In explicit form, Kant does not speak that much about values or goods. The reason for this is obvious: the concepts of 'values' and 'goods' are part of the eudaimonistic tradition, and he famously criticizes eudaimonism for its flawed 'material' approach to ethics. But he uses, on several occasions, the traditional teleological language of goods and values. Especially in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant develops crucial points on this conceptual basis. Furthermore, he implicitly discusses issues of conditional and unconditional values, subjective and objective values, aesthetic or economic values etc. In recent Kant scholarship, there has been a controversy on the question how moral and nonmoral values are related in Kant's account of human dignity. This leads to the more fundamental problem if Kant should be seen as a prescriptvist (antirealist) or as subscribing to a more objective rational agency account of goods. This issue and several further questions are addressed in this volume.

The debate between moral realism and antirealism plays an important role in contemporary metaethics as well as in the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. This volume aims to clarify whether, and in what sense, Kant is a moral realist, an antirealist, or something in-between. Based on an explication of the key metaethical terms, internationally recognized Kant scholars discuss the question of how Kant's moral philosophy should be understood in this regard. All camps in the metaethical field have their inhabitants: Some contributors read Kant's philosophy in terms of a more or less robust moral realism, objectivism, or idealism, and some of them take it to be a version of constructivism, constitutionism, or brute antirealism. In any case, all authors introduce and defend their terminology in a clear manner and argue thoughtfully and refreshingly for their positions. With contributions of Stefano Bacin, Jochen Bojanowski, Christoph Horn, Patrick Kain, Lara Ostaric, Fred Rauscher, Oliver Sensen, Elke Schmidt, Dieter Schoenecker, and Melissa Zinkin.

The debate between moral realism and antirealism plays an important role in contemporary metaethics as well as in the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. This volume aims to clarify whether, and in what sense, Kant is a moral realist, an antirealist, or something in-between. Based on an explication of the key metaethical terms, internationally recognized Kant scholars discuss the question of how Kant's moral philosophy should be understood in this regard. All camps in the metaethical field have their inhabitants: Some contributors read Kant's philosophy in terms of a more or less robust moral realism, objectivism, or idealism, and some of them take it to be a version of constructivism, constitutionism, or brute antirealism. In any case, all authors introduce and defend their terminology in a clear manner and argue thoughtfully and refreshingly for their positions. With contributions of Stefano Bacin, Jochen Bojanowski, Christoph Horn, Patrick Kain, Lara Ostaric, Fred Rauscher, Oliver Sensen, Elke Schmidt, Dieter Schoenecker, and Melissa Zinkin.