This book covers the main topics of welfare economics - general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods - and some of the major topics of social choice theory - compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs."

This second edition retains the positive features of being clearly written, well organized, and incorporating calculus in the text, while adding expanded coverage on game theory, experimental economics, and behavioural economics. It remains more focused and manageable than similar textbooks, and provides a concise yet comprehensive treatment of the core topics of microeconomics, including theories of the consumer and of the firm, market structure, partial and general equilibrium, and market failures caused by public goods, externalities and asymmetric information. The book includes helpful solved problems in all the substantive chapters, as well as over seventy new mathematical exercises and enhanced versions of the ones in the first edition. The authors make use of the book's full color with sharp and helpful graphs and illustrations. This mathematically rigorous textbook is meant for students at the intermediate level who have already had an introductory course in microeconomics, and a calculus course.

This second edition retains the positive features of being clearly written, well organized, and incorporating calculus in the text, while adding expanded coverage on game theory, experimental economics, and behavioural economics. It remains more focused and manageable than similar textbooks, and provides a concise yet comprehensive treatment of the core topics of microeconomics, including theories of the consumer and of the firm, market structure, partial and general equilibrium, and market failures caused by public goods, externalities and asymmetric information. The book includes helpful solved problems in all the substantive chapters, as well as over seventy new mathematical exercises and enhanced versions of the ones in the first edition. The authors make use of the book's full color with sharp and helpful graphs and illustrations. This mathematically rigorous textbook is meant for students at the intermediate level who have already had an introductory course in microeconomics, and a calculus course.

This book covers the main topics of welfare economics - general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods - and some of the major topics of social choice theory - compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs."