China's rapidly developing military capabilities have forced US policy makers to reconsider their own military infrastructure. The primary concern of this book is to examine how China's military modernisation will be factored into decisions about US Navy programs. Several elements of China's military modernisation have potential implications for future required US Navy capabilities. These include theatre-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly high-power microwave (HPM) devices. This book will examine how these elements and others will influence the future of the United States Navy.

This book examines the burning issues facing today's Navy and Congress. Although rapid progress in aircraft and bombing technology has caused some to question the viability of naval warfare, the role of the navy has actually grown. The Navy is able to move an astonishing amount of firepower to any corner of the globe and once there, project formidable threats or punishing misery on an opposing power. The navy has shown that it can adapt to a new world. The book also includes an important history of the US Navy. Contents: Preface: Unmanned Vehicles for US Naval Forces: Background; Navy LHD-8 Amphibious Assault Ship: Background; Navy Littoral Ship (LCS): Background; Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background; Navy Amphibious Shipbuilding Programs: Background; Navy Zumwalt (DD-21) Class Destroyer Program: Background; Navy DD-21 Land Attack Destroyer Program; Navy DD(X) Future Surface Combatant Program: Background; Navy CVNX Aircraft Carrier Program: Background; Navy Aircraft Carrier Procurement: CVN-77 'Smart Buy' Proposal; Navy New Attack Submarine (NSSN) Program: Is It Affordable?; Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background; The Navy/DARPA Arsenal Ship Program; Ind

The Navy wants to procure three new classes of surface combatants -- the DDG-1000 (formerly DD(X)) destroyer, the CG(X) cruiser, and a smaller surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The Navy wants to procure 7 DDG-1000s, 19 CG(X)s, and 55 LCSs. The first two DDG-1000s are to be procured in FY2007, with each ship being split-funded (i.e., incrementally funded) across FY2007 and FY2008. The estimated cost of each ship is $3,291 million, for a total of $6,582 million. The FY2007 budget requests $2,568 million in procurement funding for the two ships. The Navy estimates that the next three DDG-1000s will cost an average of roughly $2.5 billion each. The Navy wants to procure the first CG(X) in FY2011. The first LCS was procured in FY2005, three more were procured in FY2006, and the Navy's proposed FY2007 budget requests $521 million to procure two additional ships. The Navy's FY2007 unfunded requirements list (URL) -- its "wish list" of items desired but not included in the FY2007 budget -- includes an additional two LCSs for an additional $520 million. The DDG-1000/CG(X) and LCS programs raise several oversight issues for Congress, including the affordability of the DDG-1000/CG(X) program and the acquisition ...

The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget.

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region's future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. On January 12, 2009, the George W. Bush Administration released a presidential directive, called National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25), establishing a new U.S. policy for the Arctic region.

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular plug-and-fight mission packages. The basic version of the LCS, without any mission packages, is referred to as the LCS sea frame. The Navy wants to field a force of 55 LCSs. The first two (LCS-1 and LCS-2) were procured in FY2005 and FY2006 and were commissioned into service on November 8, 2008, and January 16, 2010. Another two (LCS-3 and LCS-4) were procured in FY2009 and are under construction. Two more (LCS-5 and LCS-6) were procured in FY2010. The Navy's FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring 17 more LCSs in annual quantities of 2, 3, 4, 4, and 4. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget requests $1,231.0 million in procurement funding for the two LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2011, and $278.4 million in FY2011 advance procurement funding for the 11 LCSs that the Navy wants to procure in FY2012-FY2014. The Navy's proposed FY2011 budget also requests procurement funding to procure LCS mission packages, LCS module weapons, and research and development funding for the LCS program. There are currently two very different LCS designs--one developed and produced by an industry team led by ...

CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN- 78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 was procured in FY2008. The Navy's proposed FY2013 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,323.2 million (i.e., about $12.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008- FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. The Navy did not request any procurement funding for the ship in FY2012, and is not requesting any procurement funding for the ship in FY2013. The Navy plans to request $449 million in procurement funding in FY2014 and $362 million in procurement funding in FY2015 for the ship to cover $811 million in cost growth on the ship.

The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. On March 28, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. The Navy is conducting a force structure assessment, to be completed later this year, that could lead to a refinement of this 310- 316 ship plan.The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. On March 28, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted to Congress an FY2013 30-year (FY2013-FY2042) shipbuilding plan that includes a new goal for a fleet of about 310-316 ships. The Navy is conducting a force structure assessment, to be completed later this year, that could lead to a refinement of this 310- 316 ship plan.

The Navy's FY2013 budget submission calls for procuring nine Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers in FY2013-FY2017, in annual quantities of 2-1-2-2-2. The five DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013-FY2015, and one of the two scheduled for procurement in FY2016, are to be of the current Flight IIA design. The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting with the second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016. The two DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2017 are also to be of the Flight III design. The Flight III design is to feature a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Navy this year is requesting congressional approval to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for the nine DDG-51s scheduled for procurement in FY2013-FY2017.

Some officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have recently renewed threats to close or exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's threats appear to have been prompted by the likely imposition of new multilateral sanctions targeting Iran's economic lifeline-the export of oil and other energy products. In the past, Iranian leaders have made similar threats and comments when the country's oil exports have been threatened. However, as in the past, the prospect of a major disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait risks damaging Iranian interests. U.S. and allied military capabilities in the region remain formidable. This makes a prolonged outright closure of the Strait appear unlikely. Nevertheless, such threats can and do raise tensions in global energy markets and leave the United States and other global oil consumers to consider the risks of another potential conflict in the Middle East. This report explains Iranian threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and analyzes the implications of some scenarios for potential U.S. or international conflict with Iran. These scenarios include: (1) Outright Closure. An outright closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery of the global oil market, would be an unprecedented disruption of global oil supply and contribute to higher global oil prices. However, at present, this appears to be a low probability event. Were this to occur, it is not likely to be prolonged. It would likely trigger a military response from the United States and others, which could reach beyond simply reestablishing Strait transit. Iran would also alienate countries that currently oppose broader oil sanctions. Iran could become more likely to actually pursue this if few or no countries were willing to import its oil. (2) Harassment and/or Infrastructure Damage. Iran could harass tanker traffic through the Strait through a range of measures without necessarily shutting down all traffic. This took place during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Also, critical energy production and export infrastructure could be damaged as a result of military action by Iran, the United States, or other actors. Harassment or infrastructure damage could contribute to lower exports of oil from the Persian Gulf, greater uncertainty around oil supply, higher shipping costs, and consequently higher oil prices. However, harassment also runs the risk of triggering a military response and alienating Iran's remaining oil customers. (3) Continued Threats. Iranian officials could continue to make threatening statements without taking action. This could still raise energy market tensions and contribute to higher oil prices, though only to the degree that oil market participants take such threats seriously. If an oil disruption does occur, the United States has the option of temporarily offsetting its effects through the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Such action could be coordinated with other countries that hold strategic reserves, as was done with other members of the International Energy Agency after the disruption of Libyan crude supplies in 2011. Iran's threats suggest to many experts that international and multilateral sanctions-and the prospect of additional sanctions-have begun to affect its political and strategic calculations. The threats have been coupled with a publicly announced agreement by Iran to resume talks with six countries on measures that would assure the international community that Iran's nuclear program is used for purely peaceful purposes. Some experts believe that the pressure on Iran's economy, and its agreement to renewed talks, provide the best opportunity in at least two years to reach agreement with Iran on curbing its nuclear program.