China's rapidly developing military capabilities have forced US policy makers to reconsider their own military infrastructure. The primary concern of this book is to examine how China's military modernisation will be factored into decisions about US Navy programs. Several elements of China's military modernisation have potential implications for future required US Navy capabilities. These include theatre-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly high-power microwave (HPM) devices. This book will examine how these elements and others will influence the future of the United States Navy.

This book examines the burning issues facing today's Navy and Congress. Although rapid progress in aircraft and bombing technology has caused some to question the viability of naval warfare, the role of the navy has actually grown. The Navy is able to move an astonishing amount of firepower to any corner of the globe and once there, project formidable threats or punishing misery on an opposing power. The navy has shown that it can adapt to a new world. The book also includes an important history of the US Navy. Contents: Preface: Unmanned Vehicles for US Naval Forces: Background; Navy LHD-8 Amphibious Assault Ship: Background; Navy Littoral Ship (LCS): Background; Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background; Navy Amphibious Shipbuilding Programs: Background; Navy Zumwalt (DD-21) Class Destroyer Program: Background; Navy DD-21 Land Attack Destroyer Program; Navy DD(X) Future Surface Combatant Program: Background; Navy CVNX Aircraft Carrier Program: Background; Navy Aircraft Carrier Procurement: CVN-77 'Smart Buy' Proposal; Navy New Attack Submarine (NSSN) Program: Is It Affordable?; Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background; The Navy/DARPA Arsenal Ship Program; Ind

On 30 November 2001, Northrop Grumman Corporation (NOC) assumed control of Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), bringing to an apparent conclusion a five-year building process of consolidation in the ownership of the six private-sector shipyards that build the Navy's major ships. Following NOC's acquisition of the NNS, the six yards are now owned by two firms-NOC, which owns three of the yards, and General Dynamics Corporation (GD), which owns the other three. The consolidation of these shipyards under two parent firms raises several issues, including potential saving results from consolidation, the potential impact on competition in Navy shipbuilding, the potential impact of shipyard employment levels, and the potential impact of the shipyards and shipbuilding of the political process.

The Navy's FY2011 budget proposes canceling the CG(X) program as unaffordable and instead building an improved version of the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyer called the Flight III version. This report provides background information on the CG(X) program as it existed prior to its proposed cancellation. For further discussion of the proposal to build Flight III DDG-51s in lieu of CG(X)s, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress.

The Navy wants to procure three new classes of surface combatants -- the DDG-1000 (formerly DD(X)) destroyer, the CG(X) cruiser, and a smaller surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The Navy wants to procure 7 DDG-1000s, 19 CG(X)s, and 55 LCSs. The first two DDG-1000s are to be procured in FY2007, with each ship being split-funded (i.e., incrementally funded) across FY2007 and FY2008. The estimated cost of each ship is $3,291 million, for a total of $6,582 million. The FY2007 budget requests $2,568 million in procurement funding for the two ships. The Navy estimates that the next three DDG-1000s will cost an average of roughly $2.5 billion each. The Navy wants to procure the first CG(X) in FY2011. The first LCS was procured in FY2005, three more were procured in FY2006, and the Navy's proposed FY2007 budget requests $521 million to procure two additional ships. The Navy's FY2007 unfunded requirements list (URL) -- its "wish list" of items desired but not included in the FY2007 budget -- includes an additional two LCSs for an additional $520 million. The DDG-1000/CG(X) and LCS programs raise several oversight issues for Congress, including the affordability of the DDG-1000/CG(X) program and the acquisition ...