues have most concerned which countries overall characterizations of each country's policy stance. The result should appeal to those interested in industrial economics, international business, global political economy, and international law.

First published in 2005, Economics and Social Interaction is a fresh attempt to overcome the traditional inability of economics to deal with interpersonal phenomena that occur within the sphere of markets and productive organizations. It makes use of traditional economic concepts for understanding interpersonal events, while venturing beyond those concepts to give a better account of personalised interactions. In contrast to other books, Economics and Social Interaction offers the reader a rigorous effort at extending economic analysis to a difficult field in a consistent manner, sensitive to insights from other behavioural and social sciences. This collection represents an important contribution to a growing research agenda in the social sciences.

Since the 1980s, there has been explosive growth in the use of experimental methods in economics, leading to exciting developments in economic theory and policy. Despite this, the status of experimental economics remains controversial. In Experimental Economics, the authors draw on their experience and expertise in experimental economics, economic theory, the methodology of economics, philosophy of science, and the econometrics of experimental data to offer a balanced and integrated look at the nature and reliability of claims based on experimental research. The authors explore the history of experiments in economics, provide examples of different types of experiments, and show that the growing use of experimental methods is transforming economics into a genuinely empirical science. They explain that progress is being held back by an uncritical acceptance of folk wisdom regarding how experiments should be conducted, a failure to acknowledge that different objectives call for different approaches to experimental design, and a misplaced assumption that principles of good practice in theoretical modeling can be transferred directly to experimental design. Experimental Economics debates how such limitations might be overcome, and will interest practicing experimental economists, nonexperimental economists wanting to interpret experimental research, and philosophers of science concerned with the status of knowledge claims in economics.

Since the 1980s, there has been explosive growth in the use of experimental methods in economics, leading to exciting developments in economic theory and policy. Despite this, the status of experimental economics remains controversial. In "Experimental Economics," the authors draw on their experience and expertise in experimental economics, economic theory, the methodology of economics, philosophy of science, and the econometrics of experimental data to offer a balanced and integrated look at the nature and reliability of claims based on experimental research.

The authors explore the history of experiments in economics, provide examples of different types of experiments, and show that the growing use of experimental methods is transforming economics into a genuinely empirical science. They explain that progress is being held back by an uncritical acceptance of folk wisdom regarding how experiments should be conducted, a failure to acknowledge that different objectives call for different approaches to experimental design, and a misplaced assumption that principles of good practice in theoretical modeling can be transferred directly to experimental design. "Experimental Economics" debates how such limitations might be overcome, and will interest practicing experimental economists, nonexperimental economists wanting to interpret experimental research, and philosophers of science concerned with the status of knowledge claims in economics.

"In this highly original book Michael Bacharach aims right at the foundations of game theory by challenging its narrow and individualistic rationality assumptions. While retaining all of the theory's analytical force, he shows how we can incorporate into it broader psychological mechanisms such as frames, social identities, and salience, producing a tool capable of biting deeper and wider into real-world social phenomena. For years to come this book will sharpen the thinking of economists. All social scientists who strive to make sense of social behavior, even those hitherto suspicious of game theory, will find it a treasure trove of inspiration."--Diego Gambetta, Professor of Sociology and Official Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

"Michael Bacharach is best known as the creator of the epistemological approach to game theory. He died while working on an equally creative project that aimed at understanding the psychology of human coordination processes. Gold and Sugden are to be congratulated on working up the notes he left behind into a book that captures the kind of intellectual adventure that Bacharach loved so much."--Ken Binmore, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University College London, author of "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. I" and "Vol. II"

""Beyond Individual Choice" addresses an important topic in game theory, namely, the type of reasoning that leads to coordination and cooperation in common interest games. It offers sensible and creative solutions to problems of strategic reasoning and thereby makes an excellent contribution to the foundations of game theory. The editors have done a fine job with Michael Bacharach's work; their perspectivescomplement his and add both unity and depth to the volume. Economists, psychologists, and philosophers will welcome the book, which is accessible to students of game theory in each of those disciplines."--Paul Weirich, Professor of Philosophy, University of Missouri, author of "Realistic Decision Theory"

This is an introduction, accessible to non-economists as well as to economists, to the practice of cost-benefit analysis. It begins from a discussion of financial appraisal. The distinguishing features of cost-benifit analysis are then introduced progressively. Practical examples are used whenever possible to aid the exposition. Economic theory is introduced only where it is immediately relevant to practice; there is no attempt to give a comprehensive survey of theoretical welfare economics.

The Community of Advantage asks how economists should do normative analysis. Normative analysis in economics has usually aimed at satisfying individuals' preferences. Its conclusions have supported a long- standing liberal tradition of economics that values economic freedom and views markets favourably. However, behavioural research shows that individuals' preferences, as revealed in choices, are often unstable, and vary according to contextual factors that seem irrelevant for welfare. Robert Sugden proposes a reformulation of normative economics that is compatible with what is now known about the psychology of choice. The growing consensus in favour of paternalism and 'nudging' is based on a very different way of reconciling normative economics with behavioural findings. This is to assume that people have well-defined 'latent' preferences which, because of psychologically-induced errors, are not always revealed in actual choices. The economist's job is then to reconstruct latent preferences and to design policies to satisfy them. Challenging this consensus, The Community of Advantage argues that latent preference and error are psychologically ungrounded concepts, and that economics needs to be more radical in giving up rationality assumptions. Sugden advocates a kind of normative economics that does not use the concept of preference. Its recommendations are addressed, not to an imagined 'social planner', but to citizens, viewed as potential parties to mutually beneficial agreements. Its normative criterion is the provision of opportunities for individuals to participate in voluntary transactions. Using this approach, Sugden reconstructs many of the normative conclusions of the liberal tradition. He argues that a well-functioning market economy is an institution that individuals have reason to value, whether or not their preferences satisfy conventional axioms of rationality, and that individuals' motivations in such an economy can be cooperative rather than self-interested.

First published in 2005, Economics and Social Interaction is a fresh attempt to overcome the traditional inability of economics to deal with interpersonal phenomena that occur within the sphere of markets and productive organizations. It makes use of traditional economic concepts for understanding interpersonal events, while venturing beyond those concepts to give a better account of personalised interactions. In contrast to other books, Economics and Social Interaction offers the reader a rigorous effort at extending economic analysis to a difficult field in a consistent manner, sensitive to insights from other behavioural and social sciences. This collection represents an important contribution to a growing research agenda in the social sciences.