Even if Peirce were well understood and there existed. general agreement among Peirce scholars on what he meant by his semiotics, or philosophy of signs, the undertaking of this book-wliich intends to establish a theoretical foundation for a new approach to understanding the interrelations of law, economics, and politics against referent systems of value-would be a risky venture. But since such general agreement on Peirce's work is lacking, one's sense of adventure in ideas requires further qualification. Indeed, the proverbial nerve for failure must in any case be attendant. If one succeeds, one has introduced for further inquiry the strong possibility that should our social systems of law, economics, and politics---our means of interpersonal transaction as a whole-be understood against the theoretical back ground of a dynamic, "motion-picture" universe that is continually becoming, that is infinitely developing and changing in response to genuinely novel elements that emerge as existents, then the basic concepts of rights, resources, and reality take on new dimensions of meaning in correspondence with n-dimensional, infinite value judgments or truth-like beliefs which one holds. If such a view, as Peirce maintained, were possible and tenable not only for philosophy but as the basis for action and interaction in the world of human experience and practical affairs, one would readily say that risk taking is a small price for the realization of such possibility."

However, it became apparent shortly after the establishing of the Center that not only were all methods of legal semiotics not Peircean in origin, but were in their respective foundational assumptions not likely to be compatible with Peirce's semiotics without some radical, transforming development of the idea, 'legal semiotics'. It was clear that if one would intend to be faithful to Peircean semiotics then holding a fixed notion of what an idea of Peircean semiotics of law means would be a violation of the spirit of Peirce's thought; this above all emphasizes the growth and development of initiative ideas and also the stricture that all leading principles must be subject to revision. Even the idea of Peircean semiotics, as leading principle, must itself be an open idea, the meaning of which must be transformable through the process of defining it. A metasemiotics view of a semiotics of law must leave open the possibility for revision of the leading principle of the term, "legal semiotics. " Therefore, if legal semiotics is an idea which accumulates and evolves its meaning in the very process of self-examination, then a process of investigating law investigates itself as well in any semiotic process of inquiry. It became apparent that the most appropriate contribution the Center could make to the area of a Peirce an semiotics would be to act as a sponsor, an inclusive rather than exclusive agent for inquiry of all kinds into the general topic of law and semiotics.

of those problems in law which we inherit and/or retrieve in order to reconstruct and interpret in the light of legal semiotics, however defined. In addition to three main areas of underlying metaphysical assumptions there are also three main areas of possible editorial focus and these should be mentioned. The three areas of focus are: 1) the state-of-the-art of legal semiotics; 2) the dynamic, intense and exceptionally interactive quality of conference participation, and 3) the content of the papers presented which is the material of this volume. My choice of this triad of focal possibilities is to exclude the last since the papers speak for themselves and need but a brief reportorial caption. I also eliminate the second possible focus as the main focus since the discussion was not taped for editing into this volume and must remain for all those who participated a quality of scholarly meetings to be remembered, savored and hoped for. My main focus is on the "state-of-the-art" of legal semiotics. II At the conclusion of the First Round Table on Law and Semiotics (1987) it was noted that there were no working paradigms, in Kuhn's sense, that thus far emerged but rather that several problematic areas were disclosed which warrant attention. Therefore the first concern of Legal Semiotics should be to address the surface, i. e.

Discussions of both semiotics and ritual have undergone a fundamental reorientation over the past several decades. Traditionally, both were east in a cognitivist vocabulary in which what is known is regarded as primitive and what is done is treated as behavior scripted by knowledge. When treated in this way, semiotics reduces to studies of the encoding and decoding of messages and ritual studies to articulations of the mythic content imbedded in ritual practices.The inadequacy of a cognitivist vocabulary for these purposes has recently been argued by researchers who mounted historical studies of both sign systems and ritual practices. These studies flesh out an alternative, non-cognitivist vocabulary. According to this approach primacy is to be accorded to process over structure, to practice over knowledge, to ritual over ideology. A non-cognitive approach has not only invigorated both ritual studies and semiotics, but has also uncovered mutual dependencies that have previously escaped attention. In many respects, sign systems alternatively emerge ritual practices and in turn transform ritual practices in fundamental ways. The essays in this volume explore some of the key aspects in which rituals and sign systems form, interact, reinforce, transform and interpret one another, especially in the context of legal institutions.