The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The breadth of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research.

The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also applications of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, political competition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to analyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics.

The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included. Our aim has been to include the most important contributions in the literature and give a broad overview of secondary contributions. The end result is a fine collection that shows the flexibility and power of the rent-seeking methodology, and the light shed on a broad range of political, social, and institutional research issues. Each volume begins with an extensive survey of the literature written by the editors and an overview of the contributions included in the two volumes.

Do constitutions matter? Are constitutions simply symbols of the political times at which they were adopted, or do they systematically affect the course of public policy? Are the policy crises of failing democracies the result of bad luck or of fundamental problems associated with the major and minor constitutional reforms adopted during their recent histories?

The purpose of the present study is to address these questions using a blend of theory, history, and statistical analysis. The Swedish experience provides a nearly perfect laboratory in which to study the effects of constitutional reform. During the past 200 years, Swedish governance has shifted from a king-dominated system with an unelected four-chamber parliament to a bicameral legislature elected with wealth-weighted voting in 1866, and then to a new electoral system based on proportional representation and universal suffrage in 1920, and finally to a unicameral parliamentary system in 1970. All these radical reorganizations of Swedish governance were accomplished peacefully using formal amendment procedures established by previous constitutions.

Theoretical work in public choice and political science implies that constitutional changes affect political equilibria and, thereby, government policies. There is much evidence of these effects in Swedish history. The historical evidence suggests that Swedish constitutional reforms have profoundly affected governmental policy making, and, indirectly, Swedish economic performance. A contractarian normative analysis of the constitutional reforms themselves and of the consequences of those reforms suggests that Swedish governance has been substantially improved by constitutional reform, although additional improvements may still be possible.

By focusing on constitutional issues rather than Sweden's political history, this book extends our understanding of constitutional reform and parliamentary democracy in general.

This collection brings together the classic papers on the economics of rent seeking. These papers date from Gordon Tullock's original 1967 paper which first put forth the idea that the pursuit of transfers was socially costly. Other classic papers by Anne Krueger and Richard Posner are included, as well as a series of more recent papers which trace the evolution of the literature on this important innovation in economic theory.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The breadth of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research.

The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also applications of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, political competition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to analyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics.

The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included. Our aim has been to include the most important contributions in the literature and give a broad overview of secondary contributions. The end result is a fine collection that shows the flexibility and power of the rent-seeking methodology, and the light shed on a broad range of political, social, and institutional research issues. Each volume begins with an extensive survey of the literature written by the editors and an overview of the contributions included in the two volumes.

This twenty-seven chapter book provides an excellent and accessible overview of the literature on rent seeking since its inception. What makes the book a fascinating reading is its application to different areas, such as regulation and economic aid, and presentation of an array of highly readable cases studies, including on China, Greece, India and Russia. It is a must for both students of public finance and policy makers.' - Sanjeev Gupta, International Monetary Fund'Indeed, this book is an indispensable companion to everyone working on rent seeking or the theory or politics of contests. It combines excellent surveys and innovative work of the most eminent researchers in this field.' - Kai Konrad, Director, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich, Germany The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although rent seeking can also take place in personal relations and within firms and bureaucracies. The contributions in this outstanding volume provide an accompaniment or 'companion' to the literature on rent seeking and the related political economy of rent creation and extraction. The chapters, written by leading scholars in the field, demonstrate the centrality of rent-related incentives to the study of economics, politics, culture, public administration and history. The expert and original contributions summarize and extend the literature in both theoretical and applied areas of research. The book begins with a clear and comprehensive description of the theory of rent seeking and of contest design for political and bureaucratic rent extraction. This is followed by a series of case studies showing the relevance of rent seeking for regulatory policies, international-trade policies, public finance, natural-resource discoveries, development aid, behavior in international bureaucracies, litigation and judicial systems. The applied chapters also include overviews of rent seeking and rent extraction in Europe, Russia, Asia, Africa and the US. This volume will appeal to a broad readership, including economists, political scientists and development practitioners, wishing to gain an understanding of the concept of rent seeking. The chapters in this book also provide an excellent introduction to the extensive literature. Contributors: J. A. Amegashie, M. Brooks, R.D. Congleton, G. Dari-Mattiacci, R.T. Deacon, G.S. Epstein, S. Flamand, R.J. Hagan, A.L. Hillman, R.G. Holcombe, C. Kang, M.S. Kimenyi, E. Langlais, M.I. Levin, N. Van Long, B. Lovat, B. Luppi, S. Marjit, J.M. Mbaku, Y. Mealem, T. Moutos, D. C. Mueller, V. Mukherjee, S. Nitzan, M. Paldam, F. Parisi, L. Pechlivanos, L. Qijun, A. Rode, G.A.Satarov, R.M. Sheremeta, W.F. Shughart II, D.W. Thomas, G. Tridimas, O. Troumpounis, R. Vaubel, K. Warneryd

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This second volume examines constitutional political economy and also various applications, including public policy, international relations, and the study of history, as well as methodological and measurement issues. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appUcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earUer surveys. Volume I contains previously pubhshed research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.

An original account of the role of ethical dispositions in the development of prosperous commercial societies In Solving Social Dilemmas, Roger Congleton provides an explanation for the rise of prosperous commercial societies. Congleton argues that an endless series of social, economic, and political dilemmas have to be solved or ameliorated to sustain social and economic progress and suggests that the most plausible solutions involve internalized rules of conduct. Previous foundational texts suggest that institutions often emerge to address social dilemmas, but Congleton focuses on a solution that is arguably prior to formal institutions: the internalization of principles and rules of conduct that directly affect individual behavior and thereby group outcomes. Supported by an intellectual and analytical history of the emergence of commercial societies in the West, the book uses elementary game theory to review a few dozen social, economic, and political dilemmas that need to be solved if prosperous societies are to emerge. It shows that ethical dispositions are likely to play important roles in solutions to all the problems examined-and arguably many more. Congleton does not claim that commercial networks result from ethical as opposed to unethical behavior, but that some ethical systems include rules that support the development of extended market networks, specialization, and innovation. As evidence the book traces how the increasing support of commerce in ethical theories in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries helped launch "the great acceleration" and the emergence of the first truly commercial societies. By combining substantive theoretical work with analysis of centuries of ethical writings, Solving Social Dilemmas reveals that commercial societies have moral foundations.

This book explains why contemporary liberal democracies are based on historical templates rather than revolutionary reforms; why the transition in Europe occurred during a relatively short period in the nineteenth century; why politically and economically powerful men and women voluntarily supported such reforms; how interests, ideas, and preexisting institutions affected the reforms adopted; and why the countries that liberalized their political systems also produced the Industrial Revolution. The analysis is organized in three parts. The first part develops new rational choice models of (1) governance, (2) the balance of authority between parliaments and kings, (3) constitutional exchange, and (4) suffrage reform. The second part provides historical overviews and detailed constitutional histories of six important countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan, and Germany. In all the countries discussed, liberal democracy emerged from a long series of constitutional reforms, rather than as a quantum leap from authoritarian to democratic governance. The third part provides additional quantitative evidence in support of the theory, summarizes the results, contrasts the approach taken in this book with that of other scholars, and discusses methodological issues.

Do constitutions matter? Are constitutions simply symbols of the political times at which they were adopted, or do they systematically affect the course of public policy? Are the policy crises of failing democracies the result of bad luck or of fundamental problems associated with the major and minor constitutional reforms adopted during their recent histories?

The purpose of the present study is to address these questions using a blend of theory, history, and statistical analysis. The Swedish experience provides a nearly perfect laboratory in which to study the effects of constitutional reform. During the past 200 years, Swedish governance has shifted from a king-dominated system with an unelected four-chamber parliament to a bicameral legislature elected with wealth-weighted voting in 1866, and then to a new electoral system based on proportional representation and universal suffrage in 1920, and finally to a unicameral parliamentary system in 1970. All these radical reorganizations of Swedish governance were accomplished peacefully using formal amendment procedures established by previous constitutions.

Theoretical work in public choice and political science implies that constitutional changes affect political equilibria and, thereby, government policies. There is much evidence of these effects in Swedish history. The historical evidence suggests that Swedish constitutional reforms have profoundly affected governmental policy making, and, indirectly, Swedish economic performance. A contractarian normative analysis of the constitutional reforms themselves and of the consequences of those reforms suggests that Swedish governance has been substantially improved by constitutional reform, although additional improvements may still be possible.

By focusing on constitutional issues rather than Sweden's political history, this book extends our understanding of constitutional reform and parliamentary democracy in general.

The very logic of majority rule implies unequal treatment or discrimination. If left unconstrained, majority coalitions will promote the interests of their own members at the expense of other persons. This book focuses on the effects of applying a generality constraint on the political process. Under this requirement, majorities would be constitutionally prohibited from treating different persons and groups differently. The generality principle is familiar in that all persons are to be treated equally. In summary, this book extends the generality norm to politics. Several defences of equal treatment or generality are developed and applied. These include the familiar intuition that invokes fairness. But the primary argument here is centred on political efficiency, which is increased when governments are constrained to treat persons or groups generally rather than differentially. The political efficiency defence of the generality constraint is based on a public choice analysis of the implication of majoritarian discrimination.

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appHcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously pubHshed research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included."

The very logic of majority rule implies unequal treatment or discrimination. If left unconstrained, majority coalitions will promote the interests of their own members at the expense of other persons. This book focuses on the effects of applying a generality constraint on the political process. Under this requirement, majorities would be constitutionally prohibited from treating different persons and groups differently. The generality principle is familiar in that all persons are to be treated equally. In summary, this book extends the generality norm to politics. Several defences of equal treatment or generality are developed and applied. These include the familiar intuition that invokes fairness. But the primary argument here is centred on political efficiency, which is increased when governments are constrained to treat persons or groups generally rather than differentially. The political efficiency defence of the generality constraint is based on a public choice analysis of the implication of majoritarian discrimination.

This book explains why contemporary liberal democracies are based on historical templates rather than revolutionary reforms; why the transition in Europe occurred during a relatively short period in the nineteenth century; why politically and economically powerful men and women voluntarily supported such reforms; how interests, ideas, and pre-existing institutions affected the reforms adopted; and why the countries that liberalized their political systems also produced the Industrial Revolution. The analysis is organized in three parts. The first part develops new rational choice models of (1) governance, (2) the balance of authority between parliaments and kings, (3) constitutional exchange, and (4) suffrage reform. The second part provides historical overviews and detailed constitutional histories of six important countries. The third part provides additional evidence in support of the theory, summarizes the results, contrasts the approach taken in this book with that of other scholars, and discusses methodological issues.