Ronald L. Cohen Justice is a central moral standard in social life. It is invoked in judging individual persons and in judging the basic structure of societies. It has been described as akin to a "human hunger or thirst" (Pascal, Pensees, cited in Hirschman, 1982, p. 91), "more powerful than any physical hunger, and endlessly resilient" (Pitkin, 1981, p. 349). The most prominent contemporary theory of justice proceeds from the claim that justice is "the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is systems of thought" (Rawls, 1971, p. 3). However, as the following chapters demonstrate, justice has a complex and controversial history. If, as has been claimed, justice is a central category of human thought and a central aspect of human motivation, can it also be the case that to invoke justice is no more than "banging on the table: an emotional expression which turns one's demand into an absolute postulate" (Ross, 1959, p. 274)? If justice is the first virtue of social institutions, can the concept of social or economic justice at the same time be "entirely empty and meaningless" so that any attempt to employ it is "either thoughtless or fraudulent" (Hayek, 1976, pp. xi-xii)? In a formal sense, justice concerns ensuring that each person receives what she or he is due.

Ronald L. Cohen Justice is a central moral standard in social life. It is invoked in judging individual persons and in judging the basic structure of societies. It has been described as akin to a "human hunger or thirst" (Pascal, Pensees, cited in Hirschman, 1982, p. 91), "more powerful than any physical hunger, and endlessly resilient" (Pitkin, 1981, p. 349). The most prominent contemporary theory of justice proceeds from the claim that justice is "the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is systems of thought" (Rawls, 1971, p. 3). However, as the following chapters demonstrate, justice has a complex and controversial history. If, as has been claimed, justice is a central category of human thought and a central aspect of human motivation, can it also be the case that to invoke justice is no more than "banging on the table: an emotional expression which turns one's demand into an absolute postulate" (Ross, 1959, p. 274)? If justice is the first virtue of social institutions, can the concept of social or economic justice at the same time be "entirely empty and meaningless" so that any attempt to employ it is "either thoughtless or fraudulent" (Hayek, 1976, pp. xi-xii)? In a formal sense, justice concerns ensuring that each person receives what she or he is due.

From July 16 through July 21, 1984 a group of American and West German scholars met in Marburg, West Germany to discuss their com mon work on the topic of justice in social relations. For over 30 hours they presented papers, raised questions about each other's work, and in so doing plotted a course for future research and theory building on this topic. The participants were asked to present work that represented their most recent state-of-the-science contributions in the area. The con tributions to this volume represent refined versions of those presentations-papers that have been improved by the authors' consid eration of the comments and reactions of their colleagues. The result, we believe, is a work that represents the cutting edge of scholarly inquiry into the important matter of justice in social relations. To give the participants the freedom to present their ideas in the most appropriate way, we, the conference organizers and the editors of this volume, gave them complete control over the form and substance of their presentations. The resulting diversity is reflected in this book, where the reader will find critical integrative reviews of the literature, reports of research investigations, and statements of theoretical posi tions. The chapters are organized with respect to the common themes that emerged in the way the authors addressed the issues of justice in social relations. Each of these themes-conflict and power, theoretical perspectives, norms, and applications-is represented by a part of this book."

The primary purposes of this volume are: 1. To provide mental health practitioners with a current overview of our knowledge about normal parental development during pregnancy and its relation to fetal development, with particular emphasis on the impact of acute and chronic stress on these developmental processes. 2. To provide an understanding of the general state of the field of pregnancy and childbirth care both in conventional health systems and in alternative options. 3. To provide an understanding of models of consultation and liaison that are adapt ed to the special conditions of pregnancy and childbirth care, as contrasted to the more traditional modes that characterize these activities in medical and surgical hospitals. If there prove to be secondary gains as a result of pursuing these goals, so much the better. The most desirable of these would be a heightening of awareness of the mental health needs of "pregnant families" and of the risks they incur in transition from non parenthood to parenthood, and a more effective level of primary and secondary prevention of childhood mental disorders. These latter goals are more global and perhaps even a bit grandiose. Their attainment could only be documented through a series of carefully designed research projects aimed at measuring long-range developmental outcome in children and families who have experienced appropriate and early intervention during the pregnancy period."

In eight chapters by leading researchers, Memory for Action presents our actual knowledge on memory for actions and the opposing explanaions for these phenomena. It gives an overview of the results from laboratory research on action memory and on memory for activities in social contexts, and presents recent results on memory for intended actions. Additionally, these results are put in relation to the information and to the brain modules which are necessary for successful control of actions.