This study provides an overview of the International Air Force (IAF) concept, which emerged in the early 20th century out of a long progression of schemes for creating multi-national armed forces to enforce the peace, most often referred to as an international police force (IPF). After broadly tracing the IAF's complex lineage, Beaumont surveys the proliferation of IPF and IAF proposals throughout the 20th century, including schemes offered by Kipling, H.G. Wells, and Theodore Roosevelt. Later ideas included the Allies' Independent Air Force of 1917-18, the evolution of the League to Enforce Peace into the League of Nations, imperial air policing between the World Wars, and a host of proposals, official and informal, such as visions of a United Nations IAF and the ad hoc coalition air forces assembled by the major western powers in the Gulf War and the Balkans in the 1990s.

The IAF concept gained far greater popularity, even among contemporary historians, than is generally appreciated. Beaumont interweaves the review of the IAF and IPF designs with diplomacy and war, especially the rise of air power, and the confounding of its advocates' visions of a cheap, quick road to victory. Based on Beaumont's survey of secondary and primary sources during more than a decade of research, this book considers the IAF image from such diverse perspectives as pacifism, popular culture, and collective security.

This short history is the first broad and selective survey of the phenomenon known as "jointness"--the co-operative operations of land and naval forces until the twentieth-century and of land, sea, and air forces since World War I. Touching on operational, doctrinal, and political dimensions, the survey ranges from the ancient Mediterranean to recent times while focusing on European and American experiences from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries, including Desert Storm. Illustrative cases and reference materials are attuned to the interests of scholars, defense analysts, and students of military affairs. Jointness, subject of major concern to military historians, policymakers, politicians, and military professionals has in the past been covered within certain periods on a case by case or topical basis. This history begins instead with a broad survey from ancient to modern times and then focuses more closley on joint operations since World War I with wide-ranging examples to illustrate trends and patterns of Jointness. The survey closes with a discussion of the central problem of friction and other paradoxes connected with joint military operations. A selected bibliography provides an array of sources both for general readers and military professionals. Maps and appendices further enrich this important history.

"War, Chaos, and History" considers the implications of the emerging field of research in chaos-complexity-non-linearity for the study of war. This study examines the special dependence of military professionals on history in their shaping of doctrines, style, and attitudes in spite of the wide gap between the portrayal of war in military history and the far greater intricacy of its reality. Special foci in the analysis include: the fragility of doctrine; the chronic confounding of plans and expectations in actual operations; the congruences of chaos and creativity theoretics; effects of war on the environment; and problems of evidence and reportage. Three cases--battle cruisers, tank destroyers, and heavy fighter aircraft--are presented to illustrate paradoxes, especially the gap between vision and realization, and the tension between the urge to control and the impulse to create chaos in war.

In contemporary military parlance, special operations denotes unconventional, often covert, military actions usually performed by specially trained forces for strictly defined objectives. In this volume, Roger Beaumont provides the most comprehensive survey available of modern special operations literature. His wide-ranging introduction sets the subject in its historical, typological, and national contexts, offering an illuminating overview of the use of special operations and elite units from the second World War to the present. The bibliographic entries describe a broad sampling of materials, from those accessible through interlibrary loan services to those far removed from central archives and major research libraries. The aim throughout has been to provide both those new to the subject and seasoned researchers with a single, easy-to-use source for information about this little-known and commonly misunderstood facet of military practice. Following the detailed introductory essay, the bibliographical section is dividied into 10 categories: background and analysis, elite forces, special operations in major wars, special operations in low-intensity conflict and counterinsurgency, counterterror operations, biography and autobiography, bibliography, official sources, critiques, and popular images. Entries are arranged alphabetically within these sections. Complete author, title, and subject indexes are included to further aid the researcher and four appendices provide valuable supplemental information on elite forces and counterterrorist operations. Scholars and students of military affairs, government officials, and practitioners of special operations will find Beaumont's work indispensable.

Rather than a technical treatise based on equations, this study of the Hitler era in Germany from the standpoint of chaos-complexity theory is a narrative history based on a non-linear perspective. After defining basic chaos-complexity concepts and terms, like "sensitivity to initial conditions" and "fractals," the book explores the Third Reich as a chaotic system; the clash between the image of Nazi technical prowess and the anti-modernism in National Socialist ideology; and German and Nazi military tactics and doctrine as ways of coping with the chaos of war and imposing it upon the enemy. Beaumont also looks at attempts to instill the arrogance and rage of the Nazi Party's brown-shirted storm troops into the Wehrmacht through the National Socialist Leadership Officer program, the "Nazi Commissars." What were the intricate causal roots of the Endloesung or Final Solution? Why did the Allies refuse to mount a direct attack on the Nazi infrastructure responsible for the Holocaust? The study concludes with a discussion of paradoxes and implications, considering such questions as whether Nazism was a form of chaos, in the theoretical sense of its being a degree of order within apparently random turbulence, or a kind of recurring pathology, as well as whether social and historical processes are tractable to chaos-complexity-based analyses.